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Occultic rhetoric, according to Joshua Gunn, is a genre of discourse concerned with 
the study and practice of secret communications. The strategic sharing of secret messages 
involves a host of methods and conventions designed for the selective disclosure of hidden 
knowledge, thus controlling the boundaries of (and accessibility to power between) insider 
and outsider groups. Occultic rhetoric has its uses in everyday encounters, but the abuse of 
such manipulative strategies, especially by those in the academy and other positions of 
power and trust, calls for an ethical response. This dissertation submits occultic rhetoric to 
moral investigation by incorporating the works of Sissela Bok who examined the ethics of 
both secrecy and lying. By applying her principles to case studies of deliberately disguised 
or distorted messages in academic settings, this project suggests an approach for the moral 
exercise of secret communications, otherwise known as an ethics of occultic rhetoric. 
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“Philosophers are notorious for having private vocabularies.” 
—Mortimer Adler (1902-2001) 
 
Occultic rhetoric is a genre of human communication that is of central importance 
to scholars interested in exploring the tensions between clarity and obscurity. One such 
scholar is Joshua Gunn, associate professor of communication studies at the University of 
Texas at Austin, who has fashioned much of his career around studying “the category of 
the ineffable, and in particular, how people use and abuse signs and symbols to negotiate 
ineffability” (Gunn, 2015). Ineffable communication, characterized by much religious and 
poetical discourse, is the kind of communication that goes beyond the power of words to 
tell—to communicate the incommunicable. Gunn recognizes that efforts to engage divine 
mysteries and scientific unknowns have often resulted in language that can be difficult to 
interpret, and which can seem to convey a secretive knowledge that is privy only to those 
who can understand such language. Analysis of the uses and abuses of difficult speech was 
showcased in Gunn’s seminal work Modern Occult Rhetoric (2005) which focused on the 
“occultic” as a central metaphor for the type of secret-wielding rhetoric responsible for the 
creation of insider and outsider groups.  
As the above introductory quote by philosopher Mortimer Adler suggests, the 
jargon or “private vocabularies” of philosophers have a reputation for frustrating audiences 
because of a felt need to “coin new words, or to take some word from common speech and 
make it a technical word” (Adler & Doren, 1972, p. 105). Such difficulties of language, 
while necessary at times for purposes of accuracy, are used in other times for the 
“notorious” purposes of secrecy. By generating an atmosphere of uncertainty and 
confusion through deliberately obscure language, people can pass on secret messages in a 
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variety of exclusive and beguiling ways, the results of which have been used to influence 
or control public beliefs and behaviors. But what are the ethics of such manipulative 
strategies? How is one to ascertain the moral worth of rhetoric as it relates to engagements 
in secrecy and obfuscation? Such inquiries reflect a serious concern over the kind of 
questionable tactics to be found within cryptic forms of communication, exploited not only 
by philosophers, but also by politicians, scientists, gangs, poets, and the military. One 
group particularly adept in such language is the academicians within our colleges. 
Academic discourse has been equally guilty of committing to secretive vocabularies that 




The discriminatory rhetoric of secrecy has been increasingly practiced by modern 
academics in a way that resembles the historical rhetoric of occult practices. The rhetoric 
of the occult is a rhetoric of secrets—the keeping of secrets, as well as the subtle art of 
revealing them. Gunn draws on this connection between the rhetoric of the academy and 
the rhetoric of the occult, for both traditions seem to foster a particular pattern of 
communication that is characterized by mystery, enigma, and obscurity. The occult is 
Gunn’s case study from which he seeks to better understand the difficult language of the 
academy. The academy too often engages in modes of thought and expression that leave 
audiences feeling baffled or excluded, while for others eliciting feelings of insight and 
privilege. Gunn terms this genre of rhetoric the “occultic”—the language of secrecy. The 
occultic is Gunn’s “cool, new term” for the type of language responsible for controlling 
the flow of hidden knowledge and the way it is understood by insiders and outsiders. 
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Occultic rhetoric is “a popular social phenomenon that is currently difficult to capture and, 
consequently, rarely discussed in scholarly literature” (Gunn, 2005, p. xxviii). Part of the 
reason why the occultic is rarely discussed is because it is difficult to define. 
Occultic rhetoric shares in the irony of being occultic itself, for as Gunn admits, 
occultic rhetoric is a concept shrouded in theoretical complexity: “readers expecting a 
direct or definitive definition of the term are likely to be disappointed. To understand 
something as ‘rhetorical’ is to understand it as negotiable, as a contingent and protean 
object that can only be discerned partially and indirectly through case studies” (2005, p. 
xxiii). A “protean object” is a fitting way to describe the heart of occultic rhetoric, for it 
refers to Proteus—the Greek god who could change his shape, readily assuming different 
forms (De Romilly, 1975, p. 28). The philosopher Plato (428-348 BC) once referred to 
sophistic rhetoricians as dangerous magicians because, like Proteus, they could give truth 
different shapes. Such is the case here when dealing with occultic rhetoric which attempts 
to represent (or give shape to) hidden, ineffable truths. The hidden, the protean, the vague, 
the strange, the mysterious and the ineffable are all ways of characterizing occultic 
discourse—the genre of speech and writing that also typifies the rhetoric of academia. 
The academy is a thriving home of dense and dissimulating rhetoric, and there is 
no changing this reality, argues Gunn. The “alterity of language” will always be 
“inevitable”; it is “our ontological plight” (Gunn, 2005, p. 234). Gunn’s only 
recommendation is to exercise humility through mindfulness toward “those whom we 
exclude,” especially those whom we exclude “in here, in the academy” (Gunn, 2005, p. 
234). Besides this, Gunn offers no solutions to the problem of occultic rhetoric. In fact, 
despite the challenges that often accompany it, Gunn ultimately defends occultic rhetoric, 
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and even contends that the ineffable conditions of existence actually prevent the possibility 
for arriving at any solutions. Occultic rhetoric is inevitable, he exclaims, and any pursuit 
to the contrary is likened to running a fool’s errand.  
But need this really be the case? Is there truly nothing we can do to stave off the 
abuses of occultic discourse within higher education? Some scholars disagree. Kevin 
Meyer of Illinois State University, for example, asserts that Gunn leaves the reader 
“longing for an extended discussion” of this topic. In his review of Modern Occult 
Rhetoric, Meyer notes that Gunn “problematizes academic language without offering 
solutions or suggesting approaches to balance better the ability of academic discourse to 
include as well as exclude audiences. Greater attention to strategies for making the 
language of the academy more accessible to those within as well as those outside its walls 
would strengthen Gunn’s argument” (Meyer, 2007, p. 119). Meyer opens a new line of 
inquiry that challenges a central assumption in Gunn’s theoretical work. Might it be 
possible to bring occultic rhetoric into the orbit of moral philosophy to formulate what may 
otherwise constitute an ethics of occultic rhetoric? In light of Meyer’s analysis, this 
dissertation investigates a primary question: How might the scholarship of Sissela Bok offer 
a way to more fully develop the ethical implications of, and solutions for, Joshua Gunn’s 
theory of occultic rhetoric? 
The goal of this project is to expand on Gunn’s thesis by challenging the assertion 
that occultic rhetoric is inevitable, unavoidable, or beyond ethical correction and guidance. 
This project complements Gunn’s scholarship by suggesting an approach from Bok’s 
philosophy of communication, based on her masterful works Lying: Moral Choice in 
Public and Private Life (1978), and Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation 
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(1983). Bok’s treatises on the ethics of secrets and lies are relevant to Gunn’s work by 
virtue of their common investigations into the ways in which secretive or deceitful 
language contributes not only to the allocation of social and political power, but also how 
it bears upon manipulating the formation of insider and outsider groups. Both texts provide 
insights into a variety of concepts broadly underlying Bok’s ethics of deception. Through 
Bok’s scholarship in these areas, one is granted an ethical framework that acts as the ground 
by which practices of occultic rhetoric may be held more accountable, and exercised more 
responsibly, within professional, academic settings. 
This dissertation is a contribution to the field of communication ethics by weaving 
the works of Sissela Bok into the moral domain of communication studies. Her scholarship 
on the subjects of secrecy and lying are significant accomplishments in the ethics of human 
communication, despite her area of expertise falling under philosophy more than that of 
rhetoric. Still, both Sissela Bok and Joshua Gunn share a common concern for 
communication, calling for greater attention to the role of secrecy in human affairs. Gunn, 
who laments the rarity of scholarly discussion on occultic rhetoric, makes clear the need 
for more research in this area. Bok, too, echoes her alarm for “the sheer extent of all we do 
not know about many aspects of secrecy, and the need for careful comparative and 
interdisciplinary studies devoted to them.” She emphasizes: “I was struck by the scope and 
the significance of all that still awaits exploration. At times, the resulting ignorance is 
costly” (Bok, 1989, p. 282). In order to remedy this ignorance, an application of Bok’s 
moral principles into Gunn’s occultic discourse helps to improve our rhetorical 
engagements with others, both inside and outside the academy. 
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I. Chapter I. Literature Review on the Obscurity of Language 
 
 “Most of us need to work hard at being plainspoken. Oddly, achieving a natural 
style takes a lot of effort because of an unconscious tendency toward verbal inflation” 
(Garner, 2009, p. 88). The common tendency to inflate one’s rhetoric is most salient, it 
seems, among those individuals operating within institutional settings. The language of 
institutions, from universities and laboratories to businesses and governments, tend to 
distinguish themselves by embellishing their communication in a tone that rings of 
sophistication, prestige, and authority. But this official-sounding language can be a 
nuisance to human understanding, earning it the apropos label “officialese.” Officialese is 
mostly a derogatory term for language that sounds official, “characterized by bureaucratic 
turgidity and insubstantial fustian; inflated language that could be readily translated into 
simpler terms” (Garner, 2016, p. 648). Related concepts abound, such as computerese, 
pedaguese, airlinese, and commercialese. “Budgetese,” for example, consists of the 
“esoteric or confusing” language involved in the “budget process” (McCutcheon & Mark, 
2014, p. 102). Such terms ending in “ese” are not meant to imply a sense of ease, but rather 
(dis)ease or difficulty—denoting the familiar challenge associated with English-speaking 
people trying to learn Chinese. “The –ese suffix found in officialese and commercialese, 
as in legalese, denotes a caricatured literary style. Other types include academese and 
journalese” (Garner, 2009, p. 88). The drawbacks of officialese, especially the highfalutin 
language of scholars known as ‘academese’, are extant in the university environment. 
Officialese in general, and academese in particular, are characterized by four primary 
attributes: (1) a preference for long sentences over short sentences, (2) a preference for 
complex words over simple words, (3) a preference for vagueness over directness, and (4) 
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a preference for passive voice over active voice, or abstract connectives over concrete 
connectives (Garner, 2016, p. 648).  
American lawyer and lexicographer Bryan A. Garner illustrates such language in 
his dictionary entry of bureaucratese, or what he defines as “the jargon of bureaucrats…a 
type of writing characterized by buried verbs, passive voice, overlong sentences, and loose 
grammar. Add to that an overlay of double-speak and officialese, and you end up with 
bureaucratese at its finest” (Garner, 2016, p. 131). Bureaucratese, like academese and other 
barbarous forms of speech, constitutes a genre of official communication that has 
antecedent roots in the history of officialdom. According to historian Steven Fischer in his 
History of Language (1999), “the stilted language of officialdom is also endemic in every 
nation with writing. ‘Officialese’ in its broadest sense pollutes nearly all ancient Egyptian 
and Mayan monumental inscriptions, as these to a large degree communicate stylistically 
convoluted messages about and from self-aggrandizing central powers” (Fischer, 1999, p. 
193). The surviving official writings of our eldest human civilizations testify to the 
enduring, unconscious tendency toward verbal inflation, the uses of which, while serving 
valuable or sacred purposes, are simultaneously responsible for impeding clarity and 
understanding. Such abuses of communication continue to this day. Consider this modern 
example of standard, bureaucratic language: 
Where particulars of a partnership are disclosed to the Executive Council 
the remuneration of the individual partner for superannuation purposes 
will be deemed to be such proportion of the total remuneration of such 
practitioners as the proportion of his share in partnership profits bears to 
the total proportion of the shares of such practitioner in those profits. 
(Garner, 2009, pp. 119-120) 
 
The impenetrability of official prose, which has been described as “the cancer of 
language” (Gupta, 2003, p. 8) for “debauching reason and feeling” (Fischer, 1999, p. 193), 
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has seeped into every corner of professional and institutional culture. The language of 
officialdom is intended to dazzle or enthuse listeners and readers, thereby suggesting an 
association with professionalism and, by extension, a deserved increase of authority. As 
others have pointed out, “Among the linguistically unsophisticated, puffed up language 
seems more impressive” (Garner, 2016, p. 648). This pretentious quality of official speech 
might also share a common impulse with genteelism, the politically correct use of “words 
and phrases by which insecure people try to raise their social status” (Garner, 2009, p. 88). 
For example, the words “plus-size,” “intellectually disabled,” and “little person” are more 
gentle and refined than the vulgar words “fat,” “retarded,” and “midget.” Thus, genteelisms 
(similar to euphemisms) may act as evasive, ‘polite’ language which can serve to raise 
one’s social or political profile. An additional function of officialese is the creation of 
outsiders by deliberately making content difficult to understand, because “If they cannot 
understand the content, they will either not be interested anymore and look for an 
alternative, or will terminate the search process completely…” (Hoppman, 2010, p. 411). 
By sabotaging or disengaging the general public’s attention via pleonastic, indecipherable 
jargon, bureaucrats can insulate their insider status, immunize themselves from the careful 
scrutiny of others, and foster the development of desired goals and actions without 
hindrance.   
Because of its cultivation of vagueness and obfuscation, officialese has been 
classified as a type of gobbledygook that aids in the purposes of propaganda. Not to be 
confused with the kind of “literary nonsense” typical of Lewis Carroll’s poem 
Jabberwocky, gobbledygook is a legitimate class of nonsense akin to gibberish or 
balderdash—statements made unintelligible by the excessive use of abstruse technical 
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terminology. Gobbledygook overlaps with propaganda by virtue of their common 
dependence on irrationality. According to the late, French intellectual Jacques Ellul, “That 
propaganda has an irrational character is still a well-established and well-recognized truth” 
(Ellul, 1973, p. 84). While there are indeed forms of rational propaganda, Ellul admits, the 
end of propaganda is always irrational because it is ultimately meant to monopolize on our 
feelings, our passions, and our sense of myth. Persuasion accomplished via irrational, 
distracting, or nonsensical language is not uncommon. For example, the statement “High-
quality learning environments are a necessary precondition for facilitation and 
enhancement of the ongoing learning process” is official, bureaucratic jargon for “Children 
need good schools if they are to learn properly” (Fisher, 1999, pp. 193-194). Such official-
sounding gobbledygook, while it can indeed persuade by veering into the practically 
nonsensical, need not always flourish so excessively. Sometimes it will appear more 
tempered, restrained, or genteel, able to lighten the intensity of certain ideas with the use 
of more palatable verbiage. For example, in times of war, Steven Fischer reports how 
officialese typically softened the sins of various governments.  
Adolf Hitler's Endlӧsung or ‘Final Solution’ chillingly cloaked an order 
for the mass murder of Europe's Jews. In the USA's Vietnam war, the 
expressions ‘to take someone out’ and ‘sanitize’ replaced ‘kill’ and 
‘murder’. Even at the end of the twentieth century, after the Cold War, 
the Pentagon was still calling bombs ‘vertically deployed anti-personnel 
devices’. Human deaths are ‘body counts’. Many believe linguistic 
sanitization is necessary, as it enables humans to perform inhuman acts. 
(Fischer, 1999, p. 192) 
 
The sanitization of official rhetoric seems to excuse ethically questionable behavior 
by burying the convictions of our conscience under jargon. In fact, the effects of such 
language today have gone to such extremes that even “countless occupational titles have 
received nearly incomprehensible reincarnations” (Fischer, 1999, p. 193). Regular titles, 
such as undertaker or mortician, have been changed to funeral director and then to 
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bereavement care expert. Other common titles, like caretaker or janitor, are now exchanged 
for sanitary engineer. Even military officers have picked up on this trend by referring to 
their fallen comrades as ICPs, otherwise known as Impaired Combatant Personnel. So 
offended was Winston Churchill (1874-1965) by the use of this term in the second World 
War that he denounced an American colonel: “Never let me hear that detestable phrase 
again. …If you are talking about British troops, you will refer to them as ‘wounded 
soldiers’” (Fisher, 1999, p. 193). The ability of official-sounding language to impede 
accuracy, debilitate interest, obstruct understanding, mitigate intensity, and conceal facts 
has been the source of much controversy inside and outside the institutions that employ it.  
Legal institutions, for example, are acutely aware of the problem of verbosity in 
matters concerning the law, a sickness of judicial language often described as abstractitis. 
Abstractitis is a “term for writing that is so abstract and obtuse (hence the portmanteau 
abstruse) that the writer does not even know what he or she is trying to say” (Garner, 2016, 
p. 10). This is particularly disconcerting for interpreters of the law because, as legal scholar 
Fred Rodell points out, our interpretations of legal code—which usually deal with long, 
vague, and fuzzy words—have real, widespread consequences on the rights, freedoms and 
protections of people’s daily lives (Garner, 2016, p. 11). Consider the following example 
of obscure, legal jargon: “The message of this article is simple and straightforward: If you 
represent non-integrated provider-controlled contracting networks purporting to operate as 
messenger arrangements but which in actuality are fixing prices, the time has come to fix 
them so they comply with section 1 of the Sherman Act.” If there is anything clear about 
this excerpt, it is only that it rots with abstractitis—its claim to clarity notwithstanding. 
“Now try rereading it slowly to see if you can make out any glimmer of a point,” chortles 
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Bryan Garner. “Guess what. The healthcare lawyers who sent it to me as an example of 
poor prose didn’t understand it either” (Garner, 2016, p. 644). 
Forms of indecipherable, judicial rhetoric (legalese) can similarly manifest in other 
contexts, particularly in academic discourse also known as academese. Academese is “the 
style typical of scholarly writing; esp., a mode of discourse that typifies the least appealing 
qualities of academic writing, namely, obscurity, pedantry, and pomposity. Academese is 
characteristic of academicians who are writing for a highly specialized but limited 
audience, or who have a limited grasp of how to make their arguments clearly and 
succinctly” (Garner, 2016, p. 985). One renowned scholar fluent in the pompous rhetoric 
of academe is Judith Butler, a feminist philosopher and gender theorist, whose writings 
have been castigated for their dense and casual mode of theoretical allusions and hermetic 
wordplay. “It is difficult to come to grips with Butler's ideas, because it is difficult to figure 
out what they are,” chides fellow philosopher and critic, Martha Nussbaum. “Butler is a 
very smart person. ...Her written style, however, is ponderous and obscure” (Nussbaum, 
1999, p. 2). Through professionalized jargon, Butler has procured a specialized field for 
herself, asserting her claims to special expertise, recognition, and privilege. The convoluted 
language of postmodern scholarship in general, however meaningless, gathers followers, 
creates insiders and outsiders, and renews the demand for esoteric texts. Consider this 
legendary example of academese by the literary theorist Geoffrey Hartman: 
Because of the equivocal echo-nature of language, even identities or 
homophones sound on:  the sound of Sa is knotted with that of ҫa, as if 
the text were signaling its intention to bring Hegel, Saussure, and Freud 
together.  Ҫa corresponds to the Freudian Id (“Es”); and it may be that 
our only “savoir absolu” is that of a ҫa structured like the Sa-
significant:  a bacchic or Lacanian “primal process” where only 
signifier-signifying signifiers exist. (Hartman, 1984, pp. 60-61) 
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Conservative intellectual, Dinesh D’Souza, not only finds Hartman’s pomposity 
“amusing,” but he remarks that these academicians have invented a new form of “literary 
consumerism”—a sophisticated “interpretation industry” that supplies these critics with 
“large salaries and lavish lifestyles,” allowing them to exist as “the richest Marxists in the 
country” (D’Souza, 1991, p. 181). By appearing profound and sounding complicated, 
postmodernist and deconstructionist writers have bewitched tens of thousands of 
impressionable graduate students with their incoherent verbosity (D’Souza, 2002, pp. 107-
108). University departments no longer proffer the clear exposition of truth and knowledge, 
but rather mysticism and interpretation. In fact, “Things have gotten so bad in some fields 
that even the experts sometimes can’t distinguish brilliance from gibberish” (Garner, 2016, 
p. 643). Such rampant abuse of the jargon and subtexts used in the liberal arts and soft 
sciences eventually summoned the consternation of one particular scientist who recently 
went down in history for orchestrating an elaborate ruse that would test the merit of these 
indiscernible vocabularies: his name was Alan Sokal.  
 
Section I.1: Notable Examples on the Obscurity of Language   
 
The Sokal Affair of 1996 is named after the contemporary physicist and 
mathematician Alan Sokal who played a public prank on the editors of the postmodern 
cultural studies journal Social Text (published by Duke University) in his attempt to prove 
the mystification and declining standards of understandability in certain sectors of the 
humanities. The social sciences in particular have long been recognized to “contain a large 
amount of conspicuously poor writing, which is now under growing attack” (Weaver, 1953, 
p. 187), and few have been as effective as Alan Sokal in exposing this scandalous trend in 
recent times. To test his theory, Sokal composed a grand-sounding article designed to 
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flatter the editors’ values, titled “Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative 
Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity” (Sokal, 1996a), under which he attempted to advance 
the claim that quantum gravity implicitly supported leftwing politics and the goals of other 
progressivist ideals. The parody essay cobbled together a smorgasbord of citations and 
theories and bizarre-sounding language, employed with such colorful phrases like “In 
mathematical terms, Derrida’s observation relates to the invariance of the Einstein field 
equation Gμ=8π GTμv under nonlinear space-time diffeomorphisms (self-mappings of the 
space-time manifold that are infinitely differentiable but not necessarily analytics)” (Sokal, 
1996a, p. 222). The paper was eventually accepted for publication, and, to the chagrin of 
cultural studies departments around the world, Sokal took to admitting the hoax in the 
journal Lingua Franca (Sokal, 1996b) where he admitted that “Nowhere in all of this is 
there anything resembling a logical sequence of thought; one finds only citations of 
authority, plays on words, strained analogies, and bald assertions” (Sokal, 1996b, p. 3). 
The exposé article erupted a firestorm of controversy, setting off national debates 
that still rage on today: “Are scholars in the humanities trapped in a jargon-ridden 
Wonderland? Are scientists deluded in thinking their work is objective? Are literature 
professors suffering from science envy? Was Sokal’s joke funny? Was the Enlightenment 
such a bad thing after all? And isn’t it a little bit true that the meaning of gravity is 
contingent upon your cultural perspective?” (Editors of Lingua Franca, 2000). To his 
credit, Sokal was careful enough to admit that his experiment did not necessarily prove that 
all of cultural studies was nonsense: “It proves only that the editors of one rather marginal 
journal were derelict in their intellectual duty, by publishing an article on quantum physics 
that they admit they could not understand…” (Sokal, 2008, p. 152). Nevertheless, the affair 
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still sparked “a years-long conversation on academic jargon and the (ir)relevance of critical 
and cultural studies to the academy” (Gunn, 2005, p. 233), a conversation which seems to 
have shaped much of the subsequent projects undertaken in Sokal’s later professional 
career. Shortly thereafter, in his text Fashionable Nonsense (1999), Sokal took to exposing 
at large the abuse of scientific concepts used by postmodern thinkers to bolster their 
arguments and theories, critiquing the likes of Jacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray, 
Bruno Latour, Jean Baudrillard, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, and Paul Virilio among 
others. In his follow up text Beyond the Hoax (2008), Sokal continued with this theme, 
further unmasking the charlatanism of postmodernist academicians, especially the 
legislators, religious fundamentalists, and pseudoscientists who exploit rhetorical 
gymnastics to misappropriate, if not purely befuddle, scientific concepts for their own 
political ends. 
Following in Sokal’s footsteps have been other attempts at discrediting the deluge 
of academic gobbledygook spewing from humanities and social science departments, such 
as the notoriously published research article “The Conceptual Penis as a Social Construct” 
(2017) written fictitiously by “Peter Boyle, Ed.D.” and “Jamie Lindsay, Ph.D.” in the peer-
reviewed journal Cogent Social Sciences. The only problem with the article was that it was 
anything but cogent. In fact, its authors—later revealed to be philosopher Peter Boghossian 
and mathematician James Lindsay—admitted to have deliberately crafted the article as 
pure balderdash, heavy on citations and official sounding language. In the paper, by way 
of “detailed poststructuralist discursive criticism” (whatever that means, they confess), the 
authors argued that the penis, understood as the male sexual organ, is an “incoherent” and 
“damaging social trope” which should be “better understood not as an anatomical organ 
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but as a social construct isomorphic to performative toxic masculinity” (Boyle & Lindsay, 
2017, p. 1). The central claim of the article, including the language that ushered it, was 
admittedly “preposterous,” and several weeks after its acceptance to the journal the authors 
turned to Skeptic.com, the online wing of Skeptic Magazine, where they announced the 
article to be a “Sokal-Style Hoax on Gender Studies” (Boghossian & Lindsay, 2017). 
According to them, the whole paper consisted of “3,000 words of utter nonsense posing as 
academic scholarship. Then a peer-reviewed academic journal in the social sciences 
accepted and published it” (Boghossian & Lindsay, 2017). 
The controversy drew the attention of Alan Sokal himself who offered his own 
review on the satirical piece, finding it “both amusing and instructive” even though he 
quibbled with the overreach of some of its implications and conclusions (Sokal, 2017). In 
fact, many of the concerns raised by the article mirrored those that emerged from the Sokal 
affair itself, where the stunt was “seen either as a brilliant tactic to expose the shallowness 
of current humanist commentaries or as a heinous breach of academic trust, depending 
from which side of the ‘science wars’ the comment came” (Gregory & Miller, 1998, p. 79). 
Detractors of the “Conceptual Penis” spoof issued various criticisms: that Cogent Social 
Sciences was a “vanity journal” of “low quality”; that hoaxes “prove nothing”; and that the 
article transpired from “sexist” or “ideological” motivations, among other attacks. Even 
though the authors rebutted these claims and many more in their rejoinder “Cogent 
Criticisms” (Lindsay & Boghossian, 2017), the overall conclusion of their project seemed 
undeniable—namely, that the credibility of the peer review process suffered from two 
fundamental diseases: (1) “the echo-chamber of morally driven fashionable nonsense 
coming out of the postmodernist social ‘sciences’…” and (2) “the complex problem of pay-
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to-publish journals with lax standards that cash in on the ultra-competitive publish-or-
perish academic environment” (Boghossian & Lindsay, 2017). In other words, by lacing 
the article with rhetorically pretentious virtue-signaling that flattered leftist moral 
sentiments, combined with the pay-to-publish conditions that favor profit over academic 
quality, the authors concluded that: “At least one of these sicknesses led to [the article] 
being published as a legitimate piece of academic scholarship, and we can expect 
proponents of each to lay primary blame upon the other” (Boghossian & Lindsay, 2017). 
The proliferation of open-access academic journals has become, over the past 
decade, a nearly universal problem for all disciplines, given that they incentivize a conflict 
of interests. To put it succinctly, “the profit motive is dangerous because ethics are 
expensive” (Boghossian & Lindsay, 2017). Journals have an ethical obligation to maintain 
high scholarly standards that aid in the circulation of accurate information. Without a moral 
adherence to this obligation, or should the quality of these standards be compromised, 
journals are reduced to nothing more than predatory money-mills which serve only to 
distribute nonsense or propaganda (or both, sometimes not always being mutually 
exclusive). The term “predatory publishers” was coined by American librarian Jeffrey 
Beall to describe a business model for publishing, whereby journals promise potential 
authors quick peer review of their manuscripts, attached of course with a substantial fee 
for the publication process (Butler, 2013). Looking to the Committee on Publication Ethics 
(COPE), Beall has provided a criterion for discerning between reliable and fraudulent 
venues (Beall, 2015), including having amassed an online archive of several hundred 
entries for “predatory journals and publishers” (Beall, 2016). Philosopher and editor of 
Skeptic Magazine, Michael Shermer, remarked that his ultimate decision to publish the 
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“Conceptual Penis” exposé was determined primarily by his sympathy for “the 
overwhelming amount of work it takes to produce quality publication, particularly when 
the remunerative rewards are so low for most writers and editors” (Sokal, 2017). Because 
the market infrastructure of pay-to-publish journals fosters sacrificing academic integrity 
to the golden calf of careerism, “the dynamics of open access is clear: the pay-to-publish 
model permits the existence of very-low-tier academic journals that on the traditional 
publishing model would fail to attract enough paid subscriptions to survive” (Sokal, 2017).  
Michael Shermer is not alone in his sympathy for writers and editors. The senior 
editor of Precision Scientific Editing, John H. McCool, has “a strong antipathy for 
predatory journals,” particularly the MedCrave Group’s Urology & Nephrology Open 
Access Journal which he sought to expose last year as a fraudulent academic press by 
submitting a fictitious case report based entirely on the plot of a classic 1991 Seinfeld 
episode “The Parking Garage”—a skit where “Jerry Seinfeld can’t find his car in a mall 
lot, has to urinate, does so against a garage wall, is caught by a security guard, and tries to 
get out of a citation by claiming that he suffers from a condition called uromycitisis. 
Seinfeld argued that, due to his illness, he could die if he doesn’t relieve himself when he 
feels the urge” (McCool, 2017). Going under the pseudonym “Dr. Martin Van Nostrand”—
an alter ego of one of the main characters—McCool purported in his article that 
“uromycitisis is…caused by prolonged failure to evacuate the contents of the bladder and 
can result in a serious infection of the lower urinary tract known as ‘uromycitisis 
poisoning,’ which, if untreated, can cause acute renal failure and has an associated high 
mortality” (Nostrand, et al., 2017, p. 1). It did not seem to matter that uromycitisis was a 
phony condition, nor the fact that the article was brimming with dozens of Seinfeld 
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allusions, from show-inspired coauthors to made-up scenarios and references. Three days 
after his submission, McCool was informed that this peer-reviewed journal (with an alleged 
focus on the science of urology) had accepted his paper for publication—to the tune of 
$799.00. “I have no intention of paying the requested fee,” reported McCool to The 
Scientist. “My short-term goal is to expose MedCrave as a publisher that will print fiction, 
for a price. My long-term goal—an ambitious one, I know—is to stop the production of 
predatory journals altogether” (McCool, 2017). Even the fact-checking research website of 
urban legends, Snopes.com, contacted the MedCrave publishing group and the editors of 
the journal to request an explanation for how this fabrication passed through their peer 
review process. “We have yet to receive a response,” Snopes reported (Kasprak, 2017). 
Perhaps the most astonishing example illustrating the depth to which open-access 
standards have sunken come from a remarkable paper titled “Get Me Off Your Fucking 
Mailing List” which was accepted for publication in 2014 to the deceptive vanity press 
International Journal of Advanced Computer Technology, a known predatory journal of 
little scholarly value. First, a little historical context: the paper was originally written in 
2005 by American researchers David Mazières and Eddie Kohler to protest a bogus 
conference—the 9th World Multiconference on Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics 
(WMSCI)—which was notorious for its spamming and low quality standards for paper 
acceptance. From the title of the article, to the abstract, to the introduction, body, and 
conclusion, including the graphs and figures in between, the entire document consisted of 
the exact same seven words—“get me off your fucking mailing list”—in repeat from start 
to finish (Mazières & Kohler, 2005). However, coming up to speed now several years later, 
the Australian computer scientist, Peter Vamplew, was being barraged by dozens of 
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unsolicited emails from a dubious publisher, The International Journal of Advanced 
Computer Technology. In response, Vamplew took to forwarding the humorous 
Mazières/Kohler article of 2005 as a submission to the journal, expecting the editors would 
either read it or ignore it, but at best would take him off their mailing list. But to Vamplew’s 
surprise, 
“It was accepted for publication. I pretty much fell off my chair.” In line 
with the highest academic standards, Get Me Off Your Fucking Mailing 
List had been subjected to rigorous, anonymous peer review. “They told 
me to add some more recent references and do a bit of reformatting…But 
otherwise they said its suitability for the journal was excellent.” 
Vamplew was required to pay a $150 fee to have the paper published, 
but he declined. The scheme has earned Vamplew some online 
recognition, but sadly his main aim remains unfulfilled. “They still 
haven’t taken me off their mailing list,” he said. The editors of the journal 
have been contacted for comment. (Safi, 2014). 
 
Unlike the three previous hoaxes which more or less manipulated the peer review 
process through rhetorical obscurity, pandering, and pure fiction, this particular hoax 
(which was not really a hoax at all) reveals an alarming depth to the problem of open-
access journals: that the content of submitted literature, intelligible or not, factual or not, 
can sometimes have little to no bearing on the publication process altogether. What this 
unique case demonstrates is a grotesque negligence on the part of referees and editors to 
safeguard the separation of genuine knowledge from genuine nonsense. “To qualify as true 
peer review,” writes Marcel Lafollette, “a process must contain some possibility of 
rejection” (LaFollette, 1992, p. 119). But that possibility did not exist here. If the incentive 
of pay-to-publish journals have proven anything, at least with respect to this specific case, 
it is that they pay only lip service to the review criteria and procedures, making virtually 
no effort to reject or discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate work. Such 
conditions threaten the authority and credibility of real, sincere scholarship which the peer 
review process is intended to protect and promote. Of course, one must concede that “peer 
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review is neither uniform nor totally reliable nor intended as a fraud detection mechanism. 
Its principal goal—and perhaps what should be its only goal—is to evaluate manuscripts 
according to whether they should be accepted or rejected, not determine their authenticity” 
(LaFollette, 1992, p. 119). This is because the relationship between author and journal is 
collaborative, based on trust and good faith. A slacken approach on either end of their 
professional obligations would render the potential ruin of both. 
The seemingly preprogrammed function of open-access journals to rush otherwise 
incoherent material into publication without peer review appears practically as 
sophisticated as the very software programs capable of generating such incoherent material 
to begin with. By this, of course, is meant the “Postmodernism Generator,” a website coded 
by Andrew C. Bulhak of Monash University in 1996 which algorithmically generates 
imitations of postmodernist writing with every new reloading of the webpage (Bulhak & 
Larios, 2000). Like other parody generators, it organizes arbitrary words and phrases into 
convincing prose, mostly meaningless, often in the style of a technical paper or particular 
writer. For example, in .02 seconds, the postmodernism generator now produced a never-
before-seen article, in this case, “Marxist Socialism and Lyotardist Narrative” by “D. Jane 
Bailey” from the “Department of Literature, MIT.” Here is a sample of professor Bailey’s 
scholarly project: “Thus, the subject is contextualized into subcultural dialectic theory that 
includes truth as a reality. Lyotard uses the term ‘the capitalist paradigm of narrative’ to 
denote a self-referential whole, but in the works of Gibson, a predominant attack of the 
status quo is the concept of pre-cultural consciousness.” A rather insightful argument, one 
might say. And the essay continues for twenty-five more paragraphs of eloquent, 
syntactically correct nonsense, complete with endnotes. The Postmodernism Generator 
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uses the Dada Engine to produce random text based on a formal grammar, the rules of 
which are defined by a recursive transition network (Bulhak, 1996). Several of the 
referenced works in the first two hoaxes previously explained were directly lifted and cited 
from the articles here produced by the Postmodernism Generator.  
Given now the existence of such technology, one can assume that it was only a 
matter of time before a predatory journal would accept a paper for publication despite it 
being nothing more than an obvious, computer-generated word salad. In 2016, associate 
professor Christoph Bartneck at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand received an 
email inviting him to submit a paper to the International Conference on Atomic and 
Nuclear Physics. “Since I have practically no knowledge of nuclear physics I resorted to 
iOS autocomplete function to help me writing the paper. I started a sentence with ‘atomic’ 
or ‘nuclear’ and then randomly hit the autocomplete suggestions” (Bartneck, 2016). This 
is evident in the very title of the paper, “Atomic energy will have been made available to a 
single source,” as the rest of the abstract reads as mere gibberish: “Atomic Physics and I 
shall not have the same problem with a separate section for a very long long way. Nuclear 
weapons will not have to come out the same day after a long time of the year he added the 
two sides will have the two leaders to take the same way to bring up to their long ways of 
the same as they will have been a good place for a good time at home the united front and 
she is a great place for a good time” (Pear, 2016, p. 1). The iOS autocomplete function 
worked accordingly. “The text really does not make any sense” (Bartneck, 2016). Using 
the alias “Dr. Iris Pear”—a subtle nod to “Siri” and “Apple”—Bartneck submitted his 
paper, which was accepted for publication only three hours later. “I know that iOS is a 
pretty good software, but reaching tenure has never been this close” (Bartneck, 2016). 
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Although he did not have to pay money to submit the paper, he was invited to register as 
an academic speaker for the conference in Georgia at the cost of US$1,099.00. “I did not 
complete this step since my university would certainly object to me wasting money this 
way,” Bartneck replied (Hunt, 2016). 
While the iOS autocomplete function is self-evidently less coherent than the 
preformatted ramblings of the Postmodernism Generator, it may escape the attention of 
many scientists that scientific communication itself is not always clear either. The 
Computer Science Generator (i.e., SCIgen) attests to that fact. Like the Postmodernism 
Generator, SCIgen also plays on the random assemblage of texts in the form of computer 
science research papers. Its purpose is “to maximize amusement, rather than coherence,” 
according to its authors Jeremy Stribling, Daniel Aguayo, and Maxwell Krohn (“SCIgen—
An Automatic”). In 2005, while graduates at MIT, Stribling, Aguayo, and Krohn sought to 
protest the very same fraudulent conference as David Mazières and Eddie Kohler (cf. the 
“Get Me Off Your Fucking Mailing List” article) by submitting a spurious paper fabricated 
by the SCIgen program, titled “Rooter: A Methodology for the Typical Unification of 
Access Points and Redundancy.” Consider this compelling abstract: “Many physicists 
would agree that, had it not been for congestion control, the evaluation of web browsers 
might never have occurred. In fact, few hackers worldwide would disagree with the 
essential unification of voice-over-IP and public/private key pair. In order to solve this 
riddle, we confirm that SMPs can be made stochastic, cacheable, and interposable” 
(Stribling, Aguayo, & Krohn, 2005, p. 1). The article’s impressive technobabble—or in 
this case computerese—is comparable to the convoluted academese of the Postmodernism 
Generator. Indeed, the aim of the SCIgen project was to maximize amusement “by aping 
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the jargon of the less illustrious papers in computer science. But they also had a more 
serious goal: to test whether such meaningless manuscripts could pass the screening 
procedure for conferences that, they feel, exist simply to make money” (Ball, 2005). The 
paper was accepted to the conference, albeit without peer review, but was later withdrawn 
after being notified by the authors it was a fraud. Not much has improved after this incident, 
considering that “more than 120 papers” have since been discovered to be nothing more 
than “computer-generated nonsense” (Noorden, 2014). The extent of the fraudulence 
taking place within scholarly, particularly scientific, disciplines points to a double standard 
that reveals a need to reexamine the relationship between science and rhetorical obscurity. 
 
Section I.2: Challenges within Scientific & Postmodern Rhetoric  
 
From the algorithmically random generation of official-sounding texts, to the 
seemingly unmanned marketing system of open access, pay-to-publish journals, computer 
technology has certainly added another layer of moral and intellectual complexity to the 
ethics of the publication industry. But while these technological influences present new 
challenges to the security of legitimate scholarship, the enduring problem of all academic 
disciplines, from the sciences to the humanities, continues to be one of language or style, 
particularly the reality of confusing, specialized jargon engendered by our unconscious 
tendency toward verbal inflation. Science is no stranger to jargon, for jargon refers to a 
particular nomenclature or shoptalk, “the special, unusually technical idiom of any social, 
occupational, or professional group,” writes Garner. This “idiom,” or discipline-specific 
terminology, “arises from the need to streamline communication, to save time and space,” 
but also inadvertently tends to “conceal meaning from the uninitiated” (Garner, 2016, p. 
535). Hence, jargon’s advantage is also its own disadvantage. The celebrated physicist 
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Richard Feynman (1918-1988) alludes to the paradox of jargon in his confession: “Hell, if 
I could explain it to the average person, it wouldn’t have been worth the Nobel Prize” (Dye, 
1988). Postmodernists, it would seem, are not alone in their use of official, technical-
sounding rhetoric, for the need of precision and shorthand is an omni-disciplinary 
condition. In fact, the paradox of jargon greatly concerned various scientists, particularly 
the 20th century’s greatest physicist Albert Einstein (1879-1955) who strove for simplicity 
in his scientific work. He quipped, “Most of the fundamental ideas of science are 
essentially simple, and may, as a rule, be expressed in a language comprehensible to 
everyone” (Einstein, 1966, p. 27). Simplicity of language is a virtue worth striving for, 
primarily because human thought—its conception, expression, and reception—is indebted 
to the quality of our speech. But while simplicity is indeed a rhetorical ideal, simplification 
is ironically no simple task. 
Simplifying is a higher intellectual attainment than complexifying. 
Writing simply and directly is hard work, and professionals ought to set 
this challenge for themselves. In fact, the hallmark of all the greatest 
stylists is precisely that they have taken difficult ideas and expressed 
them as simply as possible. No nonprofessional could do it, and most 
specialists can’t do it. Only extraordinary minds are capable of the task. 
Still, every writer—brilliant or not—can aim at the mark” (Garner, 2016, 
p. 698) 
 
Explaining science clearly and concisely is a rhetorical skill not possessed by all, 
but which has become increasingly necessary in modern times, prompting the cultivation 
of the public understanding of science, a field that emerged precisely due to the technical 
jargon that typifies the manifold of scientific discourse. In their text Science in Public: 
Communication, Culture, and Credibility (1998), communication scholars Jane Gregory 
and Steve Miller explain that while previous generations may have believed that good 
science should be “generally unintelligible to all but an elite,” the newer generations “are 
being coached in communication skills to equip them for talking intelligibly to the outside 
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world” (Gregory & Miller, 1998, p. 1). Implicit within the idea of the public understanding 
of science is the tension between insiders and outsiders—those who have understanding, 
and those who lack it. Hence, the public understanding of science recognizes that the 
insider-outsider binary is a rhetorically constructed phenomenon that can only be overcome 
by rhetoric itself—in other words, by translating the scientists’ (insider) jargon in a 
language that the public (outsiders) can understand. Take medical jargon, for example, 
where a black eye might be referred to as “bilateral periorbital ecchymosis,” a sneeze as 
“sternutation,” a cut as “laceration,” a boil as “furuncule,” heartburn as “pyrosis,” a kidney 
stone as “renal calculus,” a headache as “cephalalgia,” and vomiting as “emesis.” Even the 
practice of heart bypass surgery can be jargonized through technical length, e.g., “coronary 
artery bypass graft”, through abbreviation, e.g., “CABG” (pronounced cabbage), or 
through the downright pompously arcane, e.g., “myocardial revascularization” (Garner, 
2016, pp. 535-536).  
Still, jargon constitutes a useful, shorthand system for scientists to present ideas to 
each other, even though such linguistic conveniences “would ordinarily need explaining in 
other, more roundabout ways for those outside the specialty. Jargon thus has a strong in-
group property, which is acceptable when one specialist talks with another. But at other 
times, jargon is no time-saver at all. It can be obtuse and actually inhibit communications” 
(Garner, 2016, p. 536). While avoiding obtuse language is one way to remedy this problem 
in science communication, it can also be, at times, an insufficient solution. In other words, 
the quality of intelligible words might fail to achieve understanding if the quantity of our 
words grows into long, superfluous proportions. Sometimes too much attention to the 
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tangential aspects, at the expense of those more central, can equally inhibit science 
communication and understanding. 
…Excessive treatment of details often leads either to this substantive 
emptiness or to a self-defeating accuracy, in which it’s difficult for the 
reader to discern the major points because of the cascading minutiae. In 
writing of this kind, sentences are often so heavily qualified that they 
become unreadable. …“In one case out of a hundred a point is 
excessively discussed because it is obscure; in the ninety-nine remaining 
it is obscure because it is excessively discussed.” (Garner, 2016, pp. 643-
4). 
 
Because scientific jargon (and jargon in general) is a paradox that enables 
understanding as much as it encumbers it, the public understanding of science works to 
preserve jargon’s efficiencies while also hurdling its deficiencies. Strictly speaking, the 
public understanding of science acts as an ongoing, rhetorically motivated commitment to 
the advancement of scientific literacy—for experts to engage, communicate with, and 
translate knowledge for the public. Figures like Bill Nye “The Science Guy” is a poster 
child of this mission, and the same can be said of contemporary physicist and host of the 
Cosmos science-television series Neil deGrasse Tyson. Even one of today’s most fervent 
exponents of science education, particularly in his defense of Darwin’s theory of biological 
evolution, is the British zoologist Richard Dawkins who held the Charles Simonyi Chair 
for the Public Understanding of Science at Oxford University from 1995-2008, and who 
was himself inspired by the great science popularizer Carl Sagan (1934-1996). The public 
understanding of science testifies to the fact that while it may be (deservedly) easy for 
scientists to crack down on the circumlocutions of postmodern academic discourse, 
scientists themselves risk hypocrisy when scientific communication is neither a consistent 
paragon of rhetorical clarity. “Scientists talk funny!” admits Nobel Prize winning 
physiologist Peter Dougherty. “I do not mean by this the specialist jargon that is peculiar 
to any research discipline. Where many scientists go wrong in the public arena is to use 
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words like ‘abrogate,’ ‘quantify,’ ‘activate,’ ‘deduce,’ ‘elucidate,’ and ‘modulate.’ The 
words are Standard English, but many people will never say them” (Dougherty, 2001, p. 
272). Of course the problem of specialist jargon is common to all disciplines, the arts and 
sciences; but far from being an exclusively postmodern tendency, even scientists engage 
in their own forms of recondite prose. Curiously, however, what we also discover here in 
Dougherty’s admission is an important nuance about the nature of jargon, one which 
deserves special attention—the difference between jargon as technical language, and 
jargon as rhetorical style. 
The use of jargon as technical language is “hardly the exclusive province of such 
fields as medicine or law… It can be found in virtually any other specialized field, such as 
social work… healthcare… statistics… engineering… investments… business and 
management… computing,” and even “linguistics” (Garner, 2016, p. 536). Jargon as 
technical language, also known as ‘industry terminology,’ are words with a particular 
meaning within a specific industry, discipline, or field, and which serves the need to discuss 
themes on various registers of meaning, ranging from subtle  nuances to wide and general 
ideas. Technical language is a rhetorical need, a construct necessary for the purposes of 
precision, efficiency of communication, and “specialization,” the “narrowing of a word’s 
meaning over time” (Garner, 2016, p. 1029). Not only is technical language an agent of 
specialization and accuracy, but also of brevity—words which facilitate the exchange of 
ideas between insiders rapidly or concisely, able to leap over large and complex 
conversations in a single term or phrase. The nature of this kind of jargon is as useful as it 
is unavoidably troublesome, for while the development of a complex class of concepts and 
signifiers are unique to a particular audience who knows and speaks that language, anyone 
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outside that community, without the knowledge to understand it, must inevitably suffer 
confusion, risk misinterpretation, and/or persist in utter rhetorical disorientation.  
Compare this, though, with jargon as rhetorical style, where it is not about the 
fact of specialized language so much as it is about the manner of it. In other words, jargon 
as rhetorical style emphasizes how ideas in general are expressed, whether specialized or 
otherwise, implying an artistic effort on the part of speakers and writers who must discern 
for themselves what words, what sentence structure, and what rhetorical schemes are 
favorable in a given context. In fact, the Greek word for style was lexis, meaning “words”—
the root term for ‘lexicon’ (i.e., dictionary). The relationship between style and jargon 
depends on an individual’s judicious selectivity of certain words to fit the setting—the less 
fitting, the less intelligible (and therefore more jargonistic) it may sound. Unlike jargon as 
technical language which aids brevity, jargon as rhetorical style aids lucidity. Lucidity, or 
clarity of meaning, is the ultimate virtue of style, for “The best style is one that is clear 
without being vulgar,” noted Aristotle in his Poetics (2013, p. 45). Because rhetorical style 
is concerned with how to convey meaning both effectively and beautifully, communication 
can employ variant degrees of jargon depending, of course, on its appropriateness for the 
occasion. Without a mastery of style, Quintilian argued, “all the preliminary 
accomplishments of rhetoric are as useless as a sword that is kept permanently concealed 
within its sheath” (Institutes of Oratory, VIII.1.15). Hence, style is as much the rules 
governing jargon as it is the jargon itself. This is certainly true whenever one decries the 
corruption of style, when rhetorical virtue devolves into rhetorical vice, and the light of 
clarity and simplicity is all-at-once eclipsed by the waxing cover of opacity and 
complexity. As Aristotle observed, “the use of exotic expressions—foreign words, 
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metaphor, lengthening, and anything else of out of the ordinary—makes a style solemn and 
elevated beyond the norm. But if you compose entirely in this style, the result will be either 
paradox or gibberish—paradox if made up entirely of metaphor, gibberish if made up of 
foreign words” (Poetics, 1458a.22.21-25).  
Now, if the duty of the academy is to foster knowledge, then what comes of 
knowledge if the very medium necessary for the exchange of ideas is infected by vague 
and stilting prose? Scientists may not hesitate to snub their noses at the humanists and pride 
themselves as the unmatched expositors of Nature’s mysteries, but the problem of jargon—
as maladapted rhetorical style and/or clunky, technical language—continues to haunt the 
discursive conditions of science as equally as any other discipline. In fact, the rhetoric of 
postmodernism can be dressed in such technical garb that it can even go for what passes as 
standard scientific scholarship these days. For example, in 2016, the historian of science 
Mark Carey and colleagues submitted a postmodernist-themed research article, titled 
“Glaciers, gender, and science: A Feminist Glaciological Framework for Global 
Environmental Change Research,” which was published in the peer-reviewed scientific 
journal, Progress in Human Geography. Sponsored by a grant from the National Science 
Foundation for almost half a million dollars, the article seeks to remedy the “understudied” 
relationship between gender and the production of glaciological knowledge: “Merging 
feminist postcolonial science studies and feminist political ecology, the feminist glaciology 
framework generates robust analysis of gender, power, and epistemologies in dynamic 
social-ecological systems, thereby leading to more just and equitable science and human-
ice interactions” (Carey, Jackson, Antonello, & Rushing, 2016, p. 1). The article drew the 
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attention of various critics from both the left and the right, such as the conservative 
philosopher Christina Hoff Sommers and the liberal ecologist Jerry Coyne.  
With such arcane topics as “feminist postcolonial science studies” and “feminist 
political ecology,” Sommers asked her interlocutor Camille Paglia, “What are these fields? 
What do they read? It must just be slogans mixed with a little propaganda, a little paranoia 
thrown in” (Marchel & Angelova, 2016). With such buzzwords as patriarchy, colonialism, 
inequality, marginalization, imperialism, situated knowledges, and masculinist discourses 
to literally describe the study of frozen water, one can witness the full extent to which 
jargonized language is imbedded in the exchange and formation of scientific texts. The 
propagandistic themes of feminist glaciology were further analyzed by Jerry Coyne who 
submitted his own thorough commentary of the article on his science-blog where he 
remarked that, “It’s horribly written, in the kind of obscurantist, ideology-packed prose 
that we’re used to from postmodernism. And it says the same thing over and over and over 
and over and over and over and over and over again. These people need to learn how to 
write” (Coyne, 2016). Propaganda, obscurantism, and ideology so characterized the 
scientific rhetoric of the article that Michael Shermer, the editor of Skeptic, suspected it to 
be another kind of Sokal-inspired parody. “When this paper was published I thought it was 
a hoax, so I contacted the University of Oregon, the institution of authors, and confirmed 
it was real,” wrote Shermer. “And this is just one of countless examples, posted daily on 
Twitter @RealPeerReview and retweeted all over the net to the amusement of readers who 
cannot decipher what most of these articles are even about, much less comprehend their 
arguments and gain value from their conclusions” (Sokal, 2017). 
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As Aristotle highlighted earlier, the repetitive use of buzzwords and figurative 
language—what he termed metaphors—would ultimately result in “paradox,” a statement 
that arrives at a self-contradictory or logically unacceptable conclusion through sound and 
true reasoning. Surely the critics above would classify the relationship between gender and 
glaciers to be a daffy, unacceptable argument, despite its efforts to seem rational. But what 
about Aristotle’s other warning—that of gibberish? Consider, then, the notorious example 
of the Bogdanov Affair. In 2002, the French twin physicists, Igor and Grichka Bogdanov, 
were at the center of an academic dispute regarding the legitimacy of their contributions to 
theoretical physics when further examination of their research papers were accused of 
being faulty if not pure gibberish due to the deliberate robustness of their technical 
phraseology (though the twins continue to defend the veracity of their work). “Suddenly, 
physicists were trying to figure out what sentences like this meant, if anything: ‘Then we 
suggest that the (pre-)spacetime is in thermodynamic equilibrium at the Planck-scale and 
is therefore subject to the KMS condition’” (Overbye, 2002).  
Instead of denouncing the twins’ research as being postmodernist or 
propagandistic, critics began suspecting a different impulse: pseudoscience—the assertion 
of an “utterly implausible” claim contingent on “types of argumentation” which “fall far 
short of the logical and evidentiary standards of mainstream science” (Sokal, 2008, p. 266). 
As the mathematician John Baez pointed out, “many of us began hearing rumors that two 
brothers managed to publish at least five meaningless papers in physics journals as a hoax,” 
but the twins contended that their formulas were genuine. Upon his analysis, Baez 
concluded that the Bogdanov papers were simply “a mishmash of superficially plausible 
sentences containing the right buzzwords in approximately the right order. There is no logic 
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or cohesion in what they write” (Baez, 2010). Other critics echoed similar reviews, such as 
the string theorist Jacques Distler who opined that “The Bogdanov’s papers consist of 
buzzwords from various fields of mathematical physics, string theory and quantum gravity, 
strung together into syntactically correct, but semantically meaningless prose” (Distler, 
2004). Inadvertently casting much doubt on the competence of the physical sciences, the 
Bogdanov Affair even secured itself a spot in a respected dictionary as a classic example 
of “obscurity” (Garner, 2016, p. 643). Aristotle, it seems, was correct in his earlier 
prescription against “gibberish,” the essence of which results from the abuse of “foreign 
words.” We must therefore be prepared to confront the role of style from an ethical 
perspective. 
 
Section I.3: Ethical Reflections on the Problem of Obscure Rhetoric  
 
The impact of jargon in both the artistic and scientific hemispheres of the academic 
landscape suggests that its influence on human nature is ubiquitous. While some of the 
antecedent examples so far discussed use jargon for parodied purposes—be it the political 
implications of quantum gravity, or the social construction of the male genitalia, or the 
fictional condition of uromysitisis, etc.—the distinction of hoax from non-hoax is not 
always clear, as in the cases of feminist glaciology and the Bogdanov papers. Failure to 
discern this hoax/non-hoax (or science/non-science) distinction suggests much about the 
rhetorical commonalities between genuine and fraudulent scholarship. It is instances like 
these where Alan Sokal rushes to the defense by disclaiming any commonality between 
science and its imposters, for he insists that the only commonality to be made here is 
between the postmodernists and pseudoscientists themselves—their relationship being one 
which shares a fervent disregard for established scientific consensus. “At first glance, 
 33 
pseudoscience and postmodernism would appear to be opposites: pseudoscience is 
characterized by extreme credulity, while postmodernism is characterized by extreme 
skepticism.” And yet, on the one hand, “advocates of pseudoscience… sometimes fall back 
on postmodernist arguments when the reliability or credibility of their evidence is 
challenged,” while on the other hand, “postmodernists’ professed skepticism is often 
deployed selectively, so that a disdain for the knowledge claims of modern science 
sometimes coexists with a sympathy (if not outright belief in) one or more pseudosciences” 
(Sokal, 2008, pp. 263-264). Whether Sokal is successful in dissociating genuine science 
from the problems that plague pseudoscience and postmodernism is up for the reader to 
decide, but accepting such an argument would prove difficult from a rhetorical perspective. 
It would seem that, as a human institution, the sciences can neither resist the 
universal temptation for cryptic, verbal inflation—Sokal’s disclaimer notwithstanding. In 
fact, as one reviewer put it, “[Sokal’s] critique would also gain more credibility from 
encompassing his own community: the failure of scientific institutions to address the abuse 
of statistical methods or promote systematic reviews is no less of a threat to progress than 
the ramblings of postmodernists or fundamentalists” (Matthews, 2008). So there are 
weaknesses on both sides. Humanists do talk funny, but then again, so do the scientists, as 
Peter Dougherty earlier admitted. And if official, technical sounding rhetoric has harbored 
a tendency to mislead or straight up dupe the peer review process in the past, what should 
this suggest about the trust we place in the quality of scholarship being published in today’s 
major academic journals? This is a serious rhetorical concern, one that surpasses the 
problem of open access journals. Open access journals rarely enforce peer review, and if 
they do, they will sometimes circumvent their own editors without their knowledge in order 
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to profit from a higher publishing quota (Gilbert, 2009). But the Bogdanov affair was not 
the result of predatory publishers spamming naïve scholars, nor was feminist glaciology 
uncovered to be a hoax despite prevalent suspicions to the contrary. The rhetorical 
indistinguishability of genuine knowledge from its counterfeits has gotten so bad that even 
after exposing his own article as a hoax, Alan Sokal reported “I confess to amusement that 
one Social Text editor still doesn't believe my piece was a parody. Oh well” (Sokal, 1996c). 
What does this say about the status of clarity taking place in today’s academic 
conversations? 
When six prestigious academics, working at their scholarly leisure, are 
unable to discern that an essay is intentional gibberish, it says quite a lot 
about the turn that advanced areas of academic life has taken in the U.S. 
If this sort of nonsense were confined only to an isolated corner of 
American academic life, it would be a problem mainly for the students 
who waste their precious college years being taught by such professors, 
and the parents who foot the bills. But the basic idea underlying “cultural 
studies”—that there is no such thing as objective knowledge or 
scholarship—has metastatized into several areas. (McConnell, 2000, p. 
86) 
 
But cultural studies, the liberal arts, and the other social sciences are not alone in 
their subjection to the cancer of language. The lack of consensus among the natural and 
applied sciences also results at times from the speculative nature of their own disciplines 
and specialties. For example, the mathematician Peter Woit alludes to the decaying 
standards of scientific clarity in theoretical physics when he confessed, “The Bogdanoffs’ 
work is significantly more incoherent than just about anything else being published. But 
the increasingly low standard of coherence in the whole field is what allowed them to think 
they were doing something sensible and to get it published” (Butler, 2002). What is the 
reason for these “increasingly low standards of coherence?” What does this suggest about 
the ethics of peers and editors who allow for these kinds of errors to occur, and to persist 
unabated?  
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Arguably one of the most presently conceivable explanations must be that of the 
“Dr. Fox Hypothesis”—the idea that “if you cannot understand a paper, it must be a high-
level paper” (Armstrong, 1982, p. 30). In other words, the Dr. Fox Hypothesis is attributed 
to the association of prestige with unintelligibility: the more unintelligible it sounds, the 
more prestigious it must be. The Dr. Fox Hypothesis stems from a study in the 1970’s 
which sought to measure the effects of rhetoric (i.e., expressiveness, charisma) upon a 
scholarly audience, and to see which of the two—content, or style—would beget greater 
student-learning satisfaction. “To test the hypothesis, the authors selected a professional 
actor who looked distinguished and sounded authoritative; provided him a sufficiently 
ambiguous title, Dr. Myron L. Fox, an authority on the application of mathematics to 
human behavior; dressed him up with a fictitious but impressive curriculum vitae, and 
presented him to a group of highly trained educators” (Naftulin, et al., 1973, p. 2). The 
actor, Dr. Fox, then delivered a pseudo-presentation titled “Mathematical Game Theory as 
Applied to Physician Education,” a speech which consisted of “an excessive use of double 
talk, neologisms, non sequiturs, and contradictory statements. All this was to be 
interspersed with parenthetical humor and meaningless references to unrelated topics” 
(Naftulin, et al., 1973, p. 2-3). The unsuspecting audience on the other hand, a group of 
fifty-five psychiatrists, psychologists, social-work educators, graduate students, and other 
qualified administrators, confided in a post-speech questionnaire to have found the lecture 
to be enjoyable, clear, and stimulating (even though, unbeknownst to them, it was pure 
nonsense). 
The implications of this study offer valuable insights into the reasons behind the 
falling standards of coherence in today’s academic scholarship. According to the Dr. Fox 
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Hypothesis, peers and editors are seduced into publishing nonsense because of an 
inclination to associate research competence with reading difficulty, a tendency which 
correlates with Dr. Fox’s audience who had “…obviously failed as ‘competent crap 
detectors’ and were seduced by the style of Dr. Fox’s presentation. Considering the 
educational sophistication of the subjects, it is striking that none of them detected the 
lecture for what it was” (Naftulin, et al., 1973, p. 5). The seduction of style (think obscurity 
and jargon) is the ultimate theme explaining the phenomenon of incoherent scholarship. 
Journals are rhetorically seduced by the association of unintelligibility with prestige, and 
so clarity has become an increasingly depreciated virtue of scholarly prose. Indeed, “…the 
fact that no respondents saw through the hoax of the lecture, that all respondents had 
significantly more favorable than unfavorable responses, and that one even believed he 
read Dr. Fox’s [fictitious] publications suggests that for these learners ‘style’ was more 
influential than ‘content’ in providing learner satisfaction” (Naftulin, et al., 1973, p. 6). 
Style, it seems, is not only victorious in its capacity to persuade audiences that nonsense is 
legitimate knowledge, but the fact that one respondent felt a peculiar need to express that 
they had actually read the non-existent literature within Dr. Fox’s faux resumé suggests an 
unsettling, moral failure on the part of audiences (respondents, peers, and editors) to 
present themselves honestly before others. Fear of admitting one’s own ignorance, of 
lacking understanding, or of appearing as an outsider, engenders an all-too-human 
compulsion to cover up for these insecurities by employing a veneer of undue knowledge. 
The move to pass oneself off as an insider instead of confronting the ‘outsider-fostering’ 
rhetoric results in the detriment of coherence in contemporary scholarship. 
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Of course it must be understood that such rhetoric is binary in nature: it fosters 
outsider status as much as it does its counterpart. Alan Sokal demonstrates this principle in 
the rhetorical strategy of his hoax: “In sum, I intentionally wrote the article so that any 
competent physicist or mathematician (or undergraduate physics or math major) would 
realize that it is a spoof” (Sokal, 1996b, p. 3). Insiders became those individuals qualified 
with a basic knowledge of physics or mathematics, for it was only by this knowledge that 
one could rightly discern the truth behind Sokal’s project. Without this knowledge, the 
editors of Social Text became the outsiders, seduced by an unintelligible rhetorical style 
which managed to dupe them into an “illusion of having learned” (Naftulin, et al., 1973, p. 
6). One editor of Social Text, as aforementioned, experienced a state of incredulity 
proportionate to the respondents in the experiment whose reactions “ranged from curiosity 
to disbelief” when the experiment was announced to be a hoax, the aftermath of which still 
managed to “stimulate interest in the subject area even after the respondents were told of 
the study’s purpose. Despite having been misinformed, the motivation of some respondents 
to learn more about the subject matter persisted” (Naftulin, et al., 1973, p. 6). That hoaxes 
have incentivized inquiry and investigation, however, should not be considered necessarily 
foolish, futile, or counterintuitive. Hoaxes are indeed fictions, but many examples of 
contemporary science are indebted to the work of fiction. In fact, various inventions in 
modern technology can be attributed to the inspirations of science fiction literature, such 
as the helicopter, cell phone, submarine, taser, and rocket, among others (Strauss, 2012). 
But before getting carried too adrift down extraneous topics on the rhetorical relationship 
between reason and imagination (and its Baconian implications for science), the main 
takeaway here is to understand the binary nature of obscure rhetoric—its ability to assist 
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hoaxes, like Sokal’s and others, by privileging understanding to those with knowledge, and 
excluding those without. 
The ethics of such rhetoric can be difficult to navigate, for it treads over numerous 
considerations ranging from truth-telling, secrecy, and even lying. Rhetoric that facilitates 
the division of insider and outsider groups may, at first, seem to serve the exclusive aim of 
deceiving audiences—disabling their means of being “competent crap detectors” (Naftulin, 
et al., 1973, p. 5). But as others would argue, the function of this rhetorical ‘crap’—more 
strongly referred to as ‘bullshit’—sometimes has less to do with falsity, and more to do 
with fakery. The “essence of bullshit is not that it is false but that it is phony,” writes moral 
philosopher Harry Frankfurt in his treatise On Bullshit (2005). “In order to appreciate this 
distinction, one must recognize that a fake or a phony need not be in any respect (apart 
from authenticity itself) inferior to the real thing” (Frankfurt, 2005, p. 47). Frankfurt 
ultimately determines that bullshit is a rhetorical agent of manipulation—a kind of speech 
that intends to persuade others without regard for truth. This distinguishes lies from 
bullshit: if a woman tells a lie, she is aware that her words contradict her perception of the 
truth. But if she is bullshitting, “she is not concerned with the truth-value of what she says,” 
writes Frankfurt. He continues, 
That is why she cannot be regarded as lying; for she does not presume 
that she knows the truth, and therefore she cannot be deliberately 
promulgating a proposition that she presumes to be false: Her statement 
is grounded neither in a belief that it is true nor, as a lie must be, in a 
belief that it is not true. It is just this lack of connection to a concern with 
truth—this indifference to how things really are—that I regard as of the 
essence of bullshit. (Frankfurt, 2005, pp. 33-34) 
 
The publish-or-perish mentality thriving in the upper echelons of academia is in 
large part responsible for the widespread phenomenon of bullshit scholarship today, both 
in the arts and sciences. And our failure to attend to a clear exposition of the truth (in 
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addition to increasing hostilities toward modernist notions of truth in general) has resulted 
in bullshit becoming a standard, prevalent, and manipulative social practice. In his sequel 
text On Truth (2006), Frankfurt argues that truth is preferable to bullshit, that indifference 
to truth is more insidious than lying, and that by removing truth from human 
communication, we only bullshit ourselves. A world without concern for truth reduces 
people to “fakers and phonies who are attempting by what they say to manipulate the 
opinions and the attitudes of those to whom they speak. What they care about primarily, 
therefore, is whether what they say is effective in accomplishing this manipulation” 
(Frankfurt, 2006, p. 4). Driven more by a desire to “win” arguments, seeking out that which 
is ‘effective’ over that which is ‘true,’ reveals bullshit to possess an eristic nature.  
This fact is further corroborated by the kind of bullshit that can be found in many 
scholarly books and journals. To put it mildly, as one editor explained, “What agitates me 
is scholarship that passes for cogent argumentation in support of a thesis that is, in fact, 
‘…bullshit’” writes expert ‘crap-detector’ Michael Shermer (Sokal, 2017). It is no wonder 
then why such shoddy scholarship has sometimes been described as pseudo-profound 
bullshit—a type of rhetoric “constructed to impress upon the reader some sense of 
profundity at the expense of a clear exposition of meaning or truth”; “it attempts to impress 
rather than to inform; to be engaging rather than instructive” (Pennycook, et al., 2015, p. 
550). This form of speech typically incorporates the use of weasel words, when messages 
aim at creating a pretense of authority simply by obscuring the source or identity of that 
authority with vacuous or meaningless language. Weasel words go hand in hand with 
pseudo-profound bullshit since they both lend the impression that a specific or meaningful 
statement has been made, when instead only a vague or ambiguous claim has actually been 
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communicated. Consider such phrases as, “Wholeness quiets infinite phenomena” or 
“hidden meaning transforms unparalleled abstract beauty” (Pennycook, et al., 2015, p. 
549). Profundity is a common denominator of bullshit in general, but coupled with 
grandiloquent vagueness and ambiguity, such depth of meaning can be obscured to the 
point of appearing profound, yet still may consist of being nonsense. 
The phenomenon of pseudo-profound bullshit coincides with the findings of the Dr. 
Fox experiment. Just as respondents had found Dr. Fox’s vacuous presentation to be clear 
and interesting, so too were participants in other experiments found to be impressed by a 
presentation of indiscernible statements: “We gave people syntactically coherent sentences 
that consisted of random vague buzzwords and, across four studies, these statements were 
judged to be at least somewhat profound” (Pennycook, et al., 2015, p. 559). Does the aim 
to impress by obfuscation reveal a flaw in human morality? Or is the fact we are impressed 
by obfuscation reveal a flaw in human psychology? And who is more to blame for the 
promulgation of bullshit: authors or audiences? Of course, it is a truism of all style-guide 
manuals that sloppy writing reflects sloppy thinking; but if these experiments are taken 
seriously, they suggest that sloppiness is not always the result of incompetence, but rather 
ingenuity. Sloppiness, vagueness, ambiguity, obfuscation, pseudo-profundity—these 
characteristics of communication are not just signs of the failures of language, but they also 
constitute, in a paradoxical way, the subtle ‘weapons’ of language. To deploy any weapon 
effectively, of course, requires a significant degree of knowledge and skill. Such is the 
nature of rhetoric, and obscure rhetoric in particular, where the aim to impress by 
obfuscation is only possible by mastering a certain class of jargon.  
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Take for example Igor and Grichka Bogdanov, the twins who succeeded in 
‘bullshitting’ their peers, not through a careless expression of their work, but through the 
contrary: they took seemingly careful steps in crafting their papers so as to impress others 
via the density of their jargon, obfuscation, and pseudo-profundity. As one professor put 
it, “I had given a favorable opinion for Grichka's defense, based on a rapid and indulgent 
reading of the thesis text,” admitted physicist Ignatios Antoniadis. “Alas, I was completely 
mistaken. The scientific language was just an appearance behind which hid incompetence 
and ignorance of even basic physics [emphasis added]” (Morin, 2002). By this, it is clear 
that the enchantment of rhetoric can sometimes compensate for legitimate knowledge. 
When substance is deficient, style grows more elaborate. Hence, obscure rhetoric is not 
always the result of incompetence, for the deliberate invention of obscure messages always 
requires serious competency (albeit of language) in order to better conceal one’s 
incompetency in other areas of thought. Deploying rhetoric that hides our weaknesses 
demands foresight, intent, and strategy—elements characteristic of planned and skillful 
action. Such is a prime example of bullshit, for the art of bullshit, as Frankfurt reveals, is 
anything but mindless or sloppy. It is a detail-oriented rhetorical exercise that pervades all 
speech, from common conversation to the heights of advertising, public relations, and 
politics: 
Is the bullshitter by his very nature a mindless slob? Is his product 
necessarily messy or unrefined? The word shit does, to be sure, suggest 
this. Excrement is not designed or crafted at all; it is merely emitted, or 
dumped. It may have a more or less coherent shape, or it may not, but it 
is in any case certainly not wrought. The notion of carefully wrought 
bullshit involves, then, a certain inner strain. Thoughtful attention to 
detail requires discipline and objectivity. …The realms of advertising 
and of public relations, and the nowadays closely related realm of 
politics, are replete with instances of bullshit so unmitigated that they 
can serve among the most indisputable and classic paradigms of the 
concept. And in these realms there are exquisitely sophisticated 
craftsmen who—with the help of advanced and demanding techniques 
of market research, of public opinion polling, of psychological testing, 
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and so forth—dedicate themselves tirelessly to getting every word and 
image they produce exactly right. (Frankfurt, 2005, pp. 21-23) 
 
 Bullshit, it appears, is not simply a mindless process; it also involves mindful 
attention to detail (of course, not for the sake of truth). As Frankfurt makes clear, “however 
studiously and conscientiously the bullshitter proceeds, it remains true that he is also trying 
to get away with something” (Frankfurt, 2005, pp. 23). In order to get away with something, 
bullshitters attend to details more for the sake of manipulation than for truth. Bullshit, 
therefore, is a paradox containing both a sense of strictness and laxity: bullshit abides by 
strict rules to be “carefully wrought,” and yet it also relaxes its adherence to standards of 
“accuracy” (Frankfurt, 2005, p. 31). Laxity, or lack of care, is not so much a matter of error 
accidentally slipping into one’s speech, for accidents imply the intent of care, not the lack 
of it. Thus, the major fault of bullshit is not error, but carelessness—an apathetic attitude 
toward error altogether. The Bogdanov’s failure is not so much that they failed to get things 
right or accurate, but that they were not even trying. What they were instead trying to do 
was “get away with” advancing their careers without taking an interest in the truth or falsity 
of what they were doing or saying.  
Inspired more by ambition than by truth, the Bogdanovs managed to verbally 
seduce their peers into an illusion of having learned something meaningful. Blind or selfish 
ambition has frequently been the culprit of poor communication. As some scholars put it, 
“The root of the problem is largely psychological: ‘Most obscurity, I suspect, comes not so 
much from incompetence as from ambition—the ambition to be admired for depth of sense, 
or pomp of sound, or wealth of ornament’” (Garner, 2016, pp. 643). While ambition may 
be one of the main causes of obscurity, a convenient effect is its ability to daunt or 
intimidate critics and outsiders. “More bluntly still: ‘The truth is that many writers today 
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of mediocre talent, or no talent at all, cultivate a studied obscurity that only too often 
deceives the critics, who tend to be afraid that behind the smoke-screen of words they are 
missing the effectual fire, and so for safety’s sake give honour where no honour is due’” 
(Garner, 2016, pp. 643). By employing smoke and mirrors, obscure rhetoric can construct 
illusions, foster misimpressions, insulate insiders from outsiders, and can even abet full-on 
deception. Nevertheless, while obscurity may often be coupled with bullshit, they can be 
distinguished: for it can be argued that obscurity is more so inspired by ambition, whereas 
bullshit is deployed more as a cover for one’s incompetence. “Bullshit is unavoidable 
whenever circumstances require someone to talk without knowing what he is talking 
about,” argues Frankfurt. “Thus the production of bullshit is stimulated whenever a 
person’s obligations or opportunities to speak about some topic are more excessive than 
his knowledge of the facts that are relevant to that topic. This discrepancy is common in 
public life, where people are frequently impelled—whether by their own propensities or 
by the demands of others—to speak extensively about matters of which they are to some 
degree ignorant” (Frankfurt, 2005, p. 63). As was argued earlier, it seems again that in the 
absence of content, style becomes increasingly embellished at the expense of truth and/or 
accuracy. 
The interconnection of these variant forms of obscurity, ranging from officialese, 
gobbledygook, abstractitis, genteelism, academese, jargon, style, and bullshit, etc., share a 
common set of implications upon the ethics of communication, particularly as it relates to 
the subjects of lying, truth-telling, and most pertinently, secrecy. Up until now, intimations 
of secrecy have reservedly loomed in the background of this assortment of concepts and 
case studies; but if we interpret more seriously the purpose of obfuscation from a rhetorical 
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perspective, one cannot avert the centrality of secrecy to this manipulative style of 
communication. Strategically obscure communication depends on secrecy, for secrecy is 
the inherent mechanism that governs the construction of esoteric language games. Without 
a sense of secrecy, one could not adequately conceal their insider status or guard against 
infiltration by unwelcome outsiders. Secrecy is never without this insider-outsider binary. 
Hence, the Sokal Affair, the Bogdanov Affair, the Dr. Fox Hypothesis, and others, illustrate 
this binary (insider-outsider) principle in action, through the mediation of a binary 
language. The language of secrets necessarily demands the use of words with double 
meanings or hidden references—buzzwords, jargon, riddles, slang, or polysemous terms 
that are exclusively decipherable by insiders and indecipherable to outsiders—what can 
otherwise be considered a kind of ‘coded rhetoric.’  
 
Section I.4: On Secret Languages 
 
Getting more to the heart of the bewildering lingo of gangs, bureaucrats, professors, 
scientists, and politicians, the function of secrecy becomes increasingly significant. 
Arguably the foremost treatment of the relationship between secrecy and obscurity comes 
from Barry Blake’s Secret Language: Codes, Tricks, Spies, Thieves, and Symbols (2010) 
where “Language,” he writes, “is a means of communication, but a good deal of language 
use is deliberately obscure if not actually encrypted in some form of cipher or code” (Blake, 
2010, p. 1). One example that quickly illustrates the encoding or enciphering of words is 
in the secret language of criminals. “Among criminals and others who tend to attract the 
attention of authorities, an elaborate argot often develops, a mixture of slang and jargon. 
Such in-group languages served both to bond their users and to create codes which are 
opaque to the authorities” (Blake, 2010, p. 5). Consider the secret language of Muslim 
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extremists known as jihadese, whereby messages are encrypted so that terrorists can plan 
attacks through various social media without alerting the police or local security services. 
In certain Islamicized sectors of the UK, jihadese has become a developing phenomenon 
among radicals in need of additional layers of secrecy: “their solution has been to mutate 
the English language by combining ordinary Muslim street slang with Urdu, Bengali and 
Arabic as well as scriptural references in the Koran so that it can barely be understood 
outside of their circle” (Fielding, 2017). Jihadese, of course, is but one kind of secretive 
rhetoric, and while the uses of such rhetoric can be put to terroristic ends, it is not limited 
to these functions. Secret languages can indeed aid in the efforts against terrorism as well, 
as it enjoys a wide scope of other applications that pertain to the lives of all people, not just 
a select, nefarious few. 
People regularly find the need to communicate secretly. Governments 
need to be able to keep their communications secret from other 
governments, especially in time of war. In both war and peace 
commercial enterprises need to keep new inventions, new models, new 
marketing strategies, and the like secret from competitors, and planned 
cost-cutting measures secret from trade unions. Criminals and those 
involved in plots obviously need to be able to communicate in secret, as 
do clandestine lovers. …Secret communication can be in any medium: 
sign, speech, or writing. (Blake, 2010, pp. 72-73) 
 
Blake covers a copious spectrum of mechanisms in his discourse of secrecy, such 
as anagrams, Kabbalah, palindromes, semordnilaps, notarikon, acronyms, acrostics, 
onomancy, riddles, equivocation, prevarication, steganography, magic words, argots, 
euphemisms, oxymora, contradictions, and allusions, to name a few. Two of the major 
concepts that he discusses in his book, for example, are the code and the cipher. The 
difference between a code and cipher are thus: a cipher “involves transposing the letters 
of plain text…or replacing them by substitutive letters from the same alphabet, another 
alphabet, or a set of non-alphabetic symbols,” whereas a code, on the other hand, “involves 
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employing substitutes for words or phrases” (Blake, 2010, p. 74). To put it more concretely, 
an example of a cipher would be Morse code. “Morse code is a misnomer since this system 
is in fact a form of a cipher. Each letter is allotted a pattern of long and short sounds: a • 
—, b — • • •, e •, i • •, etc.,” (Blake, 2010, p. 74). Other kinds of ciphers are “back slang, 
where words are pronounced backwards (so that fish comes out as shif), or Pig Latin, where 
initial consonants become the initial of a final syllable with the rhyme –ay so that ‘Pig 
Latin’, for instance, becomes Igpay Atinlay” (Blake, 2010, p. 5). It is from the noun ‘cipher’ 
that we get the verbs ‘encipher’ (to encrypt a message) and ‘decipher’ (to decrypt a 
message).  
Ciphers, however, are different from codes, in that codes substitute for whole 
words. A clear example of coded language exists in Robert Luketic’s 2008 American heist 
drama film 21, inspired by a true story featuring several mathematically gifted students 
from MIT who collaborated together against various Las Vegas casinos by way of their 
learned card-counting techniques. Accompanying such techniques was the invention and 
use of coded words and gestures that would signal to one another secret instructions about 
which games to play and win. “The movie shows [them] using flash cards to practice the 
various code words, which were used to represent the count” (“21,” 2008).The count was 
encoded by substituting numbers for words: 
+1 Tree (a tree looks like a one) 
+2 Switch (binary, on or off) 
+3 Stool (a stool has three legs) 
+4 Car (cars have four tires) 
+5 Glove (a glove has five fingers) 
+6 Gun (a gun holds six bullets) 
+7 Craps (lucky seven) 
+8 Pool (eight ball) 
+9 Cat (cats have nine lives) 
+10 Bowling (strike is ten pins) 
+11 Football (eleven players on a football team) 
+12 Eggs (twelve eggs in a carton) 
+13 Witch (superstition, bad luck number) 
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+14 Ring (fourteen carat gold) 
+15 Paycheck (day of the month most people get paid) 
+16 Sweet (sweet sixteen) 
+17 Magazine (name of the teen magazine) 
+18 Voting booth (age you can vote) 
 
How did this code language work? The team organized themselves into two groups: 
Spotters and Big Players. “The Spotter conveys the count to the Big Player by casually 
using the code word in a sentence. For example, after the Big Player has been signaled that 
the table is hot, the Spotter might say nonchalantly, ‘This iced tea is too sweet,’ letting the 
Big Player know that the count is 16, because ‘sweet’ = ‘sweet sixteen’ = 16” (“21,” 2008). 
By employing this sophisticated form of coded counting, the team was frequently 
successful in tilting the tables against the house, and bringing home large sums of money.  
While gestures and indeed the spoken word can perform impressive feats of 
secrecy, writing however “allows much more elaborate forms of encryption than speech” 
(Blake, 2010, p. 73). The practice of secret writing extends well into our earliest known 
records of human literacy. Consider, for instance, the invention of private shorthand, a 
kind of secret writing that can be found in works as ancient as the Roman orator Cicero 
(106-43 BC). “In many forms of shorthand the distinction between cipher and code is 
blurred since symbols are substituted for letters, for common sequences of letters such as 
(in English) –ing, and for common words such as the” (Blake, 2010, p. 74). Interest in the 
many forms of secret writing had spread throughout Europe during the medieval era, 
running “hand in hand with a curiosity about magic, and from time to time ciphers and 
codes that seemed impenetrable were held to be the work of the devil” (Blake, 2010, p. 
77). Not only was secret writing involved with “occult lore,” but also with “science,” for 
“in the late Middle Ages and Renaissance it was common to encrypt critical details of new 
discoveries, including new recipes” (Blake, 2010, pp. 72). Despite its somewhat dark or 
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secretive reputation, however, the use of shorthand prevailed into the modern period, even 
among religious figures such as the Scottish minister George Young (1777-1848), a 
Scriptural geologist who “developed his own shorthand, which he used for writing his 
sermons and which no one yet has been able to translate” (Mortenson, 2004, p. 158). Even 
one of the most renowned theologians of all time, the Medieval St. Thomas Aquinas, wrote 
in a shorthand that was “filled with symbols, squiggles, and odd connectives” (Barron, 
2016, p. 47). 
A new type of shorthand gaining widespread acceptance in our technological world 
has recently been coined as webspeak, the lingo of teenagers who communicate through 
cell phones and computers with slang and abbreviations such as “BRB” (be right back), 
“LOL” (laugh out loud), or “TTYL” (talk to you later). One of the cultural concerns over 
webspeak is that it “is so ingrained in most students’ communication skills that they 
inadvertently use the language all the time, even where it might be inappropriate” (Murphy 
& Allen, 2007). Not only has webspeak been used to pass on secret messages, but many 
people have attributed the popularity of webspeak to a corruption of proper language. 
Conversely, however, the linguist Deborah Tannen suggests that learning to adapt to new 
uses of language is not really a bad thing: “Webspeak reflects a versatility that may actually 
be a strength, as long as the new language is used appropriately”—a view which Tannen 
compares to fashion, decorum, or how we learn to dress in a way that is appropriate to the 
context (Murphy & Allen, 2007). While webspeak is a type of code-language popular 
among teens and tech-savvy users, young children have also been recognized for their 
ability to construct their own forms of idiosyncratic language, what many theorists have 
come to label idioglossia. Idioglossia refers to languages invented and spoken by only one 
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person or a few people at a time, typically children, and which sometimes also refers to the 
pathological condition of language being so distorted as to be unintelligible. One particular 
form of this idiosyncratic child-language is cryptophasia, otherwise known as twin talk, 
twin speech, or the secret (crypto) speech (phasia) of young twins. 
Perhaps more infamous than webspeak is the similar-sounding practice of 
doublespeak. Reminiscent of George Orwell’s dystopian masterpiece 1984 through the 
conflation of ‘newspeak’ with ‘doublethink,’ the term doublespeak was coined by William 
D. Lutz, a contemporary American linguist, lawyer, and professor of English at Rutgers 
University (1989; 1990; 1996). In a famous essay titled “The World of Doublespeak,” Lutz 
defined the term as “language that pretends to communicate but really doesn’t.” He 
continues,  
It is language that makes the bad seem good, the negative appear 
positive, the unpleasant appear attractive or at least tolerable. 
Doublespeak is language that avoids or shifts responsibility, language 
that is at variance with its real or purported meaning. It is language that 
conceals or prevents thought; rather than extending thought, doublespeak 
limit it. Doublespeak is not a matter of subjects and verbs agreeing; it is 
a matter of words and facts agreeing. Basic to doublespeak is 
incongruity, the incongruity between what is said or left unsaid, and what 
really is. It is the incongruity between the word and the referent, between 
seem and be, between the essential function of language—
communication—and what doublespeak does—mislead, distort, 
deceive, inflate, circumvent, obfuscate. (Lutz, 1999, p. 347-348)  
 
Moreover, Lutz raised our awareness to the social dangers of doublespeak by 
classifying it into four distinct categories: (1) euphemism, (2) jargon, (3) gobbledygook, 
and (4) inflated language. These categories help facilitate our understanding of the variant 
forms doublespeak can assume. In fact, doublespeak seems to repeat (if not overlap in some 
way with) a host of other concepts so far discussed in this literature review. For example, 
there is a strong resemblance between doublethink and “bullshit” (Frankfurt, 2005, pp. 21-
23) when Lutz explained how “[d]oublespeak is not the product of carelessness or sloppy 
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thinking. Indeed, most doublespeak is the product of clear thinking and is carefully 
designed and constructed to appear to communicate when in fact it doesn't” (Lutz, 1999, 
p. 352). Some scholars might even qualify doublespeak as the explicit dialect of 
Washington D.C., given “the prevalence of lawyers on the District of Columbia scene” 
whose survival mostly depends on their mastery of “impersonal,” “obscure,” “pompous,” 
“evasive,” “repetitious,” “awkward,” “incorrect,” “faddish,” “serious,” and 
“unintelligible” rhetoric (Morgan & Scott, 1975, pp. viii-ix). Classifying the forms of 
occultic rhetoric can be an artistic exercise in itself, with D.C. dialect (DCD) claiming a 
total of ten categories, while doublespeak amounting to only four. 
Whether through abbreviations, codes, ciphers, dialect, doublespeak, idiosyncratic 
sounds and symbols, neologisms, mutated allusions, or shorthand, the ultimate function of 
such secretive languages is manipulation—insofar as it allows for the discrimination of 
meaning upon particular audiences. Consider, for instance, the function of a dog whistle: 
dogs become a specified audience for whom the whistle is designed to alert, while for 
humans such high-frequency sounds remain unnoticed or inaudible. This metaphor of dog 
whistles as discriminant speech carries implications into the contentious world of public 
affairs. Also known as “dog whistle politics,” a dog whistle is “political messaging using 
coded language that seems to mean one thing to the general population, but which to a 
targeted subgroup means something else entirely” (McCutcheon & Mark, 2014, pp. 136-
137). Statements like George Bush’s “wonder-working power…of the American people” 
is considered by the left to be a dog whistle that appeals to the religious community, since 
“wonder-working power” is a line from a beloved Christian hymn; and statements like 
Barack Obama’s “pay your fair share” is considered by the right to be a dog whistle that 
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appeals to the socialist community, since “fair share” alludes to notions of economic 
redistribution (McCutcheon & Mark, 2014, p. 137). Dog whistling acts as a kind of covert 
language that makes secret appeals to certain members of an audience. 
 The detection of dog whistles in political speech is an exercise in interpretation 
requiring an ability to draw connections between meanings and identities. Exposing a dog 
whistle, or decoding a buzzword, is similar in a sense to a shibboleth test. A shibboleth is 
a custom, motto, principle, catchphrase, belief, or expression that distinguishes a particular 
class or group of people. One cinematic example of a shibboleth test can be seen in Quentin 
Tarantino’s fictional, Nazi-war film Inglourious Basterds (2009) which depicted a scene 
where a British spy, disguised as a SS Officer, enters a tavern to have a drink with a leader 
of the Nazi Gestapo. The spy accidentally gives away his identity by ordering three drinks 
from the bar by gesturing “three” with his hand (using his index, middle, and ring fingers). 
The Nazi leader’s demeanor immediately changes upon recognizing the spy’s mistake, for 
this gesture was atypical German people (who instead would use their thumb, index, and 
middle fingers to signal “three”). This scene constitutes a shibboleth test—a test of one’s 
identity. A shibboleth test “is not a test of proficiency or competence, but is more like a 
blood test, or a fingerprint or DNA test,” writes renowned linguist Tim McNamara. “It is 
possible to use language tests for detection because language acts socially as a marker of 
identity, and in cases where social groups are in conflict or in competition, this feature of 
language can be exploited. But unlike a fingerprint, which is unique to each individual, 
language identity is shared among members of a speech community, so that it is group 
membership that is detected here” (McNamara, 2005, p. 352). Shibboleth tests have been 
used to great effect throughout history, especially in times of war (see Judges 12:6), to help 
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groups distinguish themselves from others, or discern friends from enemies. Hence, in 
order to protect one’s cover from detection and exposure, shibboleths must be carefully 
suppressed. 
In summary, there exist myriad forms of oblique communication employed for 
various purposes. The desire to conceal messages, or to convey meaning in discriminant 
ways, works under a panoply of likened concepts, some more nuanced than others: patois, 
anti-language, register, cant, or more familiarly, argot. “Groups who are oppressed, 
imprisoned, or isolated from the community at large and those whose activities are under 
scrutiny by the authorities tend to develop an extensive in-group variety of language known 
as argot,” writes Barry Blake. “An argot is colloquial and has the character of slang, but 
some of its vocabulary is technically jargon in that it is specialized and has no standard 
equivalents. All of these specialized varieties present a source of potential obscurity to 
anyone who knows only formal, mainstream language” (Blake, 2010, p. 196-197). The 
need for obscurity no doubt involves an ethically complex strategy that has been felt by all 
in certain circumstances at some point in time, giving way to the invention of argots, 
shorthand, codes, dog whistles, and officialese, etc. It can also be said that oblique forms 
of communication are typically motivated by four main factors: “A desire to tease or 
amuse; practical security; maintaining an identity; and fear of the power of words” (Blake, 
2010, p. 291). These and other causes of obscurity, as well as its effects, impact our world 
in significant ways, and continue to inspire important questions about the nature of secrecy 




Section I.5: The Occult Connection 
 
In order to appreciate fully the rhetoric of secrecy, one must first understand the 
tradition of secrecy. Few have studied secretive traditions more thoroughly than the 
rhetorical scholar Joshua Gunn who examines the strategies of secrecy as practiced among 
the intellectual elite, most especially through the ultimate of secret traditions—namely, the 
occult. The occult concerns the discovery and control of magical knowledge, a knowledge 
characterized by a manifestation of ritual, consecrated behavior, and “a practice of using 
tokens, images, charms, gestures, or special acts of language to influence people, events, 
or the natural world or to summon or beseech supernatural agencies” (Knoblauch, 2014, p. 
27). These “special acts of language” are often poetic as they are puzzling, and it is this 
particular trait of occult language that most likens to the language of academics. In his book 
Modern Occult Rhetoric: Mass Media and the Drama of Secrecy in the 21st Century (2005), 
Gunn contends that the inhabitants of the academic community employ a style of speech 
comparable to the obscure, dissimulating language of mystics and magicians. Rhetorical 
obscurity is a sophisticated form of communication given its penchant to exploit esoteric 
vocabularies, restrict knowledge to an in-group, and exclude outsiders.  
 Occultism is a tradition long associated with discriminating the sharing of hidden 
knowledge. Magical knowledge was something to be hidden and protected, to be revealed 
with discretion to particular audiences who could be trusted. The hiddenness of occult 
practices was motivated not only by a fear of persecution, but also by a need to advance 
oneself as a superior magus. Occultism thus relied on a unique kind of rhetoric that 
carefully managed the concealment and revelation of magical secrets. This close 
association of magic and rhetoric has existed since the days of ancient mythology: for 
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example, the Egyptian god Theuth (Thoth) was not only credited with the arts of magic, 
the development of science, and the judgment of the dead, but was also undeniably the 
patron deity of language, having “invented figures, and the letters of the alphabet, and the 
arts of reading, writing, and oratory in all its branches” (Budge, 1904, p. 414). The kinship 
of language and magic in mythology is further reinforced by the cultural significance of 
“runes,” otherwise known as secret or magical signs, letters, or symbols. “[T]here has been 
a revival of interest among New Agers with an interest in the occult because runic writing 
is believed to be connected with magic. The name rune (rūn in Old English) means ‘secret’ 
or ‘mystery’ and the runic alphabet is strongly associated with magic in the Norse sagas. 
When one considers that runes were the first form of writing to be introduced to the 
Germanic people it is not surprising that they were attributed magic properties” (Blake, 
2010, p. 143).  
 The meanings of runes were shrouded in mystery to the illiterates, appearing to hide 
or conceal sacred knowledge. The tendency of writing to be associated with magic was due 
to its ability to preserve knowledge as much as its ability to reserve knowledge to those 
who could understand it. Writing is discriminatory or biased toward those who can interpret 
it. Hence, the secret meanings behind runes contributed to the overall sense that writing in 
general was a magical art, making sense of the fact that both magic and rhetoric were 
governed by the same deity. The inscrutability of runes was consistent with the magic and 
secretive themes of the occult tradition; in fact, the very word “occult” is rooted in the Latin 
word occultus which means “secret.” Emphasizing the incomprehensibility attributed to 
reading occult texts brings to mind another magical object known as a “grimoire” (i.e., a 
book of magic spells). Grimoires were manuals containing spiritual truths and incantational 
 55 
instructions to be used within pagan rituals. The term “grimoire” reflects such words as 
glamour and grammar, derived from the French word grammaire (DeRomilly, 1975, p. v), 
and it also referred to “a figure of speech to denote something that was difficult to read or 
impossible to understand” (Davies, 2010, p. 1).  
The grammar of occultism relies on the indecipherability of messages in order to 
control the passage of understanding. Because understanding is only begotten by an act of 
interpretation, the practice of magic relies upon the study and principles of interpretation—
an art or process known as “hermeneutics” which concerns the methods for deciphering 
magical signs and meanings. Whether scrying for visions in a crystal ball, or communing 
with spirits in another dimension, or translating the wrinkles on a person’s palm, or drawing 
conclusions from a set of tarot cards, or divining the future based on the arrangement of 
the planets, the occult tradition has long depended on hermeneutics as another form of 
magic, one which yielded secret truths that would grant the seeker knowledge and security 
(and, perhaps in many cases, also power and advantage). Once again, the relationship 
between magic and hermeneutics springs forth from the insights of mythology as they 
pertain to the dialectic of secrecy and disclosure: 
The Greek word hermeios referred to the priest at the Delphic oracle. 
This word and the more common verb hermēneuein and noun hermēneia 
point back to the wing-footed messenger-god Hermes, from whose name 
the words are apparently derived (or vice versa?). Significantly, Hermes 
is associated with the function of transmuting what is beyond human 
understanding into a form that human intelligence can grasp. The various 
forms of the word suggest the process of bringing a thing or situation 
from unintelligibility to understanding. The Greeks credited Hermes 
with the discovery of language and writing—the tools which human 
understanding employs to grasp meaning and to convey it to others. 
(Palmer, 1969, p. 13) 
 
 The ancient Greeks identified Theuth to be the Egyptian equivalent of their own 
Greek deity, Hermes, for they both governed over the same values and practices (Budge, 
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1904, p. 414). The magic of hermeneutics rests in its function to de-code the coded, dis-
cover the covered, or de-cipher the ciphered—in a sense, to banish human ignorance and 
mystery, and enlighten our senses to the truth. Such is (or should be) the whole purpose of 
working in higher academia—to advance the never-ending march of knowledge into the 
vast frontiers of the unknown. Whether the mechanism of such advancement is called 
science, or hermeneutics, or dialectic, the scholars within our colleges and universities 
should nevertheless commit to the prospect of expanding the territory of truth through 
clear, intelligible communication—the type of communication suited for eliminating the 
very conditions that make intelligible translation necessary in the first place. But 
unfortunately, much of the modern academy these days has succumbed, by and large, to a 
rhetorical style that perpetuates secrecy and obscurantism rather than clarity and 
understanding. In other words, claims are no longer measured by what is ‘approximately 
true’; they are instead measured by what is “increasingly verisimilitudinous” 
(Polkinghorne, 1998, p. 17). Such impenetrable, pompous jargon privileges inscrutability 
over intelligibility, obstructs the progress of knowledge, and fosters the comparison that 
academics are modern-day occultists. 
The tendency for academics to express their knowledge in riddles and esoteric 
jargon has led Gunn to confess that much of today’s scholarship is allergic to plain and 
direct language: “all theory is occultic,” writes Gunn (2005, p. 52). This message has also 
been reinforced by other figures, like the lawyer Heather MacDonald who critiqued what 
she described as “The Ascendancy of Theor-ese” (1992). Difficult theoretical language, 
particularly within those pockets of postmodern scholarship, literary criticism, and the 
social sciences, has fortunately not gone unnoticed, as various thinkers have already begun 
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to address the problems that occultic rhetoric is fostering. Higher Superstition (1994) by 
Paul Gross and Norman Levitt, for example, is a classic text that offers arguably one of the 
most formidable challenges to the deluge of theor-ese currently sweeping the academy. In 
time, I will eventually investigate the history, theory, and ethical principles of such secret 
languages from the philosophical perspective of Sissela Bok. But before then, this project 
shall now shift attention to the work of Joshua Gunn and showcase his contribution to 
understanding the bond between difficult languages and the occult. 
 
II. Chapter II. Joshua Gunn and the Rhetoric of the Occult 
 
Joshua Gunn is a practitioner of the occult arts and a college professor of rhetorical 
communication. After obtaining his bachelor’s degree in philosophy and communication 
from George Washington University in 1996, he enrolled to the University of Minnesota 
where he earned the rest of his education in rhetorical studies: a master’s degree in 1998 
and a doctoral degree in 2002 (directed under Karlyn Kohrs Campbell). From there, Gunn 
moved to the south where he worked for three years as an assistant professor of 
communication at Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge, experiencing what he 
described as a “culture shock” that required adapting his liberal “Midwestern political 
correctness” to a southern-style, traditionally religious, and politically conservative student 
body (Gunn, 2006). Gunn was also involved with freemasonry and became a Master Mason 
in St. James Lodge No. 42. His occupation with freemasonry continued when he moved to 
Texas, becoming a 32° Scottish Rite Mason. His prolific works on the relationship between 
communication and the occult continued to flourish, and eventually rose his scholarly 
profile until he landed a career as a professor of communication studies at the University 
of Texas, Austin. With interests in queer theory, psychoanalysis, and feminism, Joshua 
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Gunn centers his attention on the subject of rhetoric as it pertains to notions of ‘ineffability’ 
where he explores the limits of language and meaning. His latest book Speech Craft: Public 
Speaking in the 21st Century (2017) weaves in much of these themes. 
“Rhetoric,” according to Joshua Gunn, “is the study of how representations 
(linguistic or otherwise) consciously and unconsciously influence people to do or believe 
things they would not otherwise ordinarily do or believe” (2005, p. xx). This is a useful 
definition for Gunn’s project which essentially upholds “representation as the central, 
suasive dimension of human drama, the song of the opera of social being” (2005, p. xx). 
Representation is a flexible term rooted in the concept of mimesis (imitation) and which 
points to the symbolic nature of language. Language symbolizes reality, such as “cat” (the 
word) is a sign meant to imitate, represent, or refer to a real cat (in the world). This 
relationship between word and world is one which has sparked copious philosophical 
debate about the presuppositions of language, the possibility of truth, the preconditions of 
meaning, and the correspondence between consciousness and reality. Representation is a 
concept that bears heavily upon discourses in the philosophy of language, philosophy of 
mind, and philosophy of communication. But one of the mysteries of representation is how 
words refer to those things which are mysterious in themselves—words which refer to 
things not in the world, but which transcend or abstract it. What can be said about the 
conflict between representation and ineffability? How does one express or represent the 
ineffable (i.e., that which transcends expression or goes beyond representation)?  
Communication is a paradox—a rhetorical antinomy which can be summarized 
as “The Truth is ineffable, but let me tell you about it anyway” (Gunn, 2005, p. 49). 
Attempts at expressing the inexpressible are common themes within the discourses of 
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miracles, transcendence, spirituality, and religion. Gunn’s ideas about the paradoxical 
nature of religious rhetoric are grounded in the works of literary theorist Kenneth Burke 
(1897-1993). In his Rhetoric of Religion (1961), Burke investigated language that strove to 
describe the indescribable: for example, the classical God of Abraham has been invariably 
portrayed in many sacred texts as being male, or possessing eyes, ears, and hands, or feeling 
emotions like joy, love, jealousy, and anger.1 But these mundane figures of humanity, when 
used to illustrate the operations of the divine, showcase a paradox of language: that we 
must necessarily borrow the words of everyday experience (immanence) to grant 
expression for those higher things which surpass everyday experience (transcendence). 
This suggests to Gunn that no matter how hard we try, our finite descriptions of God, or of 
transcendence in general, will always fall short of the infinite truth. Truth, it seems, is only 
ever an approximation, bound as it is by the limits of language. Truth is incapable of 
absolute expression, and therefore, by definition, ineffable.  
“Transcendent truths are ineffable,” writes Gunn, “but people invest a lot of time 
and energy into trying to represent ineffability. In the broadest sense, then, religious 
rhetoric seems to embody a conflict between representation and ineffability” (Gunn, 2005, 
p. xxi). One of the great exemplars of this effort to represent ineffability was St. Augustine 
(354-430 AD) whose primary question and lifelong preoccupation was determining “a 
correct description of God” (Barron, 2015, p. 3). However, while both Gunn and Burke 
                                                 
1 Though theology and occultism share an interest in spiritual or ineffable realities, it is important 
to mention that the representations of theology tend more toward publicity, while the representations of 
occultism tend more toward secrecy.  This is evident in the very cultivation of Christian homiletics, the art 
of preaching or writing sermons. Theology will strive to portray the divine, despite the limitations of 
language, while occultism will be more inclined toward mystification, exclusion, and discrimination. As G.K. 
Chesterton put it, “It was the Christians who gave the Devil a grotesque and energetic outline, with sharp 
horns and a spiked tail. It was the saints who drew Satan as a comic and even lively. The Satanists never 
drew him at all” (Chesterton, 1912, pp. 175-176). 
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affirm that religious rhetoric exemplifies a paradox or antinomy, Gunn goes further than 
Burke to suggest that this conflict “is not limited to supernaturalism” (Gunn, 2005, p. xxi). 
Gunn contends that the conflict also extends to the natural world, for the (secular) truths of 
our lowly, everyday encounters are no less governed by the limits of rhetoric. “Our 
experience of the world—what we see, hear, touch, smell, taste, and feel—is fundamentally 
ineffable” (Gunn, 2005, pp. xxi-xxii). Because our experiences are derived empirically 
(that is, directly) from our own individual senses, no one else has direct access to our own 
experiences the way we do. Each person’s experience is unique, capable only of being 
shared indirectly with others via communication. Thus, consideration for these ‘immanent 
truths’ leads Gunn to adopt a new standard of epistemology that encompasses not just our 
knowledge and “correct descriptions” of God, but also of reality. The problem therefore is 
not with the “real world” itself, but with our “vocabularies or language” about the real 
world. Hence why the antinomy is qualified as being a “rhetorical” problem (Gunn, 2005, 
p. 49). 
Subsuming our real-life experiences under the umbrella of ineffability is a strategy 
similar to the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan’s (1901-1981) notion of the “Real” 
(Gunn, 2005, p. 51), a concept which represented “the unattainable and inexpressible limit 
of language” (Audi, 2015, p. 572). The transcendent and the immanent are both ineffable, 
according to Gunn, because our words will always fail to communicate both the divine 
nature of God and the “sensory manifold of human experience” (Gunn, 2005, p. xxii). Such 
a move to expand the range of ineffability to include everyday, mundane speech is done by 
virtue of the fact that both transcendent and immanent communications often share a 
common tendency for obscurity, creative uses of language, and ambiguous meaning. This 
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is evident by the secular works of Jacques Lacan himself, for example, whose 
psychoanalytic writings are said to be “of legendary difficulty, offering idiosyncratic 
networks of allusion, word play, and paradox, which some find rich and stimulating and 
others irresponsibly obscure” (Audi, 2015, p. 572). This sense of difficulty, idiosyncrasy, 
and obscurity, which result in creating followers and critics, is among the most defining 
elements that connect Gunn’s theory of rhetoric to his conception of the occult. 
But before exploring this connection to the occult, one must first understand how 
arcane or cryptic speech relates to the creation of insiders and outsider groups: “The key to 
understanding the link between difficult language and social discrimination is to recognize 
that, on some level, strange vocabularies are created to better approximate the ineffability 
of both mundane and spiritual experience” (Gunn, 2005, p. xxii). The capacity of “strange 
vocabularies” to represent the un-representable aspects of lived experience consequently 
fosters the social discrimination and privilege of certain vocabularies over others. The 
competition and triumph of favored vocabularies is a theme reminiscent within Burkean 
theories of language, most notably his concept of the “terministic screen.” Indeed, as 
reviewer Pat Gehrke points out, Gunn’s book can be “rightly called a Burkean enterprise” 
(Gehrke, 2007, p. 380) given its emphasis on the ways in which language can screen or 
discriminately filter our perceptions of reality: “if any given terminology is a reflection of 
reality, by its very nature as a terminology it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent 
it must function also as a deflection of reality” (Burke, 1966, p. 45). Representations of 
reality, based on the kinds of terms we choose to use (and not use), always play a role in 
directing our attention down certain channels of thought over other channels, thus 
influencing our understanding, interpretations, and engagement with reality. 
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Representation implies ‘revealing,’ so it is through representation that reality is ‘revealed’ 
to us.  
 
Section II.1: Occultism as Content and Form   
 
The connection to the occult, however, emerges here when we consider how our 
language determines what is not revealed about reality. Gunn’s concern with representation 
pivots on the fact that language governs not only the ways in which reality is revealed to us, 
but also how our words are responsible for the ways in which reality is concealed to us. This 
art of revealing and concealing is the primary linchpin connecting rhetoric to occultism. In 
order to explore this link more carefully, it is important to first understand that occultism is 
comprised by two rhetorical principles: (1) content and (2) form. First, the content of occultism 
is represented under the concept of the occult: “the occult should be understood as the study 
of secrets and the practice of mysticism and magic, comprising centuries-long dialogue 
between occultists and their detractors about metaphysical secrets, the role of the imagination 
in apprehending such secrets, and who has the authority to keep and reveal them” (Gunn, 2005, 
p. xxii). Secrecy is a dominant feature of the occult, likely due to the association of hiddenness 
with forbiddenness. As Gunn explains, occultism involves secrets in the sense that “many of 
the practices assembled under its name were forbidden by authorities and had to take place ‘in 
secret.’ The occult as the secret study of secrets, then, did not exist until there was a need for 
secrecy” (Gunn, 2005, p. 9). 
The need for secrecy is vital to Gunn’s understanding of the occult. He argues that 
many introductory and encyclopedic sources have erroneously affiliated the origins of the 
occult with a variety of ancient traditions, like shamanism, because of a common interest in the 
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magical arts.2 Rather than identify occultism on the basis of magical interest, Gunn takes on 
the peculiar view of emphasizing the need for secrecy out of fear of persecution as occultism’s 
most defining attribute. “Of course, the idea of magic as the use of supernatural forces to do 
something secular has been around since antiquity, but magic did not become occult, at least 
in the Western world, until the Romans adopted Christianity as the official religion and began 
persecuting those who held alternative beliefs—including those who studied magic,” writes 
Gunn. “In light of this important qualification, occultism did not emerge until the medieval 
period—at the very earliest the fourth century of the common era, when the practice of magic 
became a capital offense” (Gunn, 2005, p. 9-10). This emphasis on persecutory secrecy, 
however, is not without its conceptual complications.3 
Second, Gunn argues that the role of secrecy essential throughout the history of the 
occult eventually gave way to a secretive form of communication—what he coins as “the 
occultic”—a genre or mode of rhetoric dealing with the use and methods of secrecy. “The 
term ‘occultic’ is derived from the Latin root occultus, which means ‘secret,’ and which is 
the past participle of occulere, ‘to conceal’” (Gunn, 2005, p. xxii). The occultic is, 
                                                 
2 Occultism has also been linked historically to Gnosticism, another diverse set of ancient mystical 
traditions obsessed with secrets or hidden knowledge—from gnosis meaning “knowledge” (Greer, 2003, 
pp.196-197). Gnosticism carries manifestly Platonic themes reminiscent of the Allegory of the Cave—the 
seeking of a truer reality behind the curtains of this world. In some ways a predecessor of occultism, in other 
ways a metanarrative of theology, Gnosticism teaches that truth exists ‘out there,’ fixed and unchanging like 
Plato’s Theory of Forms (Gunn, 2005, p. 39), and that the soul is imprisoned in a corrupt, material reality. 
3 While there is much to appreciate in Gunn’s qualification about persecution, definitional problems 
arise when privileging this qualification above other standards, mostly because this logic would render 
Christianity as a type of occultism under the reign of Emperor Nero, or Judaism under the reign of the Third 
Reich. Is the enemy of occultism an occultism? Even Gunn admits that occultism experienced fluctuating 
seasons of prominence and social acceptance (Gunn, 2005, p. 9). Did the occult then cease to be occultic? 
Placing undue emphasis on conditions of oppression rather than esoteric knowledge is an important 
qualification to consider, but remains in many ways an overcorrection to other factors that assist in the 
classification of these concepts. Certainly Shamanism and Gnosticism share far more in common with 
occultism than do Christianity and Judaism, despite the fact that all religious traditions must, to some degree, 





therefore, the language of the occult, a form of secretive communication that manifests as 
bizarre, difficult, or esoteric expression in order to pass on secret messages, or to ward off 
unwelcome outsiders, or to raise one’s social or political status, or “to avoid 
misunderstanding, perversion, or, in some cases, persecution…” Indeed, “…the 
discriminatory logic of difficult language began as a form of self-protection” (Gunn, 2005, 
p. 17). Such is the nature of occultic language, for its progenitor—the occult itself—could 
not help but thrive upon the need for secrecy. Gunn, therefore, highlights a distinction 
between the concepts of language and tradition. “Although there is an occult tradition—a 
historical content obsessed with books, spells, and secrets—this has been eclipsed by the 
form of its rhetoric, which concerns a logic of secrecy, interpretation, and discrimination” 
(2005, p. xxiii). Occultism is thus comprised of both form (language, the occultic) and 
content (tradition, the occult), a distinction that Gunn has classed in terms of generality and 
particularity. In other words, the general (larger) category of secret languages (the occultic 
form) permeates, encompasses, and initially emerged from the particular (smaller) category 
of a secret tradition (the occult content). “The smaller category, the occult, is both an 
expression and the origin of the larger category,” writes Gunn, who suggests that, 
inductively, “we could learn more about the larger occultic by examining the historical 
occult” (Gunn, 2005, p. 26).  
Some of the functions of occultic rhetoric can be observed through the various 
writings of occultists themselves. For example, a survey of modern occult texts showcases 
the use of three common rhetorical features: (1) revelation, (2) neologism, and (3) irony. 
The first feature pertains to the “language of revelation, the dialectical counterpart to 
secrecy” (Gunn, 2005, p. 18). The language of revelation connotes a sense of truth-telling: 
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that the facts are unveiled; that hidden knowledge is now deciphered; that clarity and 
precision have been promised on matters long unknown or secret. Such suspenseful or 
sensational tones of revelation are typical among the titles and book covers of various 
occult texts, all designed of course to tease the curiosities of a given audience by touting to 
have discovered or decoded the long awaited answer to some enduring riddle or mystery. 
“The language of revelation—that the given occultist will be telling secrets—is always 
couched in terms of ‘the truth,’” writes Gunn (2005, p. 20). In addition to this, the language 
of revelation is concerned with the role of authority, for the author of a particular revelation 
is invested with exclusive power to determine its meaning. The words author and authority 
are both “derived from the Latin auctor, which means ‘creator.’ In occult books, however, 
the authority claimed is always in terms of something that previously has been concealed 
or gravely misunderstood, and this something typically has to do with powers that derive 
from alternate realities most immediately accessible ‘within’ one’s own mind” (Gunn, 
2005, pp. 21-22). The language of revelation does not just appeal to our natural craving for 
new or better knowledge, but it also privileges the authority of the revealer who is 
ultimately granted primary legitimacy in the interpretation of their revelation. 
 In addition to the rhetoric of revelation is the rhetoric of neologisms. An occultist’s 
authority depends not merely on their revelatory power to expose secrets, but also on his 
or her ability to employ neologisms—the invention of words and phrases, or the novel use 
of preexisting words and phrases to mean new things, or to refer to old things in a new 
way. “Neologisms and otherwise strange terms are rife in occult texts,” admits Gunn (2005, 
p. 22). One notable example is the alchemic word “VITRIOL,” a cipher deployed in occult 
circles which referred to the Latin phrase Visita Interiora Terrae Rectificandoque Invenies 
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Occultum Lapidem, translated as “visit the interior of the earth, and by rectifying, you will 
discover the hidden stone.” According to Gunn, the cipher is referring to the Philosopher’s 
Stone, a rock of sacred importance to alchemists who were interested in turning metals into 
gold, providing eternal youth, or healing illnesses. This cipher, though found in a number 
of occult texts, was considered meaningless to non-alchemists. “Indeed, deliberately 
misleading language and prose has been a common element in occult texts since the 
medieval era, when magi and occultists were forced to compose their texts in an allegorical 
code, or ‘the language of birds’ (Gunn, 2005, p. 22). Such neologistic language was 
undoubtedly instrumental for occult groups who longed to conceal their knowledge from 
outsiders. The Rosicrucians, for example, were a secret occult order who “‘were aware of 
these different levels of meaning [in the use of strange occult terms] and could speak in 
their esoteric language on a level which was beyond comprehension to the uninitiated’” 
(Gunn, 2005, p. 22). And in other occult traditions, the Enochian language (the conjectured 
language of angels) “could also be read as cipher, a symbolic language with which to 
communicate with others about occult matters in ways that were unrecognizable to a public 
increasingly suspicious of magic and the occult” (Gunn, 2005, p. 22). While neologisms 
were employed to confound outsiders, irony on the other hand was a strategy used in order 
to deflect suspicion and criticism. 
Complementing the rhetoric of neologisms is, lastly, the rhetoric of irony. Irony is 
a literary technique that surprises us by contradicting our expectations, typically used for 
humorous or emphatic effect by “implying a meaning opposite to the literal meaning” 
(Lanham, 1991, p. 92). Consider such phrases as “the police officer was arrested,” or 
“Titanic—the unsinkable ship!” Irony becomes known as ‘sarcasm’ when used to mock or 
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convey contempt. But in occultic language, irony plays an important role in the way it 
shielded occultists from the scrutiny of critics, a strategy that Gunn calls “prefatory piety” 
(Gunn, 2005, p. 21). By prefacing their books with testaments of belief in God and 
adherence to the Christian faith, occultists effectively cleared themselves of suspicion, 
freeing them up to discuss matters long considered taboo and forbidden to their societies’ 
dominant religious sensibilities. The late psychic Sylvia Browne (1936-2013) prefaced her 
books with claims of an “unshakable” faith in God; Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa (1486-
1535), author of the three volumes of Occult Philosophy, signaled his servitude and 
religious conviction to the Chancellor of Italy; the mysterious 19th century occultist, 
Francis Barrett, author of The Magus (1801), was “careful to describe magic and astrology 
as God-given and in general ‘agreement’ with the ‘Holy Scriptures’” (Gunn, 2005, p. 21); 
also, the lapsed French Catholic-turned-magician Eliphas Lévi (1810-1875) introduced 
“his The History of Magic by stressing that the ‘three wise men’ of the story of nativity 
were, in fact, magi,” (Gunn, 2005, p. 21). But as Gunn makes clear, all these attempts to 
harmonize occultism with Christianity are actually exercises in an ironic form of deception, 
a “rhetorical blind” that is intended to mislead the uninitiated. Prefatory piety—a 
compositional regularity in much occult literature—is “an irony designed to mislead the 
less discerning” (Gunn, 2005, p. 22), for it claims to honor one thing while simultaneously 
paying homage to its opposite. This is what distinguishes the rhetoric of irony from that of 
neologisms: 
Lévi’s ironic turns in many of his books are a good example of textual 
irony, which seems to be used instead of difficult esoteric language or 
jargon for the same end. Rather than alienate a curious reading public, 
Lévi avoids the language of birds and instead uses a self-referential and 
(if one is “in the know”) humorous brand of irony. In The History of 
Magic, Lévi insists “to Christians that the author of this book is Christian 
like yourselves. His faith is that of a [Catholic] strongly and deeply 
convinced.” While Lévi may have, in fact, believed this, his implication 
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that the Devil is a fictional “personification” of malevolent force is far 
from the Catholic doctrine of his time. …That something “sneaky” is 
happening in his text is cued immediately when one contrasts the 
contents of the introduction of the book with the lengthy descriptions of 
black magic at its end. (Gunn, 2005, pp. 22-23) 
 
Having showcased occultism’s three defining tropes—the compositional forms of 
revelation, the allegorical and figurative language of neologisms, and the frequent use of 
misleading ironic blinds—Gunn then moves to expound on these concepts by situating 
them within the story of the modern occult and the eventual development of the postmodern 
occultic. As the story unfolds, Gunn describes the first two tropes as being useful rhetorical 
strategies; but, upon entering a postmodern landscape, the imagistic and invasive 
environment of the contemporary mass media brought an end to secrecy, wielding the third 
trope of irony against the occult tradition. “As the occult transforms during the twentieth 
century, the first two of these features will survive in the form of the occultic, but the ironic 
blind becomes increasingly difficult to control as society becomes increasingly ‘public’” 
(Gunn, 2005, p. 26). In order to tell this story, Gunn relies primarily on three pivotal 
characters of modern occult history: Helena Blavatsky, Aleister Crowley, and Anton 
LaVey. Through these characters, Gunn animates the function of these tropes and various 
others in the lives and texts of these particular occultists, and narrates the complex role of 
rhetoric as it mediates the transition of the occult to the occultic. 
 
Section II.2: Blavatsky’s Occult Poetics 
 
Helena Petrovna Blavatsky (1831-1891) was a Russian occultist, spirit medium, 
and “the leader of the Theosophy movement” whose “influence on occult discourse was 
monumental” (Gunn, 2005, p. 55). Taking its name from the Greek theos, “god,” and 
sophia, “wisdom,” Blavatsky cofounded the Theosophical Society in 1875 which sought, 
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among other things, to “claim a knowledge of ultimate reality more profound than that 
gained from empirical or scientific methods” (Gunn, 2005, p. 59). In short, “Blavatsky 
convinced her audience that she was selected by a secret group of supernatural beings—
the Secret Masters—to spread a message of universal brotherhood and peace to the West,” 
a message that she claimed to have channeled into a tome known as Isis Unveiled, “a 
mammoth, two-volume book of more than 1,500 pages” (Gunn, 2005, p. 60). The book 
sold out in its first week. Despite its fame, however, “the book is unwieldy in its use of 
scientific, anthropological, philosophical, and occult terminology,” leading some to 
dismiss it as ‘discarded rubbish’ or ‘a large dish of hash,’ while for others as ‘a mine of 
curious information’ and ‘one of the most remarkable productions of the century’ (Gunn, 
2005, p. 60). For example, in another one of her texts The Secret Doctrine, she relays a 
cosmology that departs from the typical precepts of Darwinian evolution and natural 
selection. As a kind of alternative creationist, Blavatsky’s mystical cosmology is written 
“in difficult and obtuse language…clothed in [a] strange mix of scientific and Hindu 
terminology” (Gunn, 2005, p. 66). 
The Tertiary Atlantean part-cycle, from the “apex of glory” of that Race 
in the early Eocene to the greedy mid-Miocene cataclysm, would appear 
to have lasted some 3½ to four million years. If the duration of the 
Quaternary is not rather (as seems likely) overestimated, the sinking of 
the Ruta and Daitya [both are claimed to be submerged continents] 
would be post-Tertiary. …leaving the classification of the geological 
periods to Western Science, esoteric philosophy divides only the life-
periods on the globe. In the present Manvantra [a period between two 
manus, or beginning times of manifestation] the actual period is 
separated into seven Kalpas [a period of roughly four billion years] and 
seven great human races. (Blavatsky, 1977, 2: 711). 
 
With “a penchant for Greek, Hindu, and Buddhist terminology,” Blavatsky’s 
revelations are novel and intriguing, yet “are more likely to confuse readers” (Gunn, 2005, 
p. 66). Rife with “contradiction, ambiguity, and tedious etymological explications that 
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obscure, rather than clarify,” Blavatsky’s books and essays were often rewritten by her 
editors “presumably to eliminate obfuscating vocabulary,” a vocabulary which the 
Theosophical Society themselves sometimes found “incomprehensible” (Gunn, 2005, p. 
70). This prompts Gunn to ask a series of necessary questions: “If Blavatsky’s writings 
were so difficult to penetrate, why were they read at all? If Blavatsky persuaded people to 
believe in her cosmology, how do we explain the deliberate use of complex esoteric 
language? If she was claiming to reveal secrets, why did she slow their uptake in difficult 
terminology” (Gunn, 2005, p. 70)? Gunn suggests a spectrum of answers to these questions, 
all of which stem from a shared, fundamental concept: what he calls an “occult poetics.” 
Occult poetics is a particular form of esoteric language involving both the invention and 
privileging of certain vocabularies over others, or the vying for “better allegories, for that 
which cannot be expressed in human representation” (Gunn, 2005, p. 34). Esoteric 
language denotes a kind of rhetorical creativity that “allows the occultist to express or 
perhaps do things that ordinary language does not seem to permit. For the occultist, esoteric 
language reaches, with hope and promise, toward the ineffable” (Gunn, 2005, p. 37). 
Resulting from the lacunas of human expression, occult poetics refers to the neologistic 
function of esoteric language which attempts to represent ineffability. Hence, modern 
occult discourse is described as “a creative linguistic practice or poetics (by using the term 
“poetics” I mean to evoke the dynamic, creative, and imaginative connotations of the term 
that are based on its rooting in the Greek poiêtikos, “inventive,” and poiein, “to make”)” 
(Gunn, 2005, p. 37). The relationship between poetry and magic has endured since ancient 
times, and the key to understanding their connection is linked to the way language conjures 
our reality: 
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Despite the limits of language, there remain aspects of experience that 
elude our attempts at meaning-making. The poet is an individual who 
can work within a language game to extend and make previously 
inexpressible and meaningless elements of human experience 
expressible and meaningful. The refutation of old vocabularies and the 
creation of new ones is made possible by experiences that are not 
immediately expressible in a given vocabulary. The possibility of 
creating language for new meanings necessarily involves the occultist-
poet in a political process insofar as his or her vocabulary is to replace 
another. (Gunn, 2005, p. 46). 
 
Manifestly so, in response to Gunn’s questions above, it would seem that 
Blavatsky’s engagements in poetic or neologistic activity was ultimately indebted to her 
felt need to confront the limitations of language. If her use of esoteric terminology came 
across as indelicate, then this was meant deliberately, writes Gunn. “A quick glance at 
Blavatsky’s explicit discussions of language discloses both an awareness of the limits of 
language and a desire to develop an ambiguous and novel vocabulary for moving readers 
toward the ineffable truth” (Gunn, 2005, p. 70). Expressing dissatisfaction with the 
limitations of the Western (dominantly English) language, Blavatsky turned to Eastern 
vocabularies, such as Sanskrit, in order to deploy her ‘ancient wisdom.’ In her logic, 
“Sanskrit terms, like most words in an unfamiliar language, are initially ambiguous, and 
hence the possibility for multiple meanings is open. Such terminological openness prolongs 
the indeterminacy of meaning, and this is desirable because indeterminacy is closer to 
ineffability—much, much closer—than accuracy or precision” (Gunn, 2005, pp. 73-74). 
Striving for ambiguity over clarity was considered a better approximation of the ineffable 
since, she admitted, “all languages, including Sanskrit, will fail to characterize the 
divine…” (Gunn, 2005, p. 72). Nevertheless, however, such strategies remained valuable 
to her project, for “Blavatsky could actively forge the rules of a new language game based 
on unusual terms from another language, and she was thus free to link strange, exotic terms 
to the philosophical or cosmological precepts that she, magically, decreed” (Gunn, 2005, 
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p. 74). The vocabulary-generating power of occult poetics, therefore, serves an explicitly 
revelatory function. 
However, in addition to confronting the limits of linguistic representation, occult 
poetics serves a discriminatory function as well—the manifestation of insider and outsider 
groups. For instance, Blavatsky managed to gather support from followers who were drawn 
to the mysterious contents of her writings. Despite her lack of clarity, “the novelty of her 
rhetoric, however difficult, contributed to her mystery. In other words, esoteric language 
and complex argumentation helped to imbue Blavatsky with authority. Her frequent use of 
comparative exegesis was a common means by which she introduced strange terms and 
was one of her favorite ways of transferring the sacred authority of a fetishized text to her 
textual persona” (Gunn, 2005, pp. 68-69). Comparative exegesis—a method of intertextual 
criticism that attempts to interpret, harmoniously, the passages of one book in light of 
correlate passages in other books written by the same author—allowed Blavatsky to create 
a community of followers through a common, authority-establishing argot, an artificial 
glossary of “weird terms” bound by a network of other terms set in relation to each other 
(Gunn, 2005, pp. 74-75). While this strategy managed to generate a body of followers, it 
also inadvertently created a community of outsiders frustrated with her esoteric claims 
(Gunn, 2005, pp. 69-70). The freethinker George W. Foote (1850-1915), for example, 
countered, “I am aware that you are extensively read in useless literature. You have a 
prodigious knowledge of occult authors. You have made a wonderful collection of the 
maggots of the human brain. There is hardly a superstition which [is] not wholly or partially 
sanctioned in your four portly volumes. Your heap of rubbish is colossal” (Foote, 1889, 
par. 12).  
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The discriminatory function of occult poetics, though responsible for elevating 
Blavatsky’s social authority and gathering a wide array of supporters, is also that which 
summoned the consternation of her various detractors. Today, occult writers, like the 
mystic Gary Zukav and the late psychic Silvia Browne, seem to have taken a decidedly 
simplistic turn. Browne and Zukav “…are written in a much plainer, more straightforward 
style than the works of Blavatsky. Despite their striving for clarity, however, these New 
Age systems continue to stress, perhaps unwittingly, the inadequacy of language and 
preserve the function of esotericism by selectively choosing a handful of strange terms and 
especially by stressing the novelty of their own revelations” (Gunn, 2005, p. 77). In the 
end, the neologistic power of occult poetics enables the revelatory and discriminatory 
functions of occult rhetoric, ultimately contributing to the imbuing of occult authority—
the authority to keep and/or reveal secret knowledge. But on this matter of authority, 
another form of occult power consists of controlling the interpretations of occult messages. 
For that discourse, we transition from the rhetorical strategies of Helena Blavatsky to the 
hermeneutical methods of Aleister Crowley.  
 
Section II.3: Crowley’s Hermeneutics of Authority  
 
Aleister Crowley (1875-1947) was an English poet, novelist, painter, mountaineer, 
and “The most famous magus of the early twentieth century” (Gunn, 2005, p. 116). 
Rejecting the family’s puritanical Christianity of his youth, Crowley pursued an interest in 
magic, culminating in his initiation to the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn, a famous 
secret society devoted to the study and practice of the occult, metaphysics, and paranormal 
activities. After some internal, political conflicts, Crowley broke away from the group to 
eventually conceive of a new magical religion called “Thelema” (the Greek word for 
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“will,” to wish or want), of which he was its central prophet. Thelema emphasizes 
discovering and understanding one’s true will, an idea captured in Crowley’s sacred 
maxim: “Do What Thou Wilt Shall Be the Whole of the Law.” This maxim forms the 
foundation of Thelemic teaching, and is sourced in Crowley’s magnum opus The Book of 
the Law, a “short work of verse that Aleister Crowley claimed was dictated to him in 1904 
by a supernatural ambassador of the Egyptian god Horus” (Gunn, 2005, p. 86). Crowley’s 
sacred book is a peculiar artifact worthy of critical discussion, particularly in the way it 
attempts to manage or control our channels of interpretation. The relationship between 
control and interpretation is one which raises our awareness to the interface of texts, 
hermeneutics, and authority, by virtue of the fact that any act of interpretation, according 
to Gunn, is always an exercise of power. “If one understands power as the ability to get 
someone to do what he or she would not otherwise ordinarily do, or to think what he or she 
would not otherwise ordinarily think…then all critical interpretation is necessarily a 
practice of power” (Gunn, 2005, p. 80). 
Power takes on a variety of forms, but in the case of literary or textual criticism, 
power is understood as productive, or “epistemic”—that is, “truth is merely the product of 
sentences” (Gunn, 2005, p. 49). The production of sentences, or of interpretations, implies 
the production of knowledge, and therefore of power, for power is born of a kind of “will 
to knowledge” (Gunn, 2005, p. 80). By generating interpretations, we generate our own 
authority, for all interpretive claims necessarily assume that “the meaning or truth of a text 
under scrutiny is not apparent and that the production of an interpretation is necessary to 
bring it out. The necessity of interpretation places the interpreter in a position superior to 
that of the text, and most certainly in a position superior to those consulting the 
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interpretation” (Gunn, 2005, p. 81). If the true meaning of a text seems murky or unclear, 
then the need for interpretation arises from a felt hiddenness or obscurity that Gunn terms 
textual occultism: “interpretation is an exercise of power that concerns the revelation of 
textual secrets and occluded meaning that primary texts fail to disclose in themselves” 
(Gunn, 2005, p. 81). The hiddenness or obstructed meaning of a text therefore invites a 
diversity of interpretations, each vying for hermeneutical authority. Such critical 
competition pivots on the presumption that the truth remains burdened by its mode of 
representation, and that a better mode of representation is thus needed to more accurately 
express the truth. “Occult texts represent an extreme version of the burden of representation 
insofar as they are built on the assumption that their truths cannot accurately be represented 
in human language. This condition inevitably produces hierarchical relationships between 
those who claim to understand occult texts and those who struggle for understanding” 
(Gunn, 2005, p. 81). 
The production of hierarchical relationships (those with knowledge/power and 
those without) bespeaks the role of occult authority: “Authority is the rhetorical process of 
establishing an unstable relation between self and Other, and particularly one that elides or 
obscures the way in which the signifier has more control over us than we would like to 
admit” (Gunn, 2005, p. 137). Authority is power, and so power intersects with textual 
occultism by virtue of the need for interpretation and understanding. Since interpretation 
generates knowledge and knowledge is power, then this naturally leads to Crowley’s 
hermeneutics of authority, the “theories concerning how to read and understand occult 
texts,” namely “by urging followers or potential followers to use an interpretive scheme, 
especially a scheme that reinforces the authority of the occultist” (Gunn, 2005, p. 125). By 
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exploiting textual occultism (the hiddenness or ambiguity of a book’s meaning) Crowley 
would subjugate his followers into a position that forced them to trust or defer to his 
authority. But in order to best understand this method of interpretation, it is important first 
to grasp how textual occultism forms the ground for a hermeneutics of authority. 
One of the greatest burdens of occult representation, of course, is the difficulty 
associated with revealing that which is fundamentally ineffable, for any act of 
interpretation, Crowley argued, “was really about managing the ambiguity of language 
central to the production of occult texts” (Gunn, 2005, p. 81). But managing the ambiguity 
of occult language calls for an authoritative agent whose hermeneutical arbitrations can 
govern when and where our interpretations are to stop. Without a sense to stop, occult 
hermeneutics would spiral out of control into an infinite regress of interpretations. Such is 
the problem associated with not knowing when or where to end particular hermeneutical 
engagements as it pertains, for example, to matters of literal and figurative truth. Consider, 
for instance, Crowley’s magical rituals, one of which requires mixing honey and olive oil 
with “the fresh blood of a child” (Gunn, 2005, p. 163). Uninitiated interpretation of this 
passage, read literally, would no doubt lead to ritualistic dangers of committing child 
sacrifice, but this “is not Crowley’s intended meaning,” Gunn argues. “Even so, the literal 
and figurative ground here is uneven because there is no intertextual indication of where 
the realignments of signification are to stop: If blood is not real blood, then does honey 
signify something else as well? …This unstable textual irony…cues readers to unravel the 
text and recode its meaning, but one is uncertain as to where covert meaning ends and the 
overt begins” (Gunn, 2005, p. 164). Uncertainty about the precise meaning of a text thus 
triggers an infinite regress of interpretive possibilities.  
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Such ambiguity over matters of literal and figurative truth bespeaks the instability 
of irony: how does one know when a text is being ironic? Without someone or something 
to indicate or constrain our attempts at interpretation, “unstable irony at the level of a text 
forces readers into a chain of questioning about how far to extend ironic meaning, such that 
uncertainty becomes the product of an endless chain of questioning” (Gunn, 2005, p. 164). 
In order to remedy the chaos of infinite regression, Crowley insists that an authority-figure 
must be in place to control the boundaries of interpretation. Hence, Crowley constructs his 
persona as “the ultimate stop” (Gunn, 2005, p. 164), the final point where all meaning is 
‘stopped’ or determined by him and him alone. Because Crowley must seize the last word 
about the true meaning of his texts, he suggests “The stops as thou wilt”—a reference to 
the “stops” or symbolic limits where “symbols cease to chain out into relevant texts in a 
field of occult discourse” (Gunn, 2005, p. 133). As Gunn explains, “occult discourse can 
be understood as a particular kind of reading or interpretive practice that forces the reader 
to end a chaining of signifiers at the feet of an occult authority—an end that is assuredly 
biographical and hence ‘outside’ the text” (Gunn, 2005, p. 81). By deploying vague and 
difficult language, Crowley forced readers to consult an authority outside of the text in 
order to determine its meaning. “In light of his characteristically prophetic insistence that 
he is ‘the sole authority competent to decide disputed points with regard to the Book of the 
Law,’ Crowley is thus imbued with the power of magical decree by the text: ‘All meaning 
stops with me’” (Gunn, 2005, p. 133). In summary, “occult hermeneutics is metonymic for 
the production of linguistic meaning in general, a continuous movement from one signifier 
to the next until one authority or another—a magus or a priest or a police officer or a 
rhetorician—prophetically exclaims: ‘STOP!’” (Gunn, 2005, p. 134). Such hermeneutical 
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strategies operate in a variety of occult contexts, most particularly in “divination”—the 
practice of seeking and interpreting knowledge of the future by supernatural means. 
The art of divination, for example, operates similarly: an adept reader of 
tarot cards spends months, perhaps even years, learning the symbolic 
correspondences of the major and minor arcana. In the contingent 
moments of divination, the tarot card reader must decide which particular 
meanings are appropriate to assign to the cards as they are dealt, for the 
possible meaningful correspondences are too numerous to be helpful. 
Likewise, astrologers have similar ‘wiggle room’ in deciding which 
meanings to assign to zodiac signs, primarily by means of numerical 
calculation and psychic intuition…symbolism is characteristically 
ambiguous, and such ambiguity is the resource occultists consult to 
fashion charismatic authority. (Gunn, 2005, p. 134) 
 
One of the ways in which Crowley sustained his authority was through exploiting 
the ambiguities associated with the Qabalah, a kind of magical alphabet or “symbolic, 
mathematical vocabulary and technique of reading” which Crowley used as a method for 
interpreting occult texts and symbolism, most especially his own (Gunn, 2005, p. 127). 
Consider, for example, the word “Adam,” which if converted into Hebrew is ADM (Aleph-
Daleth-Mem). According to the Hebrew alphabet, letters are also assigned numerical 
values (in this case, A=1, D=4, and M=40). Adding these letters together equals “45” 
which, to the Qabalist, is significant because it is the source of all numbers (45 = 0 + 1 + 2 
+ 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9). Through the ambiguous relationship between letters and 
numbers—ranging from the divine numerology of Gematria, the shorthand system of 
Notariqon, and the cryptographic exercises of Temura—the Qabalah was a hermeneutical 
invention that would disclose “an endless chain of self-referential correspondences,” and 
“Crowley insisted on its importance for decoding the cosmic puzzle that is The Book of the 
Law” (Gunn, 2005, p. 129). This method was used to great effect, able to accomplish two 
things: first, the Qabalah excused the poetic shortcomings of the book by urging a symbolic 
meaning over a surface meaning: for example, Crowley “rescues the metaphorical banality 
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of phrases like ‘burning desire’ from the abyss of pretentious and bad writing by stressing 
they are poetic and numerical substitutions” (Gunn, 2005, p. 92); secondly, the Qabalah 
also brought Crowley “to assign himself the role of the ultimate signifying authority” 
(Gunn, 2005, p. 129). Indeed, through continual, self-referential invitations for readers to 
consult his insular system of texts, Crowley was able to compose and manage the 
ambiguities within his works, stop the infinite regression of possible meanings, and invest 
himself with the authority necessary to control the range of his subordinates’ occult 
interpretations.  
But Crowley’s hermeneutical strategies were not always successful due to the fickle 
nature of symbolic ambiguity, and textual irony in particular. “The uncertainty as to the 
regress of Crowley’s ironies and ambiguous symbolism is as much a part of the success of 
the occult hermeneutic of authority as it is its greatest weakness” (Gunn, 2005, p. 164). The 
reason for this is because not everyone always ends up subjecting themselves to Crowley’s 
hermeneutical control. This highlights what Gunn terms a dialectic of control: some critics 
can stray or even break free from such control, forging their own interpretations divergent 
from Crowley’s authority. “As a hermeneutic, the Qabalah is both a way to secure authority 
and a way to undermine it; it harbors a dialectic of control” (Gunn, 2005, p. 132). The 
dissimulating, secretive, or vague nature of ironic textual occultism, therefore, is a double-
edged sword—it is a resource that fashions occult authority, and “yet it is also a resource 
that can just as easily undermine authority” (Gunn, 2005, p. 134); it “works to erase 
Crowley’s persona as much as it celebrates it” (Gunn, 2005, p. 164). Alas, employing irony 
as an authority-generating strategy is difficult to control. As was mentioned much earlier 
about occultism’s three primary tropes, “the ironic blind becomes increasingly difficult to 
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control as society becomes increasingly ‘public’” (Gunn, 2005, p. 26). The reason for this 
is because irony functions so closely with acts of secrecy and lying. “The concept of irony 
is rooted in the Greek eirōn, which means ‘dissembler,’ or one who disguises and 
conceals,” and it is sometimes discussed “in term of the Latin equivalent, dissimulare, or 
‘to dissimulate,’ [which] defines irony as ‘the humor of saying one thing and signifying 
another.’ …[Using] irony is especially pleasing if one manages it well but that it can also 
have disastrous consequences” (Gunn, 2005, p. 152). The success of irony as a verbal 
strategy depends on its stability—when readers can properly reconstruct or impute the 
intended meaning. Without this stability, irony becomes “slippery”—when “some 
audiences fail to recognize when a rhetor or author intends to be ironic” (Gunn, 2005, p. 
152).  
Such is the problem with employing ironic rhetorical blinds, like gathering the 
blood of a male child for an occult ritual, “a rhetorical blind designed to mislead a curious 
public and to encourage the true adept to read more deeply. …it is His simplicity that 
baffles the unworthy” (Gunn, 2005, p. 156). Crowley also claimed to have sacrificed “120 
male children in one year”—another “literary blind” which has been apologetically 
interpreted as to “signify ejaculate” (Gunn, 2005, p. 162). Failure by “the masses” or 
“ignorant rabble” (Gunn, 2005, p. 145) to properly interpret Crowley’s “deliberate 
misdirections” (Gunn, 2005, p. 157) reveals the significant power of irony and its 
precarious role in the production of insider and outsider groups. In fact, irony’s major 
rhetorical function was “social discrimination”—to beguile the public, to make fools of the 
‘lower classes,’ and exalt the value of the insider’s secret code language (Gunn, 2005, p. 
159). The problem with this, however, was that “…Crowley is powerless to control the 
 81 
significations of the excluded outsider who is free to signify the sacrifice of babies as he 
or she damn well pleases” (Gunn, 2005, p. 168). Thus, Crowley’s perpetual use of myth, 
irony, and misdirection all then begin to take on a life of their own within the public 
consciousness, becoming the mechanisms by which occult authority is effectively 
undermined, if not outright demonized. From the outsiders’ perspective, Crowley becomes 
“‘a thoroughly bad man, a Satanist or devil-worshipper steeped in black magic, the high 
priest of Beelzebub,’ an orgy conductor, a drug dispenser, a cannibal, a debauch, and a 
killer of cats and babies.” Occult leaders, then, are “no longer able to provide the symbolic 
maps for proper contextualization. Insofar as he or she courts irony and ambiguity, the 
occultist is necessarily doomed to misunderstanding in a media-rich environment” (Gunn, 
2005, p. 168). This undoubtedly leads to a disastrous consequence of irony: an occultist’s 
loss of authority and control, or what Gunn calls “the decentering or death of the Great 
Magus,” (Gunn, 2005, p. 152). 
The death of the Great Magus is Gunn’s metaphor for the death of the occult. While 
Crowley remains a legendary figure in occult history, his fall from authority was ultimately 
incurred by his over-reliance upon irony—a practice compelled by his need to preserve 
secrets and his authority over them amidst the rise of modernity’s mass-media—resulting 
in an increasingly confused and paranoid public who dismissed him or reassigned him as 
“an apt condensation symbol for ‘evil’ occultism” (Gunn, 2005, p. 113). The fall and 
eventual ridicule of Crowley in the popular press reflects the mass-media’s cultivation for 
mob mentality, and demonstrates “how a central element of the occult tradition, namely 
the important role of an [sic] masterful keeper of secrets, was destroyed by modern 
paradoxes of publicity” (Gunn, 2005, p. xxvii). The deluge of public outrage and suspicion 
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against Crowley reflects the unraveling of the occult—the death of the Great Magus—and 
it also highlights the challenges associated with keeping secrets in media-rich 
environments, effectively rendering secrecy near impossible. For a better understanding of 
the role of publicity in facilitating the undoing and fragmentation of the modern occult, one 
must attend to the economic shift of occult power, a commodity once exclusive to the elite 
classes, now finding a wider audience amongst individuals of lower economic status. For 
the first time, the secrets of the occult tradition were becoming increasingly known, and 
“…this was because occult discourse was becoming increasingly common in the popular 
press. This democratization of occult knowledge, enabled by the mass media, has led to an 
inversion of the social standing of the typical occultist” (Gunn, 2005, p. 171).  
The inversion here, of course, refers to the transition from a culture which allowed 
for secrecy to a culture which encouraged the uncovering of secrets. This inversion no 
doubt leads us to the feet of a different character whose penchant for inversions was evident 
even within the symbolism of his own new, religious logo (the inverted pentagram). In 
order to explore the collapse of occult authority in greater detail, we turn now to a figure 
whose impact inadvertently sealed its fate, having exposed occult secrets on a level far 
beyond anything Crowley could have ever imagined. Though Crowley, too, was known for 
popularizing the occult and infamously publishing magical secrets (Gunn, 2005, p. 116), 
his influence paled in comparison to the legacy of Gunn’s third and final occultist—Anton 
LaVey. 
 
Section II.4: LaVey’s Ironic Imagery in the Mass Media 
 
Anton Szandor LaVey (1930-1997) was an American author, musician, and 
occultist who founded the Church of Satanism in 1966, a year which he dubbed Anno 
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Satanis (the first year of the reign of Satan). As an expert in various occult traditions, 
especially Crowley’s brand of ‘magick,’ LaVey claimed that “it was time to use magick to 
‘break apart the ignorance and hypocrisy fostered by the Christian churches’” (Gunn, 2005, 
p. 183). LaVey took extreme efforts to publicize his newfound religion by hosting such 
events as a “Satanic wedding” and a “Satanic baptism”—notorious, parodying spectacles 
which received worldwide coverage. One of the most iconic and lasting artifacts of this 
new religion was the publication of LaVey’s international best-selling book, The Satanic 
Bible. Despite its sinister title, the philosophy that pulsates within its pages was little more 
than an unoriginal “secular individualism that dismisses any belief in the existence of 
deity—good, evil, or indifferent” (Gunn, 2005, p. 184). LaVey was a kind of religious 
atheist, a free-thinker convinced of man’s need for ritual, dogma, and psychodrama, but 
who put no stock in the reality of the supernatural. Instead of worshipping a literal devil, 
LaVey advanced a “strident libertarianism…which touted the ‘virtues of selfishness,’” 
effectively re-signifying the idea of Satan to represent “the essence of human nature”—a 
philosophy that was argued to be “better equipped than Christianity to cope with this 
essence” (Gunn, 2005, p. 185). 
Aside from the banality of its content, the formal aspects of The Satanic Bible was 
a commercial success. One formal aspect was its forthright prose: LaVey was disinterested 
in perpetuating the rhetorical obscurities typical of past occult writers. Rather, he believed 
that the occult was a discourse in desperate need of demystification. According to LaVey, 
the historical subject of magic had long been stultified by the overuse of secret languages 
and encoding techniques. Riddled with “ramblings and esoteric gibberish…[occultists have 
been] unable or unwilling to present an objective view of the subject,” resulting only in 
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“clouding the entire issue so badly that the would-be student of sorcery winds up stupidly 
pushing a planchette over a Ouija board, standing inside a pentagram waiting for a demon 
to present itself…in general making a blithering fool of himself in the eyes of those who 
know!” (Gunn, 2005, p. 186). The secret to truly understanding the occult, LaVey suggests, 
is that there are no secrets. In other words, as far as LaVey was concerned, the occult was 
devoid of any genuinely supernatural meaning or substance. “This brand of demystification 
denies any content to the occult tradition, refiguring centuries of revealed knowledge as an 
aesthetic contrivance, a form of human mythmaking and fantasy that appeases a human 
need for ritual. …For LaVey, truth, as much as fantasy, is entertainment” and primarily 
serves a therapeutic function over a spiritual one (Gunn, 2005, p. 186; 190). While these 
iconoclastic claims harmonized well with his goals for textual disambiguation, LaVey’s 
greater contribution to the popularization of the modern occult is attributable more to his 
efficient use of symbolism and imagery in the mass media. 
Arguably the premiere example of LaVey’s success in advertising Satanism is 
rooted in the visual appeal of his sacred text, The Satanic Bible, “a widely recognized 
representation of occultism as a visual idiom—a kitschy, garish, sixties go-go brand of 
occultism—that, in terms of popular memory, outrivals the rhetorical contributions of all 
other twentieth-century occultists combined” (Gunn, 2005, p. 183). This average-sized 
paperback was a visual idiom that set into motion a new system of occult imagery. Consider 
the example of the “Sigil of Baphomet”—a minimalist design of an inverted pentagram 
encasing the head of a goat (Gunn, 2005, p. 187). This symbol has become an almost 
universally recognized logo or “visual surrogate” for Satanic practices, or for all occultism 
in general. LaVey also recorded his tawdry, theatrical ceremonies on film for the purposes 
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of advancing Satanism in the mass media—a move which would later prove to have 
profound, rhetorical effect. As Gunn notes, “LaVey’s genius resides in his ability to 
package and market Satanism, not necessarily in his articulation of Satanic philosophy” 
(Gunn, 2005, p. 184). Equipped with the fetishism of hellish imagery and symbolism, 
LaVey’s aims could be said to embody a postmodern attitude, having strayed from the 
modernist concerns of managing hidden knowledge. Unlike modern occultists who 
habitually concealed or disguised the content of magical truths and traditions, LaVey 
heralded the triumph of form over content, publicity over secrecy. In essence, LaVey’s 
efforts sounded the death knell of the modern occult, and ushered in what Gunn has termed 
the “occultic”—a postmodern reinvention of the occult that privileges image over text, 
resulting only in greater confusion in defining the meaning of the occult, a tradition now 
rendered “increasingly abstract and diffuse” (Gunn, 2005, p. 209).  
The occult lost its coherent identity not necessarily through LaVey’s wildly 
revisionist claims, but through his dabblings in imagistic irony (particularly the way in 
which it was represented in the mass media). Images need contextualization for their 
meaning, thus highlighting the importance of maintaining a clear link between images and 
their referents. But irony can trouble this relationship, for irony conveys one thing while 
meaning another. Failure to recognize when one is serious or not is a risk that has always 
haunted the trope of irony, and is partly why imagistic works of art can always engender a 
galore of interpretations. The ontology of imagery, therefore, points to what Gunn calls the 
“mobility of image”—whereby images, like the Sigil of Baphomet, are so easily “wielded 
to mean different things in different contexts. The less ambiguous or discrete the image, 
the less mobile it will be” (Gunn, 2005, p. 194). The image of an elephant, for example, is 
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less mobile (less likely to be misinterpreted) than the image of an inverted cross or star. 
Images can thus possess an ironic quality, able to convey a multiplicity of meanings, 
sometimes contradictory, depending on the way it is framed or contextualized. Because the 
meaning of an image depends on its context, the mobility of the image underscores the 
trouble of the occultic, for the occultic relies on visual abbreviations that are more easily 
given to higher potentialities of decontextualization, misinterpretation, and re-
signification. 
With the help of the mass media to amplify LaVey’s ironic imagery—his films of 
garish costumery, gloomy lighting, and irreverent parodies of Catholic rites and rituals—
such televisual “stock footage” was indeed successful at drawing widespread attention, but 
its intended goal resulted in a rhetorical backfiring. Acting as a reservoir of abbreviated 
signs, LaVey’s ironic visuals were taken by the mass media, loosened of their original 
message, and steadily incorporated as the evidence of a different narrative: the reality of 
an underground network of organized evil, facilitating such scandals as devil-worship, 
torture, cannibalism, and sexual debauchery. Recontextualized by the mass media in this 
way, LaVey’s attempts at promoting Satanism were lost; instead, they were reassigned to 
substantiate the gradually ascending cultural myths of Satanic ritual abuse. “LaVey’s 
playful attempts to re-signify highly connotative signifiers of darkness and evil as ‘kitsch’ 
backfired, as his church was later plagued by accusations of ritual murder, child abuse, and 
other occult crimes” (Gunn, 2005, p. 193). What was meant as a sardonic caricature of 
Christian ceremonialism instead became weaponized in the mass media, inadvertently 
fanning the flames of a new, social paranoia known as the “Satanic Panic” of the late 1980s. 
The televised representations of Satanism were continually recycled into new 
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representations that united the diversity of occult crimes under one face and banner, and 
“LaVey was incapable of controlling that spectacle once it was released into the popular 
media” (Gunn, 2005, p. 194). By supplying television with stock-footage of dark, occult 
activity, the Church of Satan was roundly demonized in the news and press; the Sigil of 
Baphomet evolved increasingly into an iconic scapegoat symbol for society to blame their 
anxieties. 
The dissection and “re-presentation” of Satanism on primetime television had 
become a premiere example of media sensationalism, an event that Gunn describes as a 
rumor panic—“a phenomenon in which various folk legends build momentum and 
metamorphose into realities in the popular media, often because of larger, political 
struggles…or in response to social crisis and anomie” (Gunn, 2005, p. 173). Rumor panics 
are literally panic-events caused by particular rumors—the product of wild imaginations 
fueled by a popular sense of fear or concern. Having now entered an economy of 
information (and, by extension, an economy of the image), rumors in developed Western 
societies are more easily spread through mass-media technologies: internet, television, 
film, etc. “…Unlike rumor panics of the past that were largely localized and contained 
(e.g., the Salem witch trials), contemporary rumor panics are widespread and perpetuate 
themselves on the basis of a limited set of iconic stimuli that is first disseminated or 
released into the popular imaginary and then re-signified as evidence for a given cultural 
narrative or myth” (Gunn, 2005, p. 202). In the case of Satanism and the narrative of 
systematic ritual abuse, LaVey’s home-recorded caricatures of Christian liturgy failed to 
preserve their irony; instead, these “iconic stimuli” were decontextualized and re-expressed 
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in the mass media as serious performances that confirmed the reality of a larger social 
mythos.  
The lesson here, it would seem, is that the domination of image-based media makes 
the occultic (in the form of irony) near impossible to control, for the media’s cherry-picked 
fragmentation of useful, ironical scenes in LaVey’s recordings were undoubtedly lent 
“more easily to appropriation by mass-media producers, politicians, and cultural leaders, 
usually to either entertain and titillate or to quell widespread anxiety about this or that crisis 
stimulus” (Gunn, 2005, p. 203). Not only is occultic irony difficult to manage in image-
driven conditions, but secrecy in general becomes an increasingly unrealizable expectation 
in modern society. With the triumph of the image and the decentering of speech and text, 
we now live in a world that emphasizes surveillance and publicity—the antitheses of 
secrecy. The prospect of secrecy cannot thrive in technologically advanced environments 
that produce cameras on nearly every computer and cell phone. Transparency and exposure 
are the new threats incurred by an economy that privileges visual forms of communication 
over other forms, hence the rise of the occultic and the increasing struggles to control the 
ways in which information is communicated through the mass media. As the French media 
theorist Jean Baudrillard (1929-2007) pointed out, “…power is located in the control of the 
codes of representation and signification, not in the control of the conditions and means of 
production” (Gunn, 2005, p. 201). Hence, the power of any magician—or rhetorician—
over the structure and development of human thoughts depends essentially on their mastery 




Section II.5: Rhetorical Considerations 
 
Through Blavatsky’s occult poetics, Crowley’s hermeneutics of authority, and 
LaVey’s ironic imagery in the mass media, Gunn provides a historical account for the death 
of the occult and the manifestation of a particular form of communication he terms the 
“occultic”—a rhetorical phenomenon that is tied to the secretive languages and symbolism 
of the modern occult. As such, the occultic is a postmodern discourse that attends to the 
paradoxes of secrecy in a world that privileges publicity. “If the term ‘occult’ is to retain 
its etymological roots in hiddenness and secrecy, then the concept of a ‘postmodern 
occultism’ is oxymoronic. … ‘Postmodern occultism’ or the occultic (or perhaps in 
fashionable, scholarly terms, ‘post-occultism’) is a label for the death of modern occultism 
as the elite study of secrets and the birth of occultism as a kind of floating signifier” (Gunn, 
2005, p. 224). Images now float freely throughout the media, able to be signified (and re-
signified) to mean a variety of things “that have nothing to do, necessarily, with the secret 
knowledge and practice of mysticism”; rather, they refer to “everything from comic books 
and horror films to rock music motifs and vague ‘moods’ or states of mind” (Gunn, 2005, 
p. xxiii). Mass media environments are toxic to the occult’s rhetorical devices that once 
empowered exercises in secrecy and irony, and so the occultic marks the end of the occult, 
or, more precisely, highlights the paradox of secrecy in post-occult conditions. “Given the 
power of the ‘news’ media and the speed with which information can move these days, the 
lesson here is that no charismatic leader is likely to succeed by means of deliberate 
misdirection or ironic spectacle. Of course there will always be exceptions, but in general 
the days of the Great Magus are over” (Gunn, 2005, p. 211). 
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In order to better understand the significance of the death of the occult and the 
subsequent birth of the occultic, one must first examine Gunn’s book as a whole. The 
transition from modern occult to postmodern occultic is chronicled in two parts, both of 
which are represented by their own respective themes: (1) Esoterica, and (2) Exoterica. 
Part one, Esoterica, referring to esoteric things (things which are intended for or likely to 
be understood by only a small number of people with a specialized knowledge or interest) 
consists of exploring the occultic as a privileged discourse of secrecy, covering the chapters 
illustrating how, at the turn of the twentieth century, the occult tradition itself was marked 
by secrecy, definite meaning, and cohering as “a discrete cultural practice with a long and 
rich historical legacy” (Gunn, 2005, p. xxvii). Here, the rhetoric of the occult was born as 
a logic of secrecy and discrimination, involving various strategies of subterfuge that 
assisted the aims of occultists seeking power and concealment. But then this secretive mode 
of discourse later undergoes tremendous change with the advancement of visual 
communication technology. This change occurs by the second half of Gunn’s book, 
Exoterica—referring to exoteric things (things which are meant for or likely to be 
understood by the general public)—where at the end of the twentieth century, the occult 
tradition experiences “undoing and fragmentation” (Gunn, 2005, p. xxvii). The 
overwhelming presence of surveillance and publicity in the modern world rendered the 
occult no longer a coherent tradition of secrecy; it had died, so to speak, and its rhetorical 
form (i.e., the occultic) was left in its wake, taking on the new paradoxical task of 
exotericizing the esoteric (or publicizing the secret and unknown) through various mass-
media technologies.  
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Given the media’s paradox in publicizing secrets, it is easier to notice how this 
paradox is a direct reflection of Gunn’s earlier analysis into the primary paradox of all 
communication: the rhetorical antinomy of ineffability (to express the inexpressible). 
Because ineffability is a condition that involves our describing something we do not have 
words for, it is important to recognize here that the media’s paradox of publicizing secrets 
will also involve similar attempts at representation—the creation of new codes of meaning 
and signification for images which we do not yet have contexts for. The control over 
contexts and meaning, like the control over words in general, is the province of the occultic, 
for occultic rhetoric is the mode of discourse governing the invention of language, the 
control of meanings, and the management of what is known and unknown. The relationship 
between the known (publicity) and unknown (secrecy) is one which carries relevant 
insights into the strategies of rhetorical manipulation, particularly as it functions within the 
mass-media. As was argued earlier, strategically obscure or ironic communication depends 
on secrecy: secrecy is the principle by which language can be made esoteric; it enables 
those with exclusive knowledge to penetrate deeper (hidden) meanings; it insulates the 
power of that knowledge to particular individuals and groups. Without a sense of secrecy, 
insiders would not be able to maintain their different status from outsiders. It is no surprise, 
therefore, that we should “be expecting increasingly spectacular dramas of secrecy and 
publicity” in modern rhetorical engagements (Gunn, 2005, p. 232), as new tactics for 
maintaining secrets will be matched only by equally clever tactics in invading them. Such 
is the paradox of the occultic—the media’s use of the principles of secrecy in order to 
“crusade” against secrecy, for the sake of controlling the flow of information (Gunn, 2005, 
p. 203). 
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 The occultic captures the quintessence of Gunn’s project—the study of the means 
of secretive communication, and how communication is used to serve hidden or concealed 
ends. Modern Occult Rhetoric is a uniquely theoretical text about “strange, mysterious, or 
difficult language, including the reasons or forces behind its invention, the experience of 
reading, interpreting, and reacting to it, and the ways in which it can get the better of us” 
(Gunn, 2005, p. xix). It can be argued, therefore, that occultic rhetoric is associated with 
secrecy because it is the genre of communication involved in the art or techniques of 
obfuscation—the action of making something obscure, unclear, or unintelligible. The 
post-humanist scholar Greg Goodale also suggests that occultic rhetoric is an exercise in 
obfuscating language, or what he terms “skotison.” Skotison, meaning “darken it,” refers 
to a “fondness for intentional obscurity” (Lanham, 1991, p. 141).  Goodale declares 
skotison to be the representative trope of Gunn’s rhetorical project, for it functions in five 
fundamental ways: (1) it manifests a privileged class of experts, (2) it creates readerships 
or followers, (3) it divides insiders from outsiders, (4) it earns trust through obfuscation, 
and (5) it works as an inside joke or code (Goodale, 2015, p. 104-106). The link between 
skotison and obfuscation is reinforced by their common themes of darkness, as obfuscation 
sprouts from its Latin root obfuscare, meaning “to darken.” 
The implications of Gunn’s work extends to the typified rhetoric of the academy, 
sometimes labeled academese, which shares in many of the occultic’s motifs of obscurity, 
manipulation, and dissimulation. Because much scholarly speech and writing is 
characterized as impenetrable, Gunn draws on a connection between the occult and the 
academy. “In short, current academic theory, particularly that which trucks in neologism 
and allegory, is the contemporary equivalent to the modern occult text, the postmodern 
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exemplar of the occultic par excellence” (Gunn, 2005, p. 52). The academy, in similar 
occult fashion, engages in its own forms of secret language that facilitates the invention of 
esoteric terminologies and the discrimination between insiders and outsiders. The 
contemporary Marxist philosopher Slavoj Žižek, for example, is an avid purveyor of this 
rhetorical form. His writings swell with “logorrhea”—long excursions into half-formed 
thoughts that aim to cleanse his readers of reasoned argument. “Almost always, at the 
critical juncture, when a clear argument is needed, Žižek takes refuge behind a rhetorical 
question, into which he packs all the mysterious incantations of the Lacanian liturgy” 
(Scruton, 2016). It is no surprise, then, how Gunn connects the occult to the academy when 
“…dissimulation is a basic element of all occult organizations” (Gunn, 2995, p. 193). 
Might there be a way to remedy this pattern of discourse?  
The objective of this study is to locate the principles undergirding a moral theory 
and practice of occultic rhetoric. What are the ethical imperatives that should govern our 
engagements in rhetorical obfuscation? What factors, if any, would justify the exclusion of 
others from accessing certain kinds of knowledge? In order to move forward, we look 
beyond Joshua Gunn to the work of Sissela Bok whose philosophy of secrecy may offer 
guidance or ethical coordinates that can best address the complexities of these questions. 
 
III. Chapter III. Sissela Bok and the Ethics of Secrecy  
 
Sissela Bok (Myrdal) is a contemporary Swedish-born American ethicist and 
philosopher. Following in the footsteps of her two Nobel-prize winning parents, Bok 
upheld the family’s tradition of intellectual achievement by studying at the Sorbonne in 
Paris. At the age of 19, however, she departed from the school to marry Derek Bok (a 
Harvard Law School graduate traveling abroad on a Fulbright scholarship). Accompanying 
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his return to America in 1955, she immediately procured her bachelors and masters degrees 
in psychology from George Washington University. After completing her doctorate in 
philosophy from Harvard University in 1970, she taught ethics at Harvard Medical School 
and its Kennedy School of Government, in addition to later posts as a professor of 
philosophy at Brandeis University. She is now stationed as a visiting fellow at the Harvard 
School of Public Health, and her husband, Derek, went on to assume presidency of Harvard 
University in 2006. Having written on such diverse topics as the ethics of lying (1978), 
secrets (1983), war and peace (1989), euthanasia (1998), violence (1999), common values 
(2002), and happiness (2010), Sissela Bok makes hardly any mention of either occultism 
or rhetoric, but her approach to the study of lying and secrets nevertheless provides a 
foundation for navigating what may otherwise be called the ‘ethics of occultic rhetoric.’ In 
this section, a discussion of Bok’s ethical theories on the subjects of secrecy and lying are 
provided, including her explorations into the dialectics of privacy and publicity, the role of 
intent, and the impact of power on moral decision-making. 
In continuation of the questions raised in her previous analysis on Lying: Moral 
Choice in Public and Private Life (1978), Bok goes further to outline the place and purpose 
of hiddenness within her equally admirable treatise Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment 
and Revelation (1983). Both works are used here as the primary texts for exploring the 
moral landscape of occultic language.4 Simply put, secrecy can be defined as intentional 
concealment (Bok, 1989, p. 5). Secrecy, then, can be characterized as an art of rhetoric 
concerned with managing the hiddenness of knowledge, the boundary dividing insiders 
from outsiders, and thus the exercising of an ethical sense of discernment and 
                                                 
4 The 1989 Vintage edition of Sissela Bok’s Secrets, not the 1983 version—and the 1999 Vintage edition of 
Bok’s Lying, not the 1978 version—is used here and throughout this project. 
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discrimination. “The Latin secretum carries this meaning of something hidden, set apart” 
writes Bok. “It derives from secernere, which originally meant to sift apart, to separate as 
with a sieve. It bespeaks discernment, the ability to make distinctions, to sort out and draw 
lines” (Bok, 1989, p. 6). Drawing lines, separating, or making distinctions offers a host of 
meanings qualifying the different nuances of secrecy to various cultures throughout 
history, several of which Bok showcases at length (Bok, 1989, p. 6-7): 
(1) Secretum (Latin) – concealment, hiding 
(2) Arcanum (Latin) – sacred, uncanny, mysterious 
(3) Heimlich (German) – intimacy and privacy 
(4) Arretos (Greek) – silence, unspoken, ineffable, unspeakable 
(5) Tanjinu (Slavic) – stealth, furtiveness 
(6) Lönn (Swedish) – lying, denial, deceit 
 
Of the multiplicity of ways in which secrets have been conceived, Bok determines 
that a sense of ‘hiddenness’ is the common denominator of them all. It would be a mistake 
to define secrecy solely on one or two of the above definitions, for they all have played a 
part in the making of what it means to be secret at some point in time. And yet shallow 
understandings of the role of hiddenness in daily life have continued to thrive in public 
thought, precisely as a result of a common tendency to ignore the diversity of nuances that 
go into a fuller definition of secrecy. The consequence of this shallowness has led secrecy 
to be generally interpreted in two simplistic ways: as either all good or as all bad. Those 
who recognize secrecy as all good commend the duty to conceal, when secrecy is thought 
in terms of its links to privacy, to intimacy, and to personal confidences. On the other hand, 
those who recognize secrecy as all bad commend the duty to reveal: “Negative views of 
secrecy are even more common” writes Bok (1989, p. 8), because of the customary 
association of secrets with conspiracies and corruption. While these two duties oppose each 
other, “Both aims have their place, whether in religious or therapeutics practices, or yet in 
politics or in criminal investigations. But to allow them to influence the definition of what 
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is secret risks casting a pall on all that is kept secret...”  (Bok, 1989, p. 9). What is needed, 
therefore, is a neutral philosophy of secrecy. 
Bok advocates for a neutral definition of the term because there is what she calls a 
“need for secrecy” (Bok, 1989, p. 18). Secrecy is a need (a social good) with the potential 
for corruption—not the necessity of it—leading Bok to conclude that secrecy is not 
exclusively negative; it can be positive as well. “We must retain a neutral definition of 
secrecy, therefore, rather than one that assumes from the outset that secrets are guilty of 
threatening, or on the contrary, awesome and worthy of respect,” writes Bok. “A degree of 
concealment or openness accompanies all that human beings do or say. We must determine 
what is and is not discreditable by examining particular practices of secrecy, rather than by 
assuming an initial evaluative stance” (Bok, 1989, p. 9). Secrecy therefore is neither 
explicitly all-good nor all-evil—secrecy itself is neutral; what is not neutral are the uses of 
secrecy. The uses of secrecy are biased: thus they are to be submitted under moral 
evaluation and weighed on a case by case basis. To what aim, for what reason, or by what 
purpose does one conceal truth and knowledge from another? Is the intent of the secret 
ethical? Only by properly identifying and segregating its neutral elements from its biased 
ones can we better understand and navigate the ethical quandaries of secrecy. 
 
Section III.1: On Privacy and Lying 
 
Similar to secrecy is the notion of privacy, both concepts of which share a sense of 
hiddenness, but also call for distinction. The private realm is the counterpart of the public 
realm, for there is no privacy without publicity. Neither is privacy the same as ‘isolation’ 
from the public, for privacy suggests being elected, not imposed. In her historical analysis 
Privacy: The Debate in the United States Since 1945, the legal scholar Philippa Strum 
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(1998) explains that some measure of privacy exists in all cultures, especially amongst the 
upper classes, that is until it gradually evolved into a sophisticated form within modern, 
individualistic, particularly Western nations. Intertwining with notions of democracy, 
liberty, society, and especially individuality, privacy is “the control human beings have 
over physical access to themselves and their possessions and over access to information 
about them” (Strum, 1998, p. 4). This echoes the description advanced by Sissela Bok who 
defined privacy as “the condition of being protected from unwanted access by others—
either physical access, personal information, or attention. Claims to privacy are claims to 
control access to what one takes—however grandiosely—to be one’s personal domain” 
(Bok, 1989, pp. 10-11). These definitions may very well draw inspiration from one of the 
most eloquent arguments made on behalf of privacy in the history of American law, The 
Right to Privacy, penned by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis5 in the Harvard Law 
Review (1890) where they defined privacy as the right to enjoy life by being “let alone” 
(p. 193). The right to be let alone finds expression, for instance, in the American Bill of 
Rights which guarantees the right of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Privacy plays a valuable role not just in the life of human beings, but to all manner 
of social creatures. In nature, matters of space and territoriality prompt what is known as 
the “flight distance” which is “the distance at which an animal will flee from an intruder of 
another species: around five hundred yards for an antelope, six feet for a wall lizard. With 
respect to their own species, many animals, given a chance, will space themselves at some 
distance from one another…” (Bok, 1989, p. 11). Needing one’s own space is a plea for 
                                                 
5 Louis Brandeis (1856-1941) was the first Jewish Justice of the Supreme Court. Sissela Bok coincidentally 
taught philosophy for seven years at Brandeis University, the school which was named after the famed 
court justice. 
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privacy, not necessarily secrecy. “A private life,” Bok remarks, “is rarely a secret life” 
(Bok, 1989, p. 11). Confusion about the boundary dividing secrecy from privacy stems 
from a categorical mistake between part and whole. While privacy is a part of the public 
realm, secrecy is in fact a part of privacy. Secrecy, unlike privacy, is “added protection” 
(Bok, 1989, p. 11). Bok argues that secrecy and privacy most overlap in the private lives 
of individuals when 
secrecy guards against unwanted access by others—against their coming 
too near, learning too much, observing too closely... It serves as an 
additional shield in case the protection of privacy should fail or be broken 
down. Thus you may assume that no one will read your diary; but you 
can also hide it, or write it in code, as did William Blake, or lock it up. 
Secret codes, bank accounts, and retreats, secret thoughts never voiced 
aloud, personal objects hidden against intruders: all testify to the felt 
need for additional protection. (Bok, 1989, p. 13) 
 
The propensity for privacy or secrecy to serve unethical ends also invites 
acknowledging the ethical differences between acts of hiddenness and acts of falsehood. 
So important is this distinction that Bok organized these two subjects into their own 
respective books, one on secrets and the other on lying. While secrets can be defined as 
acts of intentional concealment (Bok, 1989, p. 5), lies are less modest and ambiguous, being 
acts of intentional deception, particularly in the form of a statement (Bok, 1999, p. 15). 
Bok distinguishes lying from deception. Similar to the part-whole distinction between 
secrecy and privacy, lying is also a part of the whole that is deception which includes 
multiple forms of untruth, e.g., gestures, disguises, actions, inactions, and silence. These 
general forms of untruth constitute the wider notion of deception, while lying is but a 
species of deception—“an intentionally deceptive message which is stated” (Bok, 1999, p. 
13). In any event, secrets are different from lies, writes Bok, because “Lies are part of the 
arsenal used to guard and to invade secrecy, [whereas] secrecy allows lies to go 
undiscovered and to build up” (Bok, 1989, p. xv). Conflating these two ideas as equally 
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negative is not uncommon. “To confuse secrecy and deception is easy,” argues Bok, “since 
all deception does involve keeping something secret—namely, that about which one wishes 
to deceive others. But while all deception requires secrecy, all secrecy is not meant to 
deceive” (Bok, 1989, p. 7). In other words, despite their shared reliance on a need for 
hiddenness, lying and secrecy nevertheless differ in one fundamental sense: “Whereas I 
take lying to be prima facie wrong, with a negative presumption against it from the outset, 
secrecy need not be” (Bok, 1989, p. xv). This should not be taken to mean that Bok views 
lying as wrong at all times and in all cases; only prima facie wrong—wrong at first 
impression, or until proven otherwise.  
The negative presumption of lying constitutes Bok’s “Principle of Veracity” which 
is indebted to Aristotle’s view that “truthful statements are preferable to lies in the absence 
of special considerations” (Bok, 1999, p. 30). The principle of veracity also aligns itself 
with Christian theological traditions. For instance, the eighth commandment declares: 
“Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor” (Exodus 20:16). This prescription 
led early church fathers like St. Augustine (354-430) to construct an eightfold hierarchy of 
lies, all of which were classed as inherently sinful—some more serious than others (Bok, 
1999, p. 34; 250). In recognition of the fact that not all lies were of equal offense, St. 
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) also distinguished between three kinds of lies: “the officious 
or helpful lies; the jocose lies, told in jest; and the mischievous or malicious lies” (Bok, 
1999, p. 34; 255). The malicious kinds of lies constituted mortal sins while the previous 
kinds only venial. Nevertheless, it was believed that the inherent sinfulness of all lying (or 
“false signification”) broke the consonance between speech and thought, undermining the 
God-given purpose of communication which was to put on our lips what was in the mind. 
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Causing the tongue to distort the contents of the mind was a violation of truth and, 
therefore, always ruled as immoral. Not even in the event of saving someone’s life was 
lying considered a permissible alternative to truth-telling, for St. Augustine held that the 
soul was not something to be defiled for the sake of the body, nor should our love of 
neighbor exceed the love of self. “Therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver 
another from any danger whatever,” concurred St. Thomas Aquinas. “Nevertheless it is 
lawful to hide the truth prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says” (Aquinas, Summa 
Theologiæ, II-II, Q110, A3, ad. 4). Both Augustine and Aquinas maintained that hiding 
could be lawful, while lying could never be—a doctrine which further advanced the 
difference between lying and secrecy, the former being a sinful act, the latter being at times 
a justifiable duty.  
Proving difficult to live by, the strictness of the doctrine against lying prompted 
some Catholic thinkers throughout the ages to adopt a controversial form of equivocation 
known as “mental reservation” where statements or gestures would be made vague 
enough to allow for the audience’s misinterpretation while clear enough in the speaker’s 
mind to avoid lying. There eventually emerged two forms of this doctrine: (1) wide, and 
(2) strict. The wide version was considered permissible, for it referred to the general 
ambiguity of words, allowing outsiders a chance to make the correct inference; but the 
strict version was forbidden, for it referred to a ‘strictly’ mental qualifier that left no chance 
for correct inferences to be drawn (Bok, 1999, p. 35). While the theory of mental 
reservation helped to offer some sanction for the felt need to hide the truth in particular 
circumstances, it failed to satisfy the logic of the reformers. By the 16th century, many 
Protestants had gone even further to say that some forms of lying did not qualify as sins at 
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all. Such is the case with the Dutch lawyer Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) who theorized a 
difference between lying and “false speech,” a view analogous to the distinction between 
murder and killing: while murder was the unjust taking of a life, killing was the just taking 
of a life, as in certain cases of self-defense, euthanasia, or capital punishment. Grotius 
contended that only in the presence of a justa causa (‘just cause’) can some forms of lying 
be morally sinless when committed against people who imbibe evil intentions, i.e., people 
who have no right to the truth (Bok, 1999, pp. 37; 263). Speaking falsely to a thief, for 
example, is not an act of lying because truthfulness is not owed to someone who intends to 
use truth for the triumph of evil. Even a few recent Catholics of note are sympathetic with 
this position: Cardinal John Henry Newman (1801-1890), for instance, defended the 
distinction between “formal lying” and “material lying” (Newman, 2005, p. 237), and G.K. 
Chesterton (1874-1936) declared that “Every sane man knows he would tell a lie to save a 
child from Chinese torturers” (Chesterton, 1990, p. 90).  
Recognizing that some lies can be harmless (Bok, 1999, p. 57), avoiding harm 
(Bok, 1999, p. 78), or even countering harm (Bok, 1999, p. 140), Bok is friendly with this 
perspective when the intention is in good conscience or “purposely intended to benefit 
society” (Bok, 1999, p. 167). While the concept of “the noble lie” contradicts earlier 
religious theories about the injunction against lying, Bok admits “I have to agree that there 
are at least some circumstances which warrant a lie. And foremost among them are those 
where innocent lives are at stake, and where only a lie can deflect danger” (Bok, 1999, p. 
45). It would seem from this that Bok countenances a kind of duty to lie, or a duty to 
exercise some measure of deception when the circumstances justify it. Surely this duty or 
“warrant to lie” does not reflect the kind of Augustinian or Thomistic sense of duty to the 
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sacredness of truth anymore than it reflects a Kantian or deontological sense of duty to 
truth-telling as a rational and universalizable maxim. Rather, Bok’s sense of duty grants us 
something closer to a utilitarian ethic of communication—an ethic that recognizes a ‘duty 
to deceive’ based on the justifiability of the consequences or circumstances. Thus, 
significant attention to the value of our speech and actions seems to hover over a specific 
factor that precedes, animates, or undergirds them: our intentions.  
 
Section III.2: The Principle of Intent 
 
Intent is a curious element in the discourses of secrecy and lying: ‘secrecy’, after 
all, is defined as intentional concealment, and ‘lying’ as intentional deceptive statements. 
The relevance of intentionality to questions of morality is evident by these definitions, 
including for example the emphasis we place on the difference between murder and 
manslaughter: murder is judged by virtue of its intentional nature; without intent, murder 
is replaced by the term ‘manslaughter.’ It is “the intention…which constitutes the formal 
sin,” writes Cardinal Henry Newman (2005, p. 237). The fact that courts have universally 
warranted murder with a heavier penalty than manslaughter demonstrates the significance 
of intention to moral decision-making and the degrees to which we are judged responsible 
for our actions. Signs of premeditation are always indicative of the intentions behind our 
choices and behaviors. Both the knowledge and interpretation of our intentions ultimately 
determines how an audience judges our character and evaluates our culpability. The notion 
of intent is an abiding principle connecting ethics to human communication, for we all 
communicate amongst ourselves “with the intent or purpose to influence others in some 
way to some degree,” writes communication ethicist Richard Johannesen (2007, p. 38). We 
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all intend our words to bring about some kind of end, or change, or veritable action; 
therefore, rhetoric is inherently ethical. 
“Intention, as the very word denotes, means to tend to something” stated Thomas 
Aquinas (1225-1274). “…Consequently intention belongs first and principally to that 
which moves to the end” (Summa Theologiæ, I-II, Q12, A1, co.). The role of intentionality 
in communication ethics factors into the process of how we arrive at ethical judgments 
about rhetorical practices and circumstances. Whenever we intend to speak certain words 
in favor over other words, our language style reflects a kind of ‘end-in-view’ that 
determines what words we choose and why. Our communication patterns or language 
choices evince or reflect our intentions because choice-making is tied to the teleology of 
intent. “Choice is future-oriented, and never fully expressed in present action,” writes 
Sissela Bok. “It requires what is most distinctive about human reasoning: intention—the 
capacity to envisage and to compare future possibilities, to make estimates, sometimes to 
take indirect routes to a goal or to wait” (Bok, 1989, p. 23). It is not difficult to understand 
why intent figures so centrally to the moral configuration of rhetorical engagement. Speech 
theorists have long recognized the role of intent when analyzing and evaluating the ethical 
merits of public address. “If a dubious communication behavior seems to stem more from 
accident, from an unintentional slip of the tongue, or even from ignorance, often we are 
less harsh in our ethical assessment,” notes Richard Johanessen. “For most of us, it is the 
intentional use of ethically questionable tactics that merits our harshest condemnation” 
(Johanessen, et al., 2008, p. 8). 
Clearly, intentionality is inextricably linked to the discourse of secrecy for reasons 
relating to the moral evaluation of human actions. According to Bok, secrets can be defined 
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as virtually anything “so long as it is kept intentionally hidden, set apart in the mind of its 
keeper as requiring concealment.” She continues, “To keep a secret from someone, then, 
is to block information about it or evidence of it from reaching that person, and to do so 
intentionally…” (Bok, 1989, pp. 5-6). Because secrecy can sometimes be used for 
deceptive ends, intentionality also bears upon the ethics of lying. “The moral question of 
whether you are lying or not is not settled by establishing the truth or falsity of what you 
say,” argues Bok. “In order to settle this question, we must know whether you intend your 
statement to mislead” (Bok, 1999, p. 6). Morality pivots much on the fulcrum of intention, 
for “A false person is not one merely wrong or mistaken or incorrect; it is one who is 
intentionally deceitful or treacherous or disloyal” (Bok, 1999, p. 7). Treachery, or 
malicious intent, however, is not always a precondition for lying. Many falsities we tell 
each other are routine examples of paternalistic lies—“lies told for social benefit and for 
the supposed benefit of the deceived persons themselves” (Bok, 1999, p. 81), such as the 
myth of Santa Clause for children, or hopeful stories of recovery for the dying.  
Lying for the good of others—with altruistic intent—is one of the ways we attempt 
to justify deceptive speech. “The excuse of altruism is often grounded in the liar’s general 
belief in his own good will. ‘I mean well; therefore my lies will help’ is as frequent a leap 
of the mind as: ‘I mean no harm; therefore my lies can’t hurt.’ The possibilities of error 
about one’s good intentions are immense. But even if these intentions are good, they are 
obviously no guarantee of a good outcome” (Bok, 1999, p. 81). Altruistic intent participates 
in acts of secrecy as well, when we aim to protect others from harm by means of 
concealment. If Jews were hiding in the basement, would we be justified to keep this a 
secret from Nazi inquisitors? Would lying to the Nazis be the more secure, and therefore 
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more ethical, response? Or do we have a duty to always tell the truth? The role of intent is 
part of what binds communicative action to ethical consideration, for the fundamental 
element that forms the architecture of all morality depends upon the ability to intend, or 
freely choose, between a set of right and wrong options. Without this element, it would 
make little sense to be upset at someone for acting a certain way. Without intent, our sense 
of justice and feelings of indignation or remorse would be without foundation. Only 
through the possibility of intention can these things have rational existence, for it implies 
the freedom to have intended or chosen one course of action over another. 
 
Section III.3: Secrecy and Power 
 
An additional element integral to the discourse of secrecy is “control”—the control 
of managing our ability to reveal or conceal. As Bok outlines, “What is at issue is not 
secrecy alone, but rather the control over secrecy and openness” (Bok, 1989, p. 23). 
Because of its connection to the element of control, secrecy necessarily addresses questions 
concerning the moral uses of power: “Conflicts over secrecy…are conflicts over power: 
the power that comes through controlling the flow of information. To be able to hold back 
some information about oneself or to channel it and thus influence how one is seen by 
others gives power; so does the capacity to penetrate similar defenses and strategies when 
used by others” (Bok, 1989, p. 19). The striving of insiders and outsiders to manipulate the 
flow of information, about themselves and others, ultimately reveals a struggle to sustain 
control over the possession and allocation of knowledge. “True, power requires not only 
knowledge but the capacity to put knowledge to use; but without the knowledge, there is 
no chance to exercise power” (Bok, 1989, p. 19). If information is knowledge, and 
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knowledge is power, then every attempt at concealing (or revealing) information is, in 
effect, a rhetorical strategy that effects our range of free choice and action. 
Power and knowledge are linked to the rhetoric of secrecy by virtue of the ways in 
which secrecy manages the insulation and exchange of messages for particular publics. 
Exercising one’s control over the mediation of secrets is felt by both insiders and outsiders. 
For the insiders, “To have no capacity for secrecy is to be out of control over how others 
see one,” and for the outsiders, “To have no insight into what others conceal is to lack 
power as well” (Bok, 1989, p. 19). Protecting secrets is as much an exercise in rhetorical 
power as are the strategies for invading them. In addition to the conflict experienced 
between insiders and outsiders, the same tensions are also felt within each group: “for 
outsiders, between seeking to probe secrets and refraining therefrom, and between 
accepting and avoiding what is revealed; and for insiders, between keeping secrets and 
divulging them, and between seeking to overcome the restraint of outsiders with respect to 
what is in no way a secret, and acquiescing” (Bok, 1989, p. 40).  
Secrecy, therefore, works under the metaphor of a safety valve, the function of 
which guards or enables control over the flow of content. “Control over secrecy provides 
a safety valve for individuals in the midst of communal life—some influence over 
transactions between the world of personal experience and the world shared with others” 
(Bok, 1989, p. 20). Without this metaphorical safety valve to grant us the power to control 
the flow of information, the relationship between insiders and outsiders crumbles, and the 
power relations that would otherwise exist between the two groups would render our world 
unlivable. “With no control over such exchanges, human beings would be unable to 
exercise choice about their lives. To restrain some secrets and to allow others freer play; to 
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keep some hidden and to let others be known; to offer knowledge to some but not to all 
comers; to give and receive confidences and to guess at far more: these efforts at control 
permeate all human contact” (Bok, 1989, p. 20). This metaphor is ultimately rooted in 
Bok’s concept of discretion, the mechanism by which secrecy and openness are employed 
responsibly, sensitively, and tactfully. Discretion is “the intuitive ability to discern what is 
and is not intrusive and injurious, and to use this discernment in responding to the conflicts 
everyone experiences as insider and outsider” (Bok, 1989, p. 41). Discretion constitutes 
the power or capacity to exercise judgment about secrecy. 
Secrecy offers us the power to hide information about ourselves and others, and 
Bok lists four major elements of human autonomy where the safety valve of secrecy can 
be put to ethically justifiable uses: (1) identity, (2) plans, (3) action, and (4) property. The 
first subject of identity concerns the protection of what we are, or “the sense of what we 
identify as, through, and with. Such control may be needed to guard solitude, privacy, 
intimacy, and friendship” (Bok, 1989, p. 20). The second subject of plans concerns the 
protection of what we intend: “Imagine, for example, the pointlessness of the game of chess 
without secrecy on the part of the players” (Bok, 1989, p. 23). Without a hidden plan, there 
can exist no element of surprise. The idea of planning is also inseparable from actions. The 
third subject of actions concerns the protection of what we do: “for the sharing and working 
out of certain plans and for cooperative action. …Surprises are sprung and jokes explained. 
The result of the jury trial can be announced, the statue unveiled, the secretly negotiated 
treaty submitted for ratification, the desire to marry proclaimed. …Many projects need both 
gestation and emergence, both confinement and publicity” (Bok, 1989, p. 23). The last 
subject of property concerns the protection of what we own. Ownership in secrecy “is 
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closely linked to identity, in that people take some secrets, such as hidden love letters, to 
belong to them more than to others, to be proper to them.” At the same time, “the school-
bus driver who has a severe heart condition cannot rightfully claim to own this medical 
information, even though it concerns him intimately. Even when outsiders have less need 
to share the information than in such a case, the question who owns a secret may be hard 
to answer” (Bok, 1989, p. 24). While these four claims are defensible, Bok recognizes that 
they are not always persuasive, being sometimes abused beyond their appropriate limits. 
Nevertheless, their shortcomings notwithstanding, Bok admits “I shall assume that they do 
hold for certain fundamental human needs” (Bok, 1989, p. 24). 
While the power to guard information can be used to defend human autonomy, 
namely our identity, plans, actions, and property, secrecy also carries a variety of moral 
dangers. The English Catholic historian John E. E. Dalberg, better known as Lord Acton 
(1834-1902), once famously quipped that “power tends to corrupt and absolute power 
corrupts absolutely” (Acton, 1887). Suspecting that power necessarily leads to corruption, 
Acton was similarly contemptible toward the power of secrecy and its equal tendency to 
foster moral degeneration. Bok acknowledges that “such categorical dismissals are too 
sweeping, but they do point to the harm that secrets can do” (Bok, 1989, p. 25). There are 
several dangers associated with abusing the power of secrecy. (1) Secrets can debilitate 
judgment: scientific creativity, for example, suffers under secret conditions because “it 
shuts out criticism and feedback, leading people to become mired down in stereotyped, 
unexamined, often erroneous beliefs and ways of thinking. Neither their perception of a 
problem nor their reasoning about it then receives the benefit of challenge and exposure” 
(Bok, 1989, p. 25). (2) Secrets can also compromise moral character: by concealing our 
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wicked traits or vices, secrets can ‘corrode us from within,’ leading to moral deterioration. 
(3) Secrets tend to multiply: the insatiable, all-too-human desire for greater amounts of 
power and control lead us to increase the spread of secrecy, whether to exploit others or to 
protect ourselves. (4) Secrets can become obsessive: constant dependence on concealment 
forces one to live in a rigid and stifling existence, no longer serving sanity and free choice. 
Such irrational obsession with secrecy can also cultivate “the pathologies of prying into 
the private spheres of others,” like “voyeurism” (Bok, 1989, p. 26). (5) Lastly, secrets often 
affect others unintentionally: “When the freedom of choice that secrecy gives one person 
limits or destroys that of others, it affects not only his own claims to respect for identity, 
plans, action, and property, but theirs” (Bok, 1989, p. 26). 
Secrecy need not always lead to corruption. “A measure of control over secrecy 
and openness—and thus one form of power—is needed in personal life for equilibrium, 
liberty, even survival” (Bok, 1989, p. 106). On the other hand, however, the risk of moral 
danger is increased when secrecy is combined with power. “When power is joined to 
secrecy, therefore, and when the practices are of long duration, the danger of spread and 
abuse and deterioration increases” (Bok, 1989, p. 110). The relationship between power 
and secrecy is one which occupies an important place in Bok’s analysis, taking on two 
particular forms: (1) individual secrecy, and (2) collective secrecy. Individual secrecy 
refers to the power of a single person to exercise their own control over the flow of 
information. We are generally in favor of individual secrecy since “denying people the 
right to decide whether or not to reveal their own personal secrets would interfere in the 
most fundamental way with their freedom”; therefore, “the burden of proof is on those who 
would override such personal control” (Bok, 1989, p. 86). However, when it comes to 
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collective secrecy, the presumption reverses. Collective secrecy refers to the power of 
groups or institutions to control the flow of information. Working as a collection of 
individuals under a common entity, we generally disfavor institutional forms of secrecy, 
exercised by the likes of corporations and governments, because they naturally dispose of 
greater than ordinary power over others; therefore, “it is up to them to show why giving 
them such control is necessary and what kinds of safeguards they propose” (Bok, 1989, p. 
110). 
The dangers of secrecy also extend into the dangers of lying, for the power disposed 
in an act of lying stems from its reliance on the hiddenness of truth. “While not all that is 
secret is meant to deceive—as jury deliberations, for instance, are not—all deceit does rely 
on keeping something secret. And while not all secrets are discreditable, all that is 
discreditable and all wrongdoing seek out secrecy (unless they can be carried out openly 
without interference, as when they are pursued by coercive means)” (Bok, 1989, p. 26). 
Although distinct from secrecy, lies carry ethical dangers of their own—dangers which 
affect human knowledge and choice. Without an ability to distinguish truth from falsehood, 
human choice and survival would be imperiled, and society would collapse. “All our 
choices depend on our estimates of what is the case; these estimates must in turn often rely 
on information from others. Lies distort this information and therefore our situation as we 
perceive it, as well as our choices” (Bok, 1999, p. 19). While the power of secrecy leaves 
outsiders groping in the dark, the power of deceit manipulates or cripples human choice 
even further by succumbing to the use of illusions and/or false knowledge. Knowledge is 
power because, as was indicated earlier, the power to have control over the flow of 
knowledge influences the thoughts, choices, and actions of others: 
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To the extent that knowledge gives power, to that extent do lies affect 
the distribution of power; they add to that of the liar, and diminish that 
of the deceived, altering his choices at different levels. A lie, first, may 
misinform, so as to obscure some objective, something the deceived 
person wanted to do or obtain. …Lies may also eliminate or obscure 
relevant alternatives, as when a traveler is falsely told a bridge has 
collapsed. …Similarly, the estimates of costs and benefits of any action 
can be endlessly varied through successful deception. …Finally, the 
degree of uncertainty in how we look at our choices can be manipulated 
through deception. Deception can make a situation falsely uncertain as 
well as falsely certain. It can affect the objectives seen, the alternatives 
believed possible, the estimates made of risks and benefits. Such a 
manipulation of the dimension of certainty is one of the main ways to 
gain power over the choices of those deceived. And just as deception can 
initiate actions a person would otherwise never have chosen, so it can 
prevent action by obscuring the necessity for choice. This is the essence 
of camouflage and the cover-up—the creation of apparent normality to 
avert suspicion. (Bok, 1999, p. 19-20) 
 
As far as lying relates to rhetoric and communication, Bok admits that truth (i.e., 
legitimate knowledge) is an element of language necessary to the healthy functioning of 
all human societies. Granted, truthful statements can sometimes be employed for “coercive 
and destructive” ends, being “used as weapons, to wound and do violence,” but 
nevertheless, “…society could scarcely function without some degree of truthfulness in 
speech and action” (Bok, 1999, p. 18). One of the areas where truth is most jeopardized is 
in the difficulties of “public relations”—that rhetorical endeavor to present “the best 
possible image of a person or organization or event.” Bok argues that, “Publicity of this 
kind can involve manipulation, secrecy, at times deception and outright lies; such publicity 
can orchestrate and arrange how something is to appear, and how its problematic aspects 
are to be concealed. It is therefore in no sense opposed to secrecy, and often makes a 
mockery of publicity in the sense of public discussion and accountability. Indeed, the 
motives and actions kept secret or blurred by avalanches of information or by manipulation 
are often precisely those that go against the public interest” (Bok, 1989, pp. 114-115). 
Public relations are a troubling form of publicity that harbors, multiplies, or exacerbates 
the problems of secrecy and lying. But publicity may, at the same time, be a necessary 
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ingredient to the redemption of deceptive practices. In order to elevate the standards of 
moral action from the pitfalls of secrecy and lying, Bok proposes a variety of publicity-
based principles that work to deter unethical uses of deception. 
 
Section III.4: Ethical Considerations 
 
Grounded in the notion of publicity, Bok provides ethical coordinates that help to 
maintain a just exercise of secrecy. Publicity does not always guarantee such a standard, 
for it sometimes fosters the detriment of morality (as in the case of public relations which 
so often employs deception). On the other hand, however, publicity can also foster moral 
accountability, and therefore enhance the ethical uses of secrecy. At first, it is reasonable 
to wonder how publicizing secret information restores morality to secrecy. Is not publicity 
the opposite or elimination of secrecy? “The tension between the two is inevitable” writes 
Bok. “But it can be reduced by stressing the publicity of moral choice about secrecy” (Bok, 
1989, p. 112). In other words, there are secrets, and then there are the ethical rules that 
govern secrets: publicity refers not to the exposing of secrets themselves, but rather to the 
moral discussions and procedures undergirding our practices of secrecy. “The moral 
arguments for any secret practices must be capable of being publicly discussed. They 
should never themselves require secrecy; nor should the existence of the practices 
themselves” (Bok, 1989, p. 112). In order to debate the moral principles of secrecy, 
including their limitations in various circumstances, it is necessary that free and open 
discussion about these protocols be made available and accessible to the public. 
With the precondition of publicity in place to secure a more transparent exchange 
of ideas concerning the moral exercise of secrecy, Bok lays out two core presumptions: (1) 
equality, and (2) partial individual control. Concerning the presumption of equality, Bok 
 113 
insists that we avoid hypocrisy and double-standards: “Whatever control over secrecy and 
openness we conclude is legitimate for some individuals should, in the absence of special 
considerations, be legitimate for all” (Bok, 1989, p. 27). A just society must allocate such 
power evenly across the board, unless constraints are deemed necessary or appropriate for 
certain situations, like in journalism and government, where risks of abuse are heightened 
or more dangerous than average. In such cases, “they would have to advance reasons 
sufficient to overcome the initial presumptions favoring equality” (Bok, 1989, p. 27). Bok’s 
presumption of equality stems from her denunciation of esoteric ethics, a “most corrupting 
exercise of secrecy” where people do not uphold their morals equally; instead, they practice 
“one set of moral principles for public consumption and another for themselves” (Bok, 
1989, p. 112). Esoteric ethics attempts to conceal this double-standard, for it is as much 
about secrecy as it is an application of secrecy unto itself. Esoteric ethics is “secrecy about 
one’s own moral position” (Bok, 1989, p. 112), allowing people to set up hypocritical 
standards that exempt themselves from the presumption of equality. Bok, who is “truly 
concerned for consequences,” favors a public ethics, and “condemn[s] esoteric ethics 
categorically, as a minimal requirement to offset some of the worst effects of the shared 
predicament on moral judgment and character” (Bok, 1989, p. 113). Secret ethics 
discourages the consistent application of equality, thus skewing choice and harming both 
insiders and outsiders. 
Concerning her second presumption of partial individual control, Bok insists that 
we secure a middle ground between ‘no control’ and ‘full control’ over secrecy. Having no 
control over secrecy would render our world literally naked, devoid of any sense of privacy 
with respect to our identity, plans, actions, and belongings—“all of which we should 
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legitimately be able to claim” (Bok, 1989, p. 27). The lack of control over the safety valve 
of private information (whether due to some mental impairment or social coercion) 
translates into an absence of choice, for without control, there would be no choice but to 
reveal all that is personal and intimate about our lives. On the other hand, however, having 
full control would aggravate the dangers of secrecy—“it would force us to disregard the 
legitimate claims of those persons who might be injured, betrayed, or ignored as a result of 
secrets inappropriately kept or revealed” (Bok, 1989, p. 28). Whether by regarding all 
secrets to be sacrosanct and inviolable, or by the sheer impossibility to eavesdrop or crack 
encoded messages, such full authority over secrecy would invite criminal abuse as much 
as it would induce social panic, for societies depend in part “on the possibility of predicting 
and forestalling or preparing for danger” (Bok, 1989, p. 18). In light of these two 
extremes—no control and full control—Bok recommends an ethic of partial individual 
control, a moderate and justifiable measure of freedom “over the degree of secrecy or 
openness about personal matters—those indisputably in the private realm” (Bok, 1989, p. 
27). The virtue of control, flanked by the vices of its deficiency and excess, is reflected in 
the analogue of fire: 
Secrecy is as indispensable to human beings as fire, and as greatly feared. 
Both enhance and protect life, yet both can stifle, lay waste, spread out 
of all control. Both may be used to guard intimacy or to invade it, to 
nurture or to consume. And each can be turned against itself; barriers of 
secrecy are set up to guard against secret plots and surreptitious prying, 
just as fire is used to fight fire. (Bok, 1989, p. 18) 
 
 In addition to the arguments undergirding the moral exercise of secrecy, Bok also 
proposes a set of principles to guide our policies on lying. All lies depend on secrecy, for 
lies are “inherently secretive” (Bok, 1999, p. 92), requiring an element of hiddenness in 
order for lies to be of any use. But lies also go beyond secrecy—whereas secrecy hides the 
truth, lying distorts it. The tampering of truth always demands justification, according to 
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Bok, and the justification of lies, like secrets, thus implies the need for an audience. 
Without an audience, justification would be impossible. “Moral justification, therefore, 
cannot be exclusive or hidden; it has to be capable of being made public” (Bok, 1999, p. 
92). Publicity, again, resurfaces as the formal constraint necessary for the open deliberation 
of moral principles. Secret moral principles cannot satisfy such a condition; thus publicity 
becomes “crucial to the justification of all moral choice” (Bok, 1999, p. 92). Moreover, 
justification is not simply a defense of one’s position before any kind of public, but rather 
a public of reasonable persons. Reasonable persons refer not only to those from the liar’s 
perspective, but also to those who are affected by our lies, both directly and potentially. 
“The test of publicity asks which lies, if any, would survive the appeal for justification to 
reasonable persons” (Bok, 1999, p. 93), thus allowing for the liar to reflect on the privately 
held assumptions and biases undergirding his or her reason(s) to lie. With the consideration 
of how acts of lying affect both the liar and those lied to, one can better curb self-deception 
and other hasty calculations that may go into our engagements in deceit. 
 After reestablishing the significance of publicity to moral decision-making, Bok 
lays out her three levels of justification, a triple-pronged procedure for determining 
whether a lie is justifiable: (1) we scrutinize our conscience, (2) we solicit helpful advice, 
and (3) we enter into public debate. The first level of justification deals with our 
conscience, forcing us to “ask whether there are alternative courses of action that will 
achieve the aims one takes to be good without requiring deception” (Bok, 1989, p. 113). 
Conscience acts as a kind of internal interlocutor or inner judge by which moral choices 
are reflected and evaluated. However, the soul-searching method cannot guarantee the 
conditions of publicity, for “while consciences can ravage, they can also be very 
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accommodating and malleable. Most often, those who lie have a much easier time in 
justifying their behavior so long as their only audience is their own conscience” (Bok, 
1999, p. 94). The second level of justification deals with solicited advice, compelling us 
“to set forth the moral reasons thought to excuse or justify the lie, and the possible 
counterarguments” (Bok, 1989, p. 113). Looking up precedents, consulting priests, 
lawyers, and moral philosophers, or asking advice from friends and family allows one to 
go beyond our own thought-experiments. Unfortunately, however, “in the more difficult 
cases, where the stakes are high, such consultation is still insufficiently ‘public.’ It does 
not [always] eliminate bias; nor does it question shared assumptions and fallacious 
reasoning” (Bok, 1999, p. 96). The third level of justification deals with public debate, 
having us “ask how a public of reasonable persons would respond to such arguments. To 
deliberate, to reason, to seek to justify in public” (Bok, 1989, p. 113). This level summons 
the consultation of all persons with any manner of allegiances. Publicity at this degree 
“rules out the hand-picking of those who should be consulted. It is not so much a matter of 
whether many or a few have access to the public justification, as that no one should be 
denied access” (Bok, 1999, pp. 97-98).  
From conscience to colleagues to community, the flow of the justification 
procedure moves from the private sphere to the public sphere, cultivating an increased 
assurance that the lie is justified. But this procedure, albeit useful, is not without some 
drawbacks. “The test of publicity is not always needed; where needed it cannot always be 
implemented; if implemented it does not always bring forth solutions to moral quandaries. 
Given these limitations, it can nevertheless reduce the discrepancy of perspectives, shed 
light on moral reasoning, and facilitate moral choice” (Bok, 1999, p. 103). Given the 
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precondition of publicity, the presumptions of equality and partial individual control, and 
the procedure of conscience, advice, and debate, Bok has proffered a robust philosophy 
that attends to the ethics of deceptive communication. Deception, ranging from secrets to 
lies, effects a diverse range of scenarios, many overlapping with each other. In Lying, Bok 
explored “lies in wartime…or to children; lies told to protect confidentiality or to conduct 
research” (Bok, 1999, p. xxxiv), and in Secrets, Bok explored “confession, psychotherapy, 
gossip, trade secrecy, cryptography, and undercover policing” (Bok, 1989, p. 18). These 
myriad forms of deception, especially in the case of secrecy (since secrecy is fundamental 
to lying), inspire theoretical research and investigation, and reinforce Bok’s everlasting 
relevance to the study of rhetoric and the ethics of communication. “The resulting 
challenge for ethical inquiry into the aims and methods of secrecy is great,” writes Bok, 
and “…it is especially important to look at them separately, and to examine the moral 
arguments made for and against each one” (Bok, 1989, p. 27). That challenge is set forth 
in the next and final section of this project. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, Bok’s principles are extracted and 
implemented within the context of secretive/deceptive discourse, the mode of 
communication which Joshua Gunn terms “occultic rhetoric.” This mode of rhetorical 
deception deserves ethical reflection. Occultic rhetoric, combined with the ethics of secrecy 
and lying, are thus synthesized in an attempt to formulate what may otherwise be 
designated an “ethics of occultic rhetoric.” Fulfilling the challenge to study the methods of 
rhetorical deception, and examine the moral arguments for and against each one, is a unique 
undertaking that invites further scholarly analysis and debate. What forms of occultic 
rhetoric may be permissible or impermissible? How does context influence its justification? 
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When does occultic rhetoric constitute a lie instead of a secret message? To what extent do 
our intentions determine the merits of obfuscation? Is truth-telling overrated? What 
considerations may override the presumptions of equality and partial individual control? 
These and other questions comprise some of the main dilemmas and predicaments 
addressed within the ethics of occultic rhetoric. 
 
IV. Chapter IV. Bok and Gunn on the Ethics of Occultic Rhetoric  
 
In this final chapter, the ethics of Sissela Bok now merges into conversation with 
the occultic rhetoric of Joshua Gunn. The convergence of their scholarship is organized 
below to address the problems of occultic rhetoric, its application, and its consequences. 
From the start of this project, Gunn’s resignation to the inevitability of occultic rhetoric 
prompted Kevin Meyer of Illinois State University to assert that Gunn leaves the reader 
“longing for an extended discussion” of this topic. In his review of Modern Occult 
Rhetoric, Meyer noted that Gunn “problematizes academic language without offering 
solutions or suggesting approaches to balance better the ability of academic discourse to 
include as well as exclude audiences. Greater attention to strategies for making the 
language of the academy more accessible to those within as well as those outside its walls 
would strengthen Gunn’s argument” (Meyer, 2007, p. 119). Meyer steers the conversation 
toward the value of ‘accessibility’ (or penetrability, intelligibility) and the ways in which 
we can cultivate it in academic language. The result of this inquiry moves occultic rhetoric 
into the purview of moral consideration, thus initiating a new discourse on the “ethics of 
occultic rhetoric.” To develop this ethics, this chapter attempts to answer the primary 
question of this project: How might the scholarship of Sissela Bok offer a way to more fully 
develop the ethical implications of, and solutions for, Gunn’s argument? 
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This chapter initiates a cross-fertilization of ideas between Gunn and Bok in order 
to generate helpful coordinates that can guide an ethical use of occultic rhetoric. It begins 
first by reviewing specified abuses of occultic rhetoric in academia, such as those 
committed by Deleuze, Guattari, Lacan, Butler, and others. The sampled writings of these 
scholars constitute the primary problem of academic language that this project seeks to 
examine and rectify. In addition to exploring and comparing a variety of cryptic, scholarly 
prose, I then analyze the faulty excuses promoted within Gunn’s philosophy of 
communication in his attempt to justify the inevitability of occultic rhetoric (and therefore 
the impossibility of an ethics). He advances a relativistic view of language that cannot 
account for the moral system he strives to promote. The inconsistencies and contradictory 
presumptions adhered to within his theoretical system of thought force me to supplant (and 
supplement) his work with the concepts and categories proposed by Bok from her texts on 
secrecy and lying. Although Bok composes the spine of philosophical research that I rely 
on in this project, I also make use of other works (like Kenneth Burke, etc.) to inform my 
construction of an ethics of occultic rhetoric. In the end, I take up the question of 
‘justification,’ and outline several guideposts that can encourage both insiders and 
outsiders to engage in acceptable forms of occultic rhetoric within an academic context. 
 
Section IV.1: The Occult and the Academy  
 
Gunn’s book Modern Occult Rhetoric is about a particular kind of experience: “the 
experience of picking up a volume in the local bookstore, reading the first few pages, and 
finding ourselves utterly mystified.” Modern Occult Rhetoric “is also about the ways in 
which individuals use language (and the ways in which language uses individuals) to 
harbor secrets, creating groups of insiders and outsiders” (Gunn, 2005, p. xv). While these 
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types of experiences are ubiquitous to human life, Gunn focuses primarily on the dynamics 
of this rhetoric within the academy, and how this language mirrors the rhetoric of the occult 
tradition. Consider the introduction of his book where he starts with a playful example of 
the dense, “torturous jargon” of philosophers (Gunn, 2005, p. xv). This jargon provides the 
reader a taste of occultic rhetoric, illustrating the breadth and scope of how cryptic the 
vocabulary of philosophers can be: 
this hodgepodge of esoteric terms and academic jargon is designed to 
discriminate among those who can read it and those who cannot. When 
writing the example ruse, I wanted the aesthetic form of the prose to 
reflect the content or argument: the difficult language of philosophy is 
akin to the difficult language of the occult tradition; both traditions 
simultaneously obscure the truths their vocabularies seek to deploy, and 
both utilize difficult language to create readerships. In short, the content 
domains of philosophy and the occult share a common logic of 
discrimination. Their prose, like mine, is designed to delight and to 
encourage the reader who is “in the know” and to annoy, discourage, or 
perhaps even intrigue the reader who is not. (Gunn, 2005, p. xix) 
 
Occultic rhetoric characterizes much of the rhetoric of the academy, and as the great 
neo-Aristotelian philosopher Mortimer Adler reminds us: “Philosophers are notorious for 
having private vocabularies” (Adler & Doren, 1972, p. 105). The vocabularies of 
philosophers are not unknown for their private, occultic style. In fact, the several 
paragraphs of impenetrable prose at the beginning of Gunn’s book are meant to recreate 
the feeling one experiences when encountering the literary obscurantism of the two, 
collaborative French philosophers Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) and Felix Guatarri (1930-
1992). Whether reading their Anti-Oedipus or A Thousand Plateaus, the works of Deleuze 
and Guatarri are widely considered to be “anything but straightforward”; indeed, their 
difficult language is specifically designed “to upset and subvert binary thinking and the 
philosophical categories of transcendence. My intent here is not to ridicule their language,” 
writes Gunn, “but rather to suggest that their philosophical rhetoric is occultic in terms of, 
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first, its having created a dedicated group of followers who have become absorbed in the 
argot of ‘D&G,’ and second, its explicit claim to a better way of understanding the world—
indeed, for understanding the enterprise of philosophy itself” (Gunn, 2005, p. xxiv). 
Deleuze and Guattari are among the premiere exemplars of occultic stylists, but they are 
far from the only ones who employ this manner of discourse. Enormous sectors of 
academia are replete with a penchant for dissimulation, most particularly the humanities 
and the social sciences. 
Consider, again, the gender philosopher Judith Butler whom Gunn compares to a 
modern-day mystic (Gunn, 2005, p. 52). Her project consists of “messing with grammar” 
so as to “locate spaces in which people can resist oppressive cultural logics, such as 
heterosexual gender norms (or ‘heteronormativity’)” (Gunn, 2005, p. 47). Butler’s rhetoric 
is characterized as mystical because of the way it fascinates “frequently by obscurity.” The 
equivalency of Butler to an occultist is reinforced by the philosopher Martha Nussbaum 
who declares that Butler is a “witch” whose baffling convolutions are “really only designed 
to create a cultish following” (Gunn, 2005, p. 220). Once again, private vocabularies 
feature centrally in occultic discourse, the purpose of which is to assume the position of 
originating authority over an esoteric vocabulary. Rather than rely on simple and direct 
communication, Butler instead “prefers a verbosity that causes the reader to expend so 
much effort in deciphering her prose that little energy is left for assessing the truth of the 
claims” (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 4). For this, Butler has won first prize in the annual Bad 
Writing Contest sponsored by the journal Philosophy and Literature, writes Nussbaum. 
Not only is obscurity the choice mechanism behind Butler’s importance, but it also serves 
as the weapon by which Butler bullies her readers into submission: 
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[Obscurity] bullies the reader into granting that, since one cannot figure 
out what is going on, there must be something significant going on, some 
complexity of thought, where in reality there are often familiar or even 
shopworn notions, addressed too simply and too casually to add any new 
dimension of understanding. When the bullied readers of Butler's books 
muster the daring to think thus, they will see that the ideas in these books 
are thin. When Butler's notions are stated clearly and succinctly, one sees 
that, without a lot more distinctions and arguments, they don't go far, and 
they are not especially new. Thus obscurity fills the void left by an 
absence of a real complexity of thought and argument. (Nussbaum, 1999, 
p. 4) 
 
Despite this fact, however, Gunn is not here to ridicule Butler’s rhetoric. Instead, 
like his defense of Deleuze and Guattari, “[he is] sympathetic to Butler’s project and 
agree[s] with the reasons for her call for challenging prose” (Gunn, 2005, p. 52). Gunn is 
ultimately a defender of occultic rhetoric; however, many of his colleagues are not 
sympathetic with this position. Various exponents of difficult language in recent history 
alone have been met with fierce criticism. Take for example the German existentialist 
philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) whose excessive use of neologisms, 
wordplay, and opaque writing style brought him to the center of academic attention (and 
vilification). “Heidegger’s bombastic mode of expression, whereby he sought to express 
insights in a manner which escaped the distorting effects of traditional philosophical 
terminology, has been ridiculed by philosophers who advocate clarity and exactness, for 
example Rudolf Carnap and A. J. Ayer. Even Gilbert Ryle, who appreciated aspects of 
Heidegger’s account of the self, thought that his phenomenology would end up in a ‘self-
ruinous subjectivism’, or in a ‘windy mysticism’. Yet, when he wanted to, Heidegger 
himself could write with astonishing clarity and simplicity and with penetrating insight” 
(Moran, 2002, p. 192). Even the late German historian Klemens von Klemperer (1916-
2012) remarked that “I am impatient with [Heidegger’s] metalanguage” (Klemperer, 1994, 
p. 2). Some scholars might impugn Heidegger’s critics as biased reactionaries who opposed 
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his work on the basis of his Nazi sentiments, but this would make no sense of the equally 
shared invective for the Jewish postmodernism of Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995). 
Levinas was another existentialist philosopher whose works deployed a thick soup of 
mystical prose (Miller, 2017), often in response to the ethical failings of Heidegger’s 
philosophy. But in the eyes of the contemporary theologian David Hart, Levinas’s obscure 
language did little to advance the conversation: 
Levinas's importance, it must be noted, lies not in the clarity of his 
thought (which is, in truth, a prodigy of incoherence), but in the utter 
purity of his idiom; in his work one encounters a logic of the ethical that 
other thinkers repeat, but none with such absolutely unalloyed and 
hyperbolic intensity. It should also be noted that the good opinion 
that Levinas's work at present enjoys is so great (in large part because it 
appears apt to satisfy some commendable appetite in certain thinkers in 
this postmetaphysical age for some language of moral responsibility) 
that it may seem somewhat coarse to observe that it is poor philosophy—
the banal tortured into counterfeit profundity, the obviously false 
propounded as irresistibly true, other forms of thought caricatured and 
condemned with a vehemence frequently vicious, and a fulminant tone 
of mystical authority assumed wherever principled argument proves 
impossible. (Hart, 2003, p. 75) 
 
As a self-described Levinasian, Gunn defends occultic rhetoric in his attempt to 
honor the need for philosophers to grapple with the ineffable. The ineffability of ‘the Other’ 
in Levinasian philosophy is among the canons of translinguistic ideas paralleling the 
ineffability of ‘the Real’ in Lacanian psychoanalysis. As a comparably faithful admirer of 
Jacques Lacan, Gunn also seeks to defend the need for social scientists to grapple with 
the ineffable. The writings of the French psychoanalyst has “been routinely attacked for its 
difficulty, and his many followers are quick to acknowledge that reading Lacan’s prose is 
anything but easy. One might say Lacan’s letters seem to take on a life of their own, as if 
they held an authority over the reader” (Gunn, 2005, p. 139). Social scientists are no less 
guilty of having private vocabularies, and are perhaps no less deserving of similar critiques 
like those offered by Hart and others. The contemporary philosopher Raymond Tallis, for 
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instance, is one such critic contending that “Lacan’s ideas were insulated against critical 
evaluation by his writing style.” In fact, “His quasi-mathematical, pseudo-logical 
fantasies—the culmination of the cargo cult science of his school—propounded in 
interminable seminars, were agonised over by his congregation who suffered appallingly 
from their inability to make sense of them. They felt unworthy of the Master” (Tallis, 
1997). Lacan’s legacy now seems to live on within literature departments where they 
attempt to (or pretend to) make sense of his “gnomic teachings,” whereas the legacy of 
“Aleister Crowley…whom Lacan most resembles” has not been so fortunate (Tallis, 1997). 
Gunn’s painstaking analysis into the hermeneutical methods of Aleister Crowley is 
no accident. The relationship between Lacan and Crowley—indeed between the academy 
and the occult—rests upon a single, foundational endeavor: to describe or define 
phenomena that transcends the representational powers of language. Whenever we 
encounter anomalies or confront the unknown—phenomena that fail to fit neatly within 
our mental preconceptions or linguistic categories—our attempts at description and 
definition become ever more explorative, experimental, inventional, or more simply, 
theoretical. But as with all theoretical communication, our descriptions and definitions of 
reality are never neutral. All talk about talk, all theory, is biased, partisan, or sermonic 
(Weaver, 1970), or as Gunn prefers, occultic (Gunn, 2005, p. 52). “Theory,” then, is the 
academy’s equivalent to the poetic incantations of the occult (i.e., occult poetics), since all 
expression is a form of preaching. “Academic terminology (most especially theoretical 
vocabulary) is…deployed in a manner that is said to invite esoteric understanding, often 
for the purposes of demystifying human behavior or social reality,” writes Gunn. “[T]heory 
should be understood as a proposed alternate vocabulary for describing human reality. For 
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example, Rorty has argued that the difficult vocabularies of Heidegger and Derrida 
represent a poetic or ‘literary’ attempt to ‘suggest new questions in new terms.’ Insofar as 
everything meaningful is within the domain or map of human representation, new 
vocabularies help to expand meanings and, as Rorty suggests, possibilities for change” 
(Gunn, 2005, p. 51). Tapping into the expansive power of language is as much the method 
of the occult as it is for the academy. Just as Blavatsky, Crowley, and LaVey “are revered 
authorities of esoteric knowledge, so too are Heidegger, Derrida, and Butler authorities in 
an esoteric language game…” (Gunn, 2005, p. 51-52). Authority over language is the 
hallmark of academia, and the social sciences are particularly adept at this technique 
because of their relentless investigations into the ineffable.  
Consider the psychoanalytic preoccupation with representing the unconscious. 
“Psychoanalysis is a contemporary occultic discourse precisely because of the pride of 
place it secures for the ineffable,” (Gunn, 2005, p. 140). Because its truth is beyond 
representation, psychoanalytic investigations into the unconscious are steeped in 
theoretical communication, rendering the social sciences an elite coven of jargon and 
academese. Rhetorical scholar Richard Weaver in his Ethics of Rhetoric (1953) highlighted 
that the language of the social sciences contains a plethora of “conspicuously poor writing” 
because, among other reasons, it suffers from an equivocation between scientific truths and 
moral truths (Weaver, 1953, p. 189). In order to downplay this equivocation, social science 
literature often relies on a pool of sophisticated vocabulary that serves to conceal its 
flaws—a vocabulary that strongly resembles the official language of bureaucracy: “The 
bureaucrat’s world is prim and proper and aseptic, and his language reflects it (perhaps one 
could say that the discourse of the bureaucrat is social science ‘politicalized’)” (Weaver, 
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1953, p. 199). One example of this language can be seen in the ancient adage: “Too many 
cooks spoil the broth.” This phrase is far too simple and direct. For a social scientist, the 
phrase should read: “Undue multiplicity of personnel assigned either concurrently or 
consecutively to a single function involves deterioration of quality in the resultant product 
as compared with the product of the labor of an exact sufficiency of personnel” (Weaver, 
1953, p. 200). Written this way, any simplicity of truth and meaning is wonderfully 
deflected by jargon.  
The abuse of obscurity within the social sciences has attracted the attention of 
various scholars who have pondered its relationship to magical thinking and practice. For 
example, in his Social Sciences as Sorcery (1972), the sociologist Stanislav Andreski 
(1919-2007) makes mention of how “constant attention to the meaning of terms is 
indispensable in the study of human affairs, because in this field powerful social forces 
operate which continuously create verbal confusion” (Andreski, 1974, pp. 60-61). The 
confusion engendered by obscure rhetoric is more or less strategic, working like a 
smokescreen that limits or controls the range of human thought and action. Such is the 
method of magic. But science, on the other hand, triumphed over magic because its method 
sought to reveal the truth rather than disguise or distort it. “Sorcery lost, not because of any 
waning of its intrinsic appeal to the human mind, but because it failed to match the power 
created by science. But, though abandoned as a tool for controlling nature, incantations 
remain more effective for manipulating crowds than logical arguments, so that in the 
conduct of human affairs sorcery continues to be stronger than science” (Andreski, 1974, 
pp. 98-99). This infiltration of magic into the sciences has confused the boundaries of 
science and the occult. Echoing Weaver’s disputes, the contemporary psychologist Paul 
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C. Vitz argues in his Psychology as Religion (1994) that the equivocation of both scientific 
truth and moral truth has made “selfism” (e.g., psychology and psychotherapy) 
indistinguishable “from religion, literature, political ideology and ethics” (Vitz, 1994, p. 
55). Our failure to distinguish between science and the occult tradition does not necessarily 
mean that there is no distinction, “but rather that the rhetoric of each is often experienced 
by the ‘outsider’ as occultic” (Gunn, 2005, p. xxiv). Even the specialized jargon of the 
natural (hard) sciences can be experienced as occultic, for the abuse of metaphors among 
physicists has even been known to summon “unintelligible” notions, such as the 
nonsensical idea that space is literally curved (Tallis, 2015). 
In summary, the permeation of abstruse language is a feature endemic to higher 
education that renders a variety of parallels between magicians and academicians. “[T]he 
contemporary academic paradigm is occultic,” writes Gunn, and “a litany of homologies” 
are evident by the ways in which scholars at universities (like magi in secret societies) 
climb up various promotion systems toward increasingly higher degrees of prestige; or, 
how the processes of “publication” and “initiation” serve mysterious power structures; or, 
how “close textual reading” resembles the “hermeneutics of the Kabbalah”; or, most 
pertinently, how the esoteric language of modern occultism mirrors the rhetoric of 
postmodernist theorists (Gunn, 2005, p. 231). If these parallels prove anything, it is only 
that all individuals within the arts and sciences are tendentiously vulnerable to the suspect 
practices and politics of verbal complexity, a tendency which has resulted in society’s 
widespread disdain for the academic profession. In her book Academic Instincts, 
Shakespeare scholar Marjorie Garber explains that, in modern parlance, the word 
‘academic’ is associated with social awkwardness, intellectual skepticism, and a jargonized 
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language that is perilously detached from public understanding. Academic is a word that 
“has come to mean artificial or impractical, merely theoretical…or excessively formal,” 
and “is not a term held in high repute in today’s world” (Garber, 2001, p. 112). The decline 
and fall of academic respectability should be cause for alarm in our historical moment, and 
unless scholars begin to seriously redress the flaws within academic communication, the 
relevance of the academy will continue to hang in the balance. 
 
Section IV.2: The Conflicted Ethics of the Fool 
 
Possessed by a spirit of pride, academics have by and large succumbed to the 
seductions of careerism at the expense of ‘the Other.’ Having willfully forgotten their 
audiences in their ambitious pursuit for ever greater means of personal power and success, 
occultic rhetoric has flourished to such extremes that academia has been devolving into a 
“Lucifer State” with an impeding “death date” (Melia & Ryder, 1983). One synecdoche of 
academia’s gradual expiration is featured in Roman Polanski’s 1999 film The Ninth Gate, 
an occult thriller about the power of hidden knowledge and the drama of secrecy within 
magical texts and societies. The Faustian character, Boris Balkan, figures as the central 
villain whose vice of pride is represented by many members of the academic community: 
“Balkan is described as the stereotypically arrogant professor,” an upper class aristocrat 
with delusions of grandeur whose claim to authority is established through undeniable self-
righteousness and charismatic appeal (Gunn, 2005, p. 220). As the patron of many rare 
occult texts, Balkan funds a quest to uncover the secrets of The Nine Gates—a book 
supposedly written by the inspiration of the Devil—in order to benefit from the powers of 
Satanic knowledge within. By the climax of the film, Balkan’s expedition comes to an 
abrupt end when his body is engulfed by flames in a ritual that backfires on him. In an 
 129 
under-worldly spectacle of death by self-immolation, Gunn uses Balkan’s demise as a 
synecdoche for the death of the academy: “just as Nussbaum would symbolically burn 
Butler at the scholastic stake, so Polanski sets Balkan ablaze,” (Gunn, 2005, p. 220). 
Balkan’s haughtiness and conceit are roundly punished in the film, reducing the professor 
to nothing more than a glorified fool. 
But the notion of the academic fool is no minor footnote in Modern Occult Rhetoric. 
Rather, it forms the fundamental basis to understanding the ethics of occultic 
communication. In the beginning of his book, for instance, Gunn explains that the occult 
and the academy—portrayed through his metaphors as the “Great Magus” and the “Great 
Orator”—have died; in fact, “these deaths are one and the same” (Gunn, 2005, p. xxix). 
Such is the message reflected in Boris Balkan’s fall from greatness—the occultist/professor 
brought low. Just as the authority of the occult has been demoted to hocus-pocus nonsense, 
so has much of the increasingly cryptic academy been losing its social legitimacy, being 
reduced to foolishness: “academics are often regarded by outsiders as fools—intelligent, 
perhaps, but fools nonetheless” (Gunn, 2005, p. 231). Not even Gunn exempts himself from 
the implications of his critique, for according to him, all academics are fools, being 
committed to keeping secrets, to excluding others, to playing the prideful insider, and 
weaponizing knowledge rhetorically against our fellow outsiders. “[T]he figure who arose 
in the wake of the Great Orator and the Great Magus,” writes Gunn, “…is the Learned 
Fool, Parsifal, the Great Professor, number zero in the Rider-Waite tarot. The composite 
character of Boris Balkan in Polanski’s The Ninth Gate is, of course, this figure” (Gunn, 
2005, pp. 230-231). The primary image of this figure can, in fact, be seen on the very cover 
of Gunn’s book, featuring the tarot card “The Fool” with Gunn’s own name replacing the 
 130 
label at the bottom. Even perusing over a search for the “Fool” within the book’s index 
humorously reveals “See also Gunn, Joshua” (Gunn, 2005, p. 332). The Fool is a symbol 
which offers a peculiar scene: “In the Rider-Waite tarot deck, the Fool is depicted as a 
young white man in garish clothes, his worldly belongings tied in a bundle at the end of a 
stick. The Fool feels free, engaged in a new beginning, and because his head is in the clouds 
he does not see the cliff he is swiftly approaching. A tiny dog barks at his heels trying to 
warn him” (Gunn, 2005, p. 231). Also known as the Fool’s ‘yapping cur,’ the dog attempts 
to draw attention to the peril ahead. 
The meaning of the symbol of the Fool, according to Gunn, is grounded in a critical 
view of the professoriate. With their heads in the clouds, academics march forward blithely 
unaware of the fact that a precipice awaits their path: “The scene depicted on the card is an 
allegory for the contemporary occultic enterprise of academics in the humanities” (Gunn, 
2005, p. 231). Academics are fools—dreamers and stargazers secluded from the outside 
world, pondering matters unrelated to the practical problems of everyday life from behind 
the safe and insulating walls of the ivory tower.  Gunn, a practicing academic, cannot help 
but identify with the Fool; but, in a stroke of insight, he also finds himself identifying with 
the yapping cur—the dog who yields a warning to the Fool. Gunn’s bark, so to speak, is 
directed to the inhabitants of the ivory tower, and can be translated roughly in this way: 
…we academics should, in light of what happened to the great modern 
magi of the twentieth century, be expecting increasingly spectacular 
dramas of secrecy and publicity. …we should be able to locate 
competing vocabularies concerning secret truths, and a professoriate at 
odds with itself, mobilized into elite, discrete, and competing cabals that 
are, in turn, organized around the challenging work of this or that 
scholarly magus. Worse, in light of the death of modern occultism as a 
coherent tradition, we should discover that the ‘ivory tower,’ the central 
metaphor of a clandestine academic enterprise, has been leveled. Amid 
the smoldering rubble of this centuries-old artifice, we should find the 
Great Professor unprotected, naked, divided against him- or herself, 
unable to control or signify his or her texts, and, perhaps, under attack. 
If the rhetoric emerging from the academy these days is any measure, 
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then these things are coming to pass—if they are not already a done deal. 
(Gunn, 2005, p. 234) 
 
The collapse of the ivory tower reflects the demise of the arrogant professor, Boris 
Balkan, in Polaniski’s The Ninth Gate. It is not entirely impossible to say that academicians 
court the Devil with their smugness, their exclusivity, and their “sadistic” appetite for 
greater control and autonomy. The vice of the academy is the vice of pride, and Gunn 
appears in the form of a dog to issue a perennial warning: pride is the root of all evil. Take 
caution, barks Gunn, for where the occult is today, the academy will be tomorrow, if we 
do not turn from this voracious path of pride and power. “Balkan’s spectacular death, for 
example, can be understood as the price one pays for narcissism, for failing to realize the 
importance of the Other” (Gunn, 2005, p. 222). The deaths of the Great Orator and Great 
Magus—condensed within the iconic demise of Boris Balkan—results from narcissism, 
selfishness, and a disregard for others. The tightly controlled membership of the academic 
community, and the snobbishness of the scholarly elites, emerges from a sense of 
superiority or pride; but as Gunn seems to affirm in ancient wisdom, “Pride goeth before 
the fall” (Proverbs 16:18). So the prescription for resolving this little dilemma—indeed its 
only conceivable solution—is to embrace the virtue of humility. Humility is the diametric 
opposite of pride; a modest or low view of one’s own importance. And the first step for 
academics to begin practicing this virtue is by encouraging them to admit their own 
foolishness. “[W]e should embrace the fool as our patron saint” argues Gunn (2005, p. 
236). It appears that the Fool has a double meaning: because of “the ambivalent symbolism 
of the Fool, …I think that there are good reasons to embrace the figure” (Gunn, 2005, p. 
231).  
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The ambivalence of the Fool as the mascot of the academy can be characterized as 
the dialectic between two sub-classifications: Calliclean fools and Socratic fools. Gunn 
does not create nor define these categories, but for purposes of illuminating Gunn’s 
argument, I label these categories as such. Calliclean fools are the type of fools who 
portray the stereotypical professor, like Boris Balkan, by promoting a self-venerating 
disposition. This type of fool is representative of Callicles (c. 484 BC – 5th century BC), a 
character from within Plato’s dialogue Gorgias (named after Callicles’ teacher). Callicles 
was an ancient Athenian political philosopher who criticized democracy and equality 
because these concepts, he believed, were violations to the laws of nature. Instead, he 
advocated roughly for a ‘might-makes-right’ philosophy: “justice consists in the superior 
ruling over and having more than the inferior” (Plato, 1952, p. 271). Responding to 
Callicles is a fellow Athenian philosopher named Socrates (c. 470 BC – 399 BC) who 
astutely asks Callicles to define what he means by “the superior.” Callicles concludes that 
the idea of superiority is a status established or won by those who are deemed “the wiser.” 
Socrates checks his understanding: 
Soc. Then according to you, one wise man may often be superior to ten 
thousand fools, and he ought to rule them, and they ought to be his 
subjects, and he ought to have more than they should. … 
Cal. Yes; that is what I mean, and that is what I conceive to be natural 
justice—that the better and wiser should rule and have more than the 
inferior. (Plato, 1952, p. 274). 
 
Such is the nature of the prideful academician who establishes a system of 
competition which sorts the weak from the strong. Reminiscent of Boris Balkan’s 
unwavering assurance in his own intellectual superiority, Callicles endorses a social system 
that privileges one class over another—the wiser over the foolish. Not only does such 
competition foster the ultimate rule of a tyrant (e.g., an ‘alpha,’ dictator, or charismatic 
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leader), but it also cultivates the idea that procuring power is the only best way to avoid 
having to suffer an injustice. Resonances of Callicles’ thought are perpetuated throughout 
the contemporary university, especially among graduate students, where competition for 
authority is a fierce struggle. One example of the rivalry for intellectual dominance stems 
from an experience in Gunn’s graduate years where he recounts an embarrassing 
interaction between him and another advanced student: 
…at the age of twenty-four my first taste of magickal warfare was in my 
maiden graduate seminar, a course on semiotic theory conducted by a 
highly regarded professor at the University of Minnesota. Much of the 
material we were reading (Peirce on “thirdness,” e.g.) was very difficult 
to understand. I recall delivering a presentation for class on the readings, 
and then voicing some difficulty with a concept. An advanced graduate 
student from the Department of Cultural Studies and Comparative 
Literature laughed aloud, and then smugly posed a rhetorical question to 
me: “Haven’t you read Lacan on desire?” I was embarrassed and felt 
stupid, having been taken to task by someone who knew a secret that I 
didn’t know, someone smarter, more in control of his language, someone 
who knew how to read better. (Gunn, 2005, p. 234) 
 
This ruthless experience of being “laughed at” resulted in Gunn feeling “nauseous” 
and wanting to “throw up” (Gunn, 2005, p. 235). With such fervid determination to 
embarrass or subjugate others in order to demonstrate our own intellectual superiority, we 
reinforce a Calliclean system of competition that extends beyond graduate school and into 
the halls and hierarchies governing faculty and scholars. “I do think that the professoriate 
too easily forget how contentious and competitive our degree system can be on the inside—
especially among graduate students—and how the word humiliates at each successive rung 
of progress toward certification” (Gunn, 2005, p. 235). It is perhaps this pattern of 
humiliation that most defines the vicious conditions of the academy, a pattern which 
continues to spread (as well as invite criticism). To humiliate someone is to make them 
feel ashamed and foolish by injuring their dignity and self-respect, especially publicly. 
Humiliation is motivated by one’s pride or sense of superiority, for it is only by humiliating 
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others that one is believed to procure power and ascend the social hierarchy. Such is the 
reason why academicians are often held in an ironic, low repute. For of all their self-styled 
importance, arrogant intellectuals are repeatedly vilified—effectively reduced to 
(Calliclean) foolishness. Despicable pretension and their increasing lack of empathy for 
others is a notorious hallmark of the Calliclean fool, and the irony of their superiority-
complex is well recognized throughout history: “Professing themselves to be wise, they 
became fools…” as it were (Romans 1:22). Gunn suggests that in order to salvage what is 
left of modern academia from the proverbial rubble of a collapsing ivory tower, we must 
begin thinking of our foolishness in a new way—a way that does not result in one’s painful 
loss of pride (i.e., humiliation), but rather one in which it is organically reoriented (i.e., 
humility). 
By this, Gunn means for us to imitate a humble fool rather than a prideful one—a 
fool which I designate after the West’s original philosopher, Socrates. Unlike the self-
venerating disposition of the Calliclean fool, Socratic fools are in reference to those 
scholars who promote a self-depricating disposition. This type of fool is representative of 
Socrates, the antithesis of Callicles, who imbibed such a spirit of self-criticism that the 
famed Pythian prophetess—the Oracle of Delphi—declared Socrates to be “the wisest” of 
all. According to the Apology written by Socrates’ student, Plato, the Oracle expresses what 
would later become known as the “Socratic paradox,” for Socrates cannot understand how 
he—the great skeptic of his own knowledge—could ever possibly epitomize the height of 
human wisdom. As far as Socrates was concerned, the only thing he knew was that he knew 
nothing: “I know that I have no wisdom, small or great” (Plato, 1952, p. 202). Socrates 
then attempts to refute the Oracle by visiting with (and inquiring into the knowledge of) 
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fellow politicians, poets, and artisans, all of whom end up disappointing him, thus 
reaffirming the Oracle’s judgment. “I found that the men most in repute were all but the 
most foolish and that others less esteemed were really wiser and better” (Plato, 1952, p. 
202). Contrary to the Calliclean fools who fashioned themselves as wise, Socratic fools are 
deemed wiser because of their humbling recognition of their own ignorance. “I am better 
off than he is,” asserts Socrates, “for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows; I neither 
know nor think that I know” (Plato, 1952, p. 202). In a paradoxical turn, Socrates’ professed 
ignorance becomes emblematic of the highest wisdom, while those who would profess 
their own intelligence are soundly regarded as fools.6 
The ambivalence or dialectical symbolism of the Fool (between Calliclean and 
Socratic) is figured in Polanski’s The Ninth Gate, where the arrogant professor Boris 
Balkan attempts to rival the anti-heroic book detective and protagonist, Dean Corso. Unlike 
Balkan who is absolutely convinced of his autonomous power to determine his own 
destiny, Corso instead puts his faith in others, resisting to trust only in himself. He is honest 
and respectful; in fact, he is “the only character who engages the community for 
companionship and for information” (Gunn, 2005, p. 222). Corso exemplifies the Socratic 
fool by the way he humbles his own intelligence, allowing himself to rely on the knowledge 
of others and to relinquish whatever sort of control he thinks he might have over his own 
fate. After Balkan’s infernal demise, the film ends with Corso’s humility being rewarded 
with unlocking the secret of The Nine Gates. 
Corso is regarded not only because of his scholarly humility…but also 
because he seems to understand the fictive nature of his autonomy as an 
                                                 
6 Callicles seems to assert that the binary relationship between wiseman and fool is one that is grounded in 
nature, like the relationship between predators and prey. But Socrates rejects this logic. Knowledge is not 
proper to some people more than others, as if wisdom and foolishness were identities to be born into. 
Instead, Socrates argues for the democratization of wisdom—in other words, that knowledge is common 
and therefore universal to all men. 
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individual. …The significant difference between Corso and the other 
characters is his sense of his own fallibility, his somewhat naïve trust in 
the characters he meets, and his distrust of the image and other forms of 
representation. Those who do not ‘get it’ are the Fools who have the 
strongest faith in their individual autonomy” (Gunn, 2005, pp. 222-223). 
 
Corso is to Balkan what Socrates is to Callicles: unlike the Calliclean fool who 
consistently overestimates the extent of his/her knowledge, the Socratic fool instead 
recognizes the limitations of it. Corso’s triumph is linked to his humility, while Balkan’s 
downfall is linked to his pride. For this, Gunn appreciates the ambivalence of the Fool, thus 
calling for us to amend our Calliclean ways and to adopt a Socratic attitude. Without an 
awareness of our own ignorance, we merely labor under the illusion of possessed wisdom 
or superiority. Self-absorbed authority, ruthless competition, and a penchant for 
humiliating others is largely what summoned the undoing and fragmentation (or Balkan-
ization) of the occult tradition (Gunn, 2005, p. 236). The academy’s resemblance to 
occultic practices—its tendency to employ secrecy and obfuscation as a rhetorical strategy 
against competing scholars and colleagues—is no doubt courting a similar destruction. The 
pretentious language of the Calliclean fool cleverly conceals and/or conveniently obscures 
the reality of their own ignorance. It is no surprise, therefore, that the Socratic method (a 
dialectical process named after Socrates’ habit of clarifying the truth through continued 
exchanges of inquiry and response) emerged as an effective alternative to the dominant 
Sophistic methods of rhetorical education, which, at the time, focused more on 
understanding the principles behind entertaining, impressive, and persuasive 
communication. The Socratic method was useful in wading through the mysticism, 
fallacies, and contradictions of sophistic speech—a style of speech which resembles if not 
strongly correlates with the meaning and function of occultic rhetoric. Even Socrates hints 
at the relationship between sophistry and occultic rhetoric when he declares, “I have 
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concealed nothing, I have dissembled nothing. And yet, I know that my plainness of speech 
makes them hate me” (Plato, 1952, p. 203). 
 
Section IV.3: Illuminating Gunn's Contradiction 
 
The above tension between plain speech and difficult speech is one which returns 
us to the problem of academic language. The impenetrably theoretical language of the 
academy can make outsiders of us all. Like reading the difficult works of psychoanalysis, 
for example, the presumed incapacity (or ‘ineffability’) of language to reach the things 
themselves—concomitantly producing the plague of occultic rhetoric we see in the 
academy—is largely what drives Gunn’s intellectual resignation: “we fools can’t help it” 
(Gunn, 2005, p. 234). And if such foolishness is inevitable—because ineffability implies 
the impossibility of knowledge—then the production of occultic rhetoric is also 
unavoidable, thus prompting Gunn’s command for “a certain degree of humility” (Gunn, 
2005, p. 140). Gunn concludes, therefore, like the humbling approach of Socrates, that “the 
best one can do is dialectic, the method of using language against itself in order to transcend 
it” (Gunn, 2005, p. 34). But while this is a perfectly reasonable antidote that makes sense 
of Socrates’ everlasting relevance to (and classical enmity with) the Sophists of antiquity, 
there is only one problem: Gunn tacitly rejects the Socratic method. The Socratic method 
is a dialectical process we find in Plato’s writings that assumes a fixed view of language—
the view which “presumes a meaningful mind-independent reality that language, however 
inaccurately, represents” (Gunn, 2005, p. 45). But Gunn rejects the fixity of language, and 
instead endorses the fluid view of language—the view that “language is contingent and 
never corresponds to the material world in a direct or transparent way” (Gunn, 2005, p. 
45). 
 138 
The crux of the dialectic between fixity and fluidity is one which argues over the 
relationship between truth and language. This places the academy at odds with the occult 
(and religion in general). While religious discourse generally assumes the correspondence 
between truth and language, academic discourse ignores this distinction. According to 
Gunn, truth and language are one; truth is whatever language makes it to be. Truth, in any 
fixed, absolute, transcendent, or independent sense does not exist; rather, truth is 
contingent, fluid, relative, and/or socially constructed. “The Platonic assumption… that 
there is something ‘out there’ beyond language…denies the fluidity of language that 
academics like Butler draw upon to ‘open up’ spaces of cultural resistance” (Gunn, 2005, 
p. 48). In other words, Gunn exchanges the correspondence theory of truth with a 
rhetorical one: We must “recognize the contingency of truth and the social construction of 
reality. …A rhetorical worldview, of course, stresses the fluid view of language mentioned 
previously—a sophistic understanding of meaning that Robert L. Scott termed ‘epistemic’ 
in the late 1960s. Regardless of one’s stance on ‘the real,’ the rhetorical view implies that 
nothing means outside human modes of representation and that ‘truth’ is merely the product 
of sentences” (Gunn, 2005, p. 49). The rhetorical position is largely an epistemic view of 
the world—the view that rhetoric creates knowledge. This idea is fundamental to Gunn’s 
project, and its impact can be clearly seen in the early pages of his book: “For Robert 
Icabod Ebenezer Alexander Perry Garcella Phillip Algernon Scott” (Gunn, 2005, p. v). 
Like Harry Potter’s spirited devotion to Albus Percival Wulfric Brian Dumbledore, Gunn’s 
book is dedicated entirely to his headmaster, Robert L. Scott, as further admitted in his 
acknowledgements: “The idea for a book on secrets was hatched in an ‘Introduction to 
Rhetorical Criticism’ course taught by my adviser, Robert L. Scott, in the very early hours 
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of a cold Minnesota winter day. Despite reading numerous error-filled essays, Professor 
Scott encouraged further study. He read, reread, and read yet again every chapter, tirelessly 
recommending changes and suggesting new areas of inquiry. I dedicate this book to Dr. 
Scott for his kindness, his caring, his parenting, and above all his humanity” (Gunn, 2005, 
p. xi). 
 As a loyal sorcerer’s apprentice, Gunn rejects the fixed view of language in favor 
of the fluid (epistemic) view, indebted to Scott (and Nietzsche, Derrida, Rorty, 
Wittgenstein, Brummett, and others). But this complicates Gunn’s call for a more Socratic, 
dialectical humility: how can Gunn consistently endorse the Sophistic presuppositions of 
language while simultaneously advocating for a Socratic sense of humility? The source of 
Socrates’ humility stemmed from his conviction in the existence of a transcendent truth or 
reality, and particularly his recognized futility of possessing it. His failure to grasp this 
higher knowledge rendered him admittedly ignorant, and this paradoxical knowledge of 
his own ignorance was the very perception that defined his claim to wisdom. The Socratic 
method, therefore, is a natural outworking of these convictions, and so the Socratic 
dialectical process is one that depends on the presumption of transcendence—a 
presumption which Gunn explicitly rejects. How, then, can one hope to preserve and/or 
encourage the imperative to humility (engendered by our ignorance of the Truth) if there 
is, at bottom, no Truth to be ignorant of in the first place? All truth is presumably created 
rather than discovered, according to Gunn. Thus, epistemic theory is incompatible with a 
dialectic ethic, thereby undermining the presumptions that made the Socratic fool possible. 
This does not mean that humbling the academy is wrong or an undesirable prospect. In 
fact, it is one that should be celebrated. Gunn offers a timely analysis into the unfortunate 
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state of contemporary academic language, and he should certainly be applauded for his call 
to humility—a call which is undoubtedly needed in our climate of intellectual pride and 
competition. But it does raise the question of how a fluid view of language—a self-
undermining view which regards truth and morality as contingent and epistemic byproducts 
of sentences—can provide the foundation necessary for compelling us toward an ethic of 
humility.  
Gunn’s conundrum is that he identifies with the Sophists, but envies Socrates. The 
irony is palpable. Gunn devotes approximately three-hundred pages spilling ink against the 
idea of universals, but concludes his book with a call to humility—a moral (i.e., universal) 
admonition. Gunn proudly owns an epistemology of morality while denying the ontology 
of morality. His rejection of transcendence (or of universals) is principally a rejection of 
realism, the idea that language is a bridge to the noumenal world, most aptly exemplified 
through Plato’s Theory of Forms. Realism contends that “universals, numbers, and/or 
propositions exist objectively, apart from the human mind and distinct from any material 
or physical features of the world” (Feser, 2008, p. 41). Without universals, Gunn is 
effectively an exponent of nominalism, the alternative view that denies the reality of 
universals, thus reducing language to a “body of fictions convenient for grappling with 
transitory phenomena” (Weaver, 1948, p. 150). Nominalism (which stems from the Latin 
nomen meaning ‘name’) posits that universals are not real, but “are only general names, 
words we apply to many things” (Feser, 2008, p. 44). In his Ideas Have Consequences 
(1948), the rhetorical scholar Richard Weaver traces the contemporary, fluid view of 
language (espoused by the “Semanticists”) to the Medieval period, where its best 
articulation emerged from William of Occam, the father of nominalism: “one of the first 
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major steps in the direction of modern skepticism came through the victory of Occam over 
Aquinas” where “ontological referents were abandoned in favor of pragmatic 
significations” (Weaver, 1948, p. 150). Flowing from Occam to Bacon to Hobbes and now 
to the semanticists, “ideas become psychological figments, and words become useful 
signs” (Weaver, 1948, p. 151). The semantic, fluid view of language, according to Weaver, 
is an “extreme outgrowth of nominalism” which is inspired from the felt irreconcilability 
between the perpetually changing particularities of the world and the eternally fixed 
universals of the word.  
Given Gunn’s nominalist assumptions, the call to humility is not grounded in the 
idea of a transcendent ‘Good,’ but rather in his own arbitrations—which is to say, like a 
good occultist, his own charismatic authority. There is nothing within our descriptions of 
language, Sophistic or otherwise, that “commands” our humility, for this commits the 
fallacy of reification. Humility must be grounded in a transcendent source. Instead of 
admitting his ignorance of the knowledge of the Good, like the humble Socrates did, Gunn 
ironically asserts his knowledge that there is no Good! Clearly this approach (to remedy 
the pride of the academy) is not going to work. It would seem that the humility of the 
Socratic fool can best be secured through practicing the Socratic dialectic. This, in fact, is 
the recommendation of Richard Weaver who argues that the “Socratic dialectic” links 
“reason” with “the science of naming” (Weaver, 1948, p. 167). This relationship can be 
seen in the word nomenclature (Latin for name-calling) which finds itself naturally related 
to such concepts as technical terminology, specialist vocabulary, shoptalk, and jargon, the 
concepts of which result from humanity’s dialectical ability to reason together and to strive 
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for increasing precision and specificity from within given disciplines of knowledge. 
Weaver writes, 
Dialectic comes to our aid as a method by which, after our assumptions 
have been made, we can put our house in order. I am certain that this is 
why Plato in the Cratylus calls the giver of names a lawgiver 
(νομοθέτης); …Plato sees here that name-giving and lawgiving are 
related means of effecting order. Actually stable laws require a stable 
vocabulary, for a principal part of every judicial process is definition, or 
decision about the correct name of an action. Thus the magistrates of a 
state have a duty to see that names are not irresponsibly changed. 
(Weaver, 1948, p. 168) 
 
Gunn, however, rejects this proposal. “The best we can do is dialectic… But not 
just any dialectic—certainly not Plato’s—will do” (Gunn, 2005, p. 34). How can Gunn 
hope to defend a spirit of humility by dispensing with the very Fool we are expected to 
emulate? It seems that Gunn’s idea of dialectic is one that concerns the rivalry between 
“privileged vocabularies” (Gunn, 2005, p. 34), which is not really dialectic at all, but rather 
a recipe for “eristic.” Eristic, which means seeking victory in argument, was the Sophistic 
art of discourse that promoted the aim of ‘winning debates’ over the aim of ‘discovering 
truth.’ While the end of dialectic is geared toward the search for truth, eristic on the other 
hand regards truth as an expedient element of persuasion. Truth is not necessary or integral 
(and sometimes a nuisance) to the end of eristic, suggesting that the deliberate use of false 
or fallacious reasoning is justifiable so long as it enhances one’s success in debate. Such is 
the nature of occultic rhetoric which also attempts to persuade and manipulate others by 
means of difficult or obscure (secret) languages, the result of which necessarily manifests 
in the drama of in-group/out-group conflict. No surprise, then, that occultic rhetoric would 
be couched in terms of eristic debate or competition—the struggle in language where 
vocabularies are interfering with each other, competing to win for favor and cultural 
authority, thus prompting “the creation of new metaphors and the destruction of old, ‘dead’ 
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ones” (Gunn, 2005, pp. 45-46). Eristic sets the stage for rhetorical and political rivalry 
between two or more ‘language games’ vying for prominence and social legitimacy. “The 
possibility of creating language for new meanings necessarily involves the occultist-poet 
in a political process insofar as his or her vocabulary is to replace another” (Gunn, 2005, 
p. 46).  
Gunn’s diagnosis of the rhetorical landscape is not exactly inaccurate, however. 
The world of occultic rhetoric is indeed red in tooth and claw—it carries homologies that 
can be more or less described as Darwinian or Malthusian (or, perhaps, even capitalistic). 
The eristic conditions of occultic rhetoric bespeak the struggle for existence between 
competing vocabularies and definitions, all of which seek to exert their dominance over 
the currency of thought, and assume official primacy. This cutthroat environment 
constitutes the unfolding drama of secrecy taking place within the academy: a scene 
concerned with the preservation of favored vocabularies in the struggle for acceptance, 
privilege, and officialization. As a socialist, Gunn blames capitalism for the wild 
production of occultic rhetoric, for capitalism best reflects the conditions of competition 
that occur within nature as well as the marketplace. He writes, 
there is immense pressure on us academics to popularize our work and 
to justify our existence, and consequently an intense desire to thicken our 
prose and to create the conditions that require our interpretive expertise 
and thereby guarantee our survival. In short, we are encouraged to be 
snotty. Our contemporary academic occultic is the ironic response to that 
globalizing corporate machine that accuses us of producing mere 
gibberish, “empty rhetoric.” As our jobs become less plentiful and tenure 
goes the way of the dodo, as resources become more scarce and we are 
made to compete for a sense of security, the pressure to produce the 
contentious, argumentative Blue-Meanie Magus, or in the argot of 
graduate students, the “theory Nazi,” is increasing. (Gunn, 2005, p. 235) 
 
The modern magician or academician is caught within a fierce “struggle for 
authority and recognition,” bound within the hierarchy of intellectual celebrities that Gunn 
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terms “the current star system of the academy.” He expounds, “We academics in the 
humanities are currently mired in a genius-virtuoso, superstar model of intellectual 
authority that has emerged in the wake of ‘Truth’ and the abandonment of absolutes. 
Understanding the relevance of the authority of the modern magus only requires one to 
replace the role of supernatural truth with this or that notion of post-truth ineffability that 
is so central to the project of the posts (e.g., poststructuralism, postmodernism, and so on)” 
(Gunn, 2005, p. 118). In other words, the eclipse of absolute truth has rendered us in a 
Darwinian-like struggle where only the fittest will survive if only we have the nerve, the 
wit, and the brute strength to seize it. Such is the nature of a Calliclean environment which 
fosters the tyranny of the strong and superior over the weak and inferior. To put it more 
simply, with the rise of nominalism over realism, and eristic over dialectic, the academy 
has gradually toggled away from the pursuit of absolute truth in exchange now for the 
pursuit of absolute power. Power is the idol of the postmodern academy; it constitutes the 
very epicenter of critical discourse that mobilizes much of the contemporary political 
concerns over a spectrum of new, fashionable controversies ranging from social justice and 
white privilege to queer studies and intersectional feminism. Our obsession with power has 
cultivated an academy that is nothing short of a “sadistic” Machiavellianism that takes 
pleasure in humiliating others.  
The power to control the channels of knowledge implicitly points to the power of 
secrecy, for secrecy entails the role of gatekeeper or strategic control over the flow of 
information, in order to further manage, by extension, the (re)formation of the class-
struggle between insider and outsider groups. Occultic rhetoric serves an ideological 
function, and its practices are learned by example from the so-called ‘academic star 
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system.’ Graduate students, for instance, would not be learning “how to spar and demean 
with secret vocabularies” if they were not watching “black-caped magi posture, argue, and 
stab backs at conferences and conventions” in the first place (Gunn, 2005, p. 235). The 
Darwinian struggle to survive the hostile milieu of the academy overlaps with the 
presuppositions of the Calliclean Fool—the proclivity of the stronger or “the wiser” to 
compete and backstab, to win at any cost, to deny the objectivity of truth, to humiliate and 
dominate, to secure power and autonomy, and to rule over the weaker and inferior. 
Certainly the great irony of all of this is Gunn’s Dawkinsian conviction that nothing—no 
truth or moral transcendence of any sort—exists beyond the drama of “natural justice” 
governing the intellectual community. And yet, amidst this rhetorical savagery, Gunn 
appeals for a dose of Socratic virtue that makes no sense from within a strictly Calliclean 
worldview. He must necessarily borrow from the Platonic universe in order to comfort a 
Sophistic one. Gunn advocates for the ambivalent symbolism of the Fool, but seems 
suspiciously unaware of the fact that the two symbols are mutually incompatible with each 
other. Gunn is not the first academician whose philosophy is in tension with his ethics. 
Gunn is the Richard Dawkins7 of the rhetoric department who is “not content to derive his 
ethics from the scriptures of his upbringing,” but still tries to harmonize the humility or 
“super niceness” of Christ with a Darwinian (or in this case, Calliclean) perspective (Hahn 
& Wiker, 2008, p. 128). 
                                                 
7 While Gunn and Dawkins do share a common rejection of the Christian faith, including a desperate attempt 
to salvage a sense of humility without appealing to a transcendent source, Gunn is clearly a postmodernist 
scholar disenchanted by any notion of absolute truth and meaning. Dawkins, on the other hand, remains a 
strict modernist thinker given his defense of the truth-claims of atheism and evolutionary theory, and his 
hostility for postmodernists who distort the findings of science by means of obscure speech and writing 
(Dawkins, 1998). 
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The Slavic scholar Ewa Thompson put the irony in a similar way, citing the 
common postmodernists’ anti-Darwinian “sympathy toward the voiceless peoples whose 
history has been obliterated by the victorious imperial voices” (Thompson, 2003, p. 195). 
Postmodernists seek to subvert the triumph of the colonizers through deconstructionism 
and postcolonial discourse which attempts to delegitimize the version of events as told 
from the perspective of the strong and powerful, and to reclaim the lost narratives of the 
oppressed and marginalized. Curiously, however, such a project presumes an essentialist 
ethics—that the domination of the conquerors was evil or wrong in the absolute sense; that 
the Darwinian triumph of the strong over the weak violates a universal, objective, and 
natural moral law and not merely an advantageous, socially constructed one. But the 
postmodernists, being nominalists and existentialists, have already given up on the reality 
of essences and universals. What, then, are the grounds for their moral outrage from a non-
essentialist perspective? “Any kind of sympathy for the weak and the defeated is 
essentialist in nature, for it is grounded in a hierarchy of values and goes against the 
Darwinian thesis that the fittest should and must win” (Thompson, 2003, p. 196). Without 
these values being grounded in some kind of essence, final cause, or universal, we are 
merely left with relativized desires and subjective preferences, guided by nothing more 
than “heredity, environment, luck”—the very Darwinian conditions that reduce our desires 
to a game of power and competition, all of which are vying for fulfillment and prominence, 
and yet none of which can satisfy instructing “what desires we ought to have,” argues 
philosopher Edward Feser. Hence the irony of postmodernist ethics: all of morality “falls 
apart if we deny that anything has a final cause or that there are forms, essences, or natures 
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in the Aristotelian sense; and of course [the nominalist] denies just this” (Feser, 2008, pp. 
139-140). 
Despite this peculiar irony, however, Gunn’s attentiveness to humility is one which 
still deserves academic reflection and appreciation, even if it is incompatible with a strictly 
Sophistic, rhetorical ontology. The virtue of humility is the solution—or great secret—to 
restoring the academy to its former glory. He writes, “…if the demise of the Great Modern 
Magus provides a lesson for us academics, it must be that of recognizing our ignorance and 
celebrating the virtue of humility” (Gunn, 2005, p. 235). Humility is Gunn’s central clarion 
call—a Levinasian reminder for us to be our brother’s keeper and respond to the face of 
the excluded other. He repeats: “…the rhetorical lesson to be learned from the Great Magi 
of modernity is an ethical one, a lesson that has less to do with the inevitable alterity of 
language use (our ontological plight) and more to do with the ways in which we ignore or 
forget those whom we exclude or discipline with our words in here, in the academy” (Gunn, 
2005, p. 234). Beyond this general (golden) rule, however, Gunn does not expound on what 
a humble application of occultic rhetoric should look like. His book merely ends on a 
cryptic, Derridean rumination, and thus leaves the reader “longing for an extended 
discussion of this topic,” complains Kevin Meyer. Gunn “problematizes academic 
language without offering solutions or suggesting approaches to balance better the ability 
of academic discourse to include as well as exclude audiences. Greater attention to 
strategies for making the language of the academy more accessible to those within as well 
as those outside its walls would strengthen Gunn’s argument” (Meyer, 2007, p. 119). 
Devoid of any strategies to temper the incline of obfuscation in the academy, this project 
now focuses on one scholar who can demystify the complex nature of secret languages, 
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and illuminate some helpful principles that can foster a more virtuous practice of occultic 
rhetoric. 
 
Section IV.4: Bok Renovates the Foundations  
 
 The first step in establishing an ethics of occultic rhetoric must begin primarily by 
dispensing with a variety of Sophistic presuppositions about language. Gunn advances such 
a philosophy, making it difficult to construct a moral practice of occultic rhetoric. Evidence 
of Gunn’s sophistic tendencies can be verified by his preoccupation with speech as a kind 
of “craft” that coordinates social action. In his latest book Speech Craft (2018), Gunn 
explores the linkages between rhetoric and magic, a relationship that hinges on the idea 
that language can control us in a manner commensurable to our control over it. Awareness 
of this relationship between rhetoric and magic goes as far back as ancient Greece, where 
some of the most influential sophists of the day sought to teach that the true power of 
language did not rest in the truth of our words, but rather the effectiveness of our word 
choice. Words carry power, and the right word at the right time arranged in the right way 
was believed by sophists to unlock the secret to persuasion. Rather than emphasize the 
pursuit of truth and logic, the sophistic study of the art of rhetoric depended on one’s 
mastery over “rhythmic…epideictic” prose, an “oppressive social force” whereby “one is 
hypnotized by the beautiful words repeating themselves forever, and constrained in thought 
by compositional principles that lend themselves more to the copious stacking-up of 
equivalent phrases than to reasoned inquiry” (Walker, 2000, p. 12). One of the most 
prominent teachers of this rhetorical philosophy was the famed sophist Gorgias (483-375 
BC) who sought to privilege the power of pathos over logos. Gorgias and his fellow 
“masters of rhetoric, who wanted to claim this power for themselves,” sought “the irrational 
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influence of poetry” by making emotions central to their rhetorical theory (De Romilly, 
1975, pp. 6-7). This “hypnotic ‘witchcraft’ of poetry” reflects a kind of occultic rhetoric 
that “functions as a medium for both the exercise and contestation of authority and social 
power” (Walker, 2000, p. 12-13).  
Much of Gorgias’ thoughts on the emotional effects of magical or poetic language 
play into Gunn’s theory of occultic rhetoric: in fact, Gorgias is given primary treatment in 
his introduction to the art of public speaking (Gunn, 2018, pp. 3, 5). Gunn also argues that 
“public speaking is mostly about feelings” (Gunn, 2018, pp. 70-71), a claim undoubtedly 
inspired by the Gorgian emphasis on emotion or audience disposition. “Gorgias can be 
regarded as having sought to create an elevated oratorical style for formal speech, distinct 
from conversational language, though at the risk of drawing attention away from what he 
was saying to how he was saying it,” writes the classicist George Alexander Kennedy. The 
Gorgianic figures of rhetoric, such as “homoeoteleuton (rhyme at the ends of successive 
phrases) or parison (equal lengths of phrases)” are but a few of the tropes that “probably 
should be regarded as the devices by which Gorgias sought to work his magic. They are 
the techniques that stir the passions or obsess the mind and perhaps draw the listener to 
unconscious agreement with the speaker” (Kennedy, 1999, p. 35). Many consider Gorgias 
as more a magician or clever rhetorician than a philosopher, but others have challenged 
this impression. Speculations about Gorgias’ philosophy mirror the principles and 
presuppositions undergirding Gunn’s investigations into ineffability, paradox, and the 
limitations of human knowledge and expression. In his famous treatise On the Nonexistent, 
or On Nature, “Gorgias proposes that nothing exists, that even if anything does exist it is 
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inapprehensible by human beings, and even [if] it were apprehensible it would be 
impossible for one person to communicate knowledge to another” (Kennedy, 1999, p. 36).  
The logic of this argument seems to reflect the major assumption underlying 
Gunn’s theory of occultic rhetoric, namely that “our experience of the world—what we 
see, hear, touch, smell, taste, and feel—is fundamentally ineffable” (Gunn, 2005, pp. xxi-
xxii). Similar to Gunn’s “axiom” that communication will always fail to capture or convey 
“the sensory manifold of human experience” (Gunn, 2005, pp xxii), Gorgias echoes that 
“since the truth cannot be known rationally, the function of an orator is not logical 
demonstration so much as emotional presentation that will stir the audience’s will to 
believe. Thus, the power of persuasion involves deceiving ‘the emotional and mental state 
of listeners by artificially stimulating sensory reactions through words’” (Kennedy, 1999, 
p. 36). Gunn and Gorgias share a common understanding of language and its powers, both 
of which depend on a particular understanding of truth: that it is inapprehensible, 
incommunicable, or even, more simply, inexistent. It is this emphasis on our inaccessibility 
to the truth that shapes much of the expression and practice of occultic rhetoric in the 21st 
century academy. Only by confronting the sophistic presuppositions of language can we 
then move to construct a new foundation necessary for supporting a formal ethics of 
occultic rhetoric, one that reclaims the importance of truth and restores our accessibility to 
it. 
Gunn’s preoccupation with the subject of truth, and the failure of language to 
convey it, constitutes arguably the major foundation of his philosophy of rhetoric. This 
principle, which he terms ineffability, is the product of his conviction that language is 
inadequate as a means of communicating meaning. To ‘communicate the incommunicable’ 
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or ‘describe the indescribable’ is the “rhetorical antinomy” at the root of Gunn’s theory of 
language, for he believes that we all engage in the paradoxical task of using effable symbols 
to point to ineffable referents. Since all referents are presumably ineffable, language is only 
ever a subjective approximation for describing human experience. Many theological 
scholars have already responded to these kinds of objections against the adequacy of 
language. For example, whereas Gunn advances the epistemic claim that truth is merely 
the product of sentences, the theologian Douglas Blount points to the reality that sentences, 
while diverse, can certainly share “common meanings,” i.e., propositions (Blount, 2013, p. 
48). For instance, “I think therefore I am” and “Cogito ergo sum” are obviously different 
sentences, but betoken the same proposition. “John is a bachelor” and “John is an 
unmarried man” is another example that shares a common proposition between two 
different sentences. Propositions exist objectively and universally, “distinct from the 
material world” and “independent of any mind,” because, as the philosopher Edward Feser 
points out, people down from ancient history to the present day can communicate and 
contemplate “exactly the same thing[s],” despite the differing varieties of grammar that we 
use to convey them (Feser, 2008, p. 41). The principle of ineffability, which depends on 
the rejection of universals, assumes that truth does not exist out there and that “sentences, 
not propositions, are the fundamental bearers of truth” (Blount, 2013, p. 52). But these 
presumptions about truth and the adequacy of language deserve to be further unpacked if 
we are to understand how to seriously consider the subject of occultic rhetoric from within 
an ethical framework. 
In her book Lying, Sissela Bok never uses the word ‘ineffability’ in her analysis of 
truth, but she certainly is attuned to its complexity: “The truth has seemed so obviously 
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unattainable to some as to cause them to despair of human communication in general. They 
see so many barriers to prevent us from obtaining truthful knowledge, let alone 
communicating it; so many pitfalls in conveying what we mean” (Bok, 1999, p. 4). This 
common concern over the pitfalls and problems of obtaining truthful knowledge has 
resulted in many academicians, like Gunn, to declare the inadequacy of communication 
because of our inaccessibility to (or, simply, the nonexistence of) truth. Gunn denies truth, 
it seems, because of an unrealized Cartesian impulse to conflate knowledge with certainty. 
In other words, Gunn infers from the elusiveness of certainty that all truth is therefore 
inaccessible (if it exists at all). But certainty need not be a necessary precondition for an 
ethics of lying (or, in this case, occultic rhetoric). According to Bok, “The whole truth is 
out of reach,” she concedes. “But this fact has very little to do with our choices about 
whether to lie or to speak honestly, about what to say and what to hold back” (Bok, 1999, 
p. 4). Bok offers a more balanced way to understand the concept of truth, and provides a 
sturdier foundation from which to construct an ethics of occultic communication. The 
daunting topic of truth, she writes, is nothing short of a perplexing discourse—“no concept 
intimidates and yet draws thinkers so powerfully. From the beginnings of human 
speculation about the world, the questions of what truth is and whether we can attain it 
have loomed large. Every philosopher has had to grapple with them” (Bok, 1999, p. 5). 
Gunn is certainly not the first to doubt the adequacy of language in conveying truth; Bok 
points to ancient precedents such as the Heraclitean disciple, Cratylus, a contemporary of 
Socrates who “refused discussion of any kind” because “words in any conversation would 
be changing and uncertain”; and the great skeptic, Pyrrho, “denied that anything could be 
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known and concluded that nothing could therefore be said to be honorable or dishonorable, 
just or unjust” (Bok, 1999, p. 9). 
A revival of such doubts have evidently taken over much of the modern academy. 
Gunn’s principle of ineffability is likely inspired by the French deconstructionist 
philosopher Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) whose concept of différance held that 
philosophy, and language in general, is characterized by an “absence” (not “presence”) of 
meaning. The absence of meaning in language is wrought by a perceived gap between 
signifier and signified. But as the hermeneutician Grant R. Osborne points out, the question 
behind the deconstructive logic of ineffability is not whether this gap exists, but whether 
this gap is insurmountable. Derrida certainly thought so, and Gunn’s principle of 
ineffability also seems to parallel this assumption. But the key to bridging this gap, Osborne 
argues, is “context.” Equipped with context, “the reader has an ethical responsibility to 
consider the intended meaning of a text.” But if the deconstructionist critics are correct in 
their dictum that there is nothing outside the text and that absolute knowledge or meaning 
is “an impossible dream,” then “the ethical aspect would not be quite so strong a case” 
(Osborne, 2006, p. 487). This claim is significant, and may be cause for concern: Osborne 
hints at how the perceived impossibility of certainty or absolute meaning tends to attenuate 
our investigations into the moral aspects of language; that is, epistemology takes 
precedence over ethics. Without our knowledge of the whole truth, it seems, there is little 
impetus to explore how we ought to use it in our dealings with others. But Bok considers 
this a problem: our “impatience” to possess the whole truth immobilizes ethical reflection. 
“This impatience helps to explain why the contemporary debate about deception is so 
barren. Paradoxically, the reluctance to come to grips with deception can stem from an 
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exalted and all-absorbing preoccupation with truth” (Bok, 1999, p. 5).  In other words, the 
underdevelopment of an ethics of occultic rhetoric can be attributed to the fixation with 
epistemological certainty. This also explains Kevin Meyer’s vexation with Gunn’s 
nebulous call for humility: crippled by the presumption that truth is either inaccessible or 
nonexistent, the growth of an ethics is stunted. 
Evidence of this ethical impediment can be seen throughout Gunn’s work, 
particularly in his criticism of scholars who rebuke the use of unwieldy prose. Take, for 
example, his report on the impasse between Martha Nussbaum and Judith Butler: appealing 
once again to the principle of ineffability, Gunn discounts Nussbaum’s call for a more 
ethical standard of communication. He argues, “One problem with Nussbaum’s account, 
of course, is that she fails to recognize that mystery and mystification are inevitable 
consequences of the rhetorical invention spawned by the ubiquitous confrontation with 
ineffability, consequences that are aptly and humorously caricatured in Kenneth Burke’s 
modern version of the Tower of Babel as the cacophonous and mundane ‘human barnyard,’ 
with each of its critters chattering and goading each other into hierarchies” (Gunn, 2005, 
p. 52). Again, the principle of ineffability seemingly defends obscurity; it undermines the 
call for a humbler rhetorical style. By denying our access to absolute truth or meaning, the 
principle of ineffability serves instead to excuse Butler’s obfuscation rather than hold it 
morally accountable.  
The same goes for Gunn’s defense of Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytic prose from 
critics such as Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont. “Because Sokal and Bricmont lack any 
understanding of rhetoric, their failure to acknowledge the psychoanalytic processes of 
invention and interpretation in respect to ineffability (occult poetics) makes them the 
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unwitting victims of their own lettered thefts” (Gunn, 2005, p. 140). In other words, Sokal 
and Bricmont are prevented from establishing an ethics of clarity and accuracy because, by 
its very nature, the language of psychoanalysis is necessarily complex, ambiguous, and 
translinguistic (i.e., ineffable). The principle of ineffability justifies the use of occultic 
prose, thereby neutralizing the development of a mature or formal ethics of secrecy and 
lying. This confirms what Bok (and Osborne) hinted at earlier: “to the extent that one has 
radical doubts about the reliability of all knowledge, to that extent the moral aspects…may 
lose importance” (Bok, 1999, p. 10). Gunn’s principle of ineffability, which prioritizes the 
impossible possession of knowledge, engenders the trivialization of morality—his various 
claims to humility notwithstanding. The natural flow of such logic can be summarized as: 
“since we can never know the truth or falsity of anything anyway, it does not matter 
whether or not we lie when we have a good reason for doing so” (Bok, 1999, p. 12). 
Bok is the real yapping cur. The principle of ineffability paralyzes the relationship 
between rhetoric and ethics because it negates the existence and/or accessibility to 
universal truth, the removal of which reduces language to a mere game for procuring power 
and exerting it over others. In short, humility cannot flourish under the consequences of 
ineffability. And yet one of the most spurious defenses of occultic rhetoric comes from 
Gunn’s own suggestion that it does not problematize academic language, but rather 
resolves it. (Cue the record skip!). At this point, Gunn’s apologetics for ineffability takes 
an unprecedented turn toward a glorious, self-sabotaging inconsistency, as this claim stands 
in direct conflict to everything he has so far been explaining throughout his whole book. 
Contrary to the impression that scholars “struggle over authority and ‘secret’ meaning,” 
we are instead expected to believe that occultic rhetoric is “intentionally designed” to 
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“achieve the opposite effect” (Gunn, 2005, p. 140). Are we now to discover, after all, that 
occultic rhetoric is actually an agent not of struggle and warfare, but of peace and harmony? 
Presumably exemplified by Jacques Lacan, the difficulty of his writings were “deliberately 
designed to ‘jolt’ readers out of ‘conceptual ruts.’ One of those ruts is the tendency to put 
faith in an authoritative expert—Lacan as a magus—instead of in our own ability to think 
though [sic] ideas or pursue ‘the truth.’ In other words, unlike Crowley’s, Lacan’s 
hermeneutic is one of anti or un-authority to prevent the subjection and hierarchy of an 
occultic star system” (Gunn, 2005, p. 141). This spirited defense of Lacanian rhetoric is an 
attempt to dismantle the barbs of Sokal and Bricmont, but it fails to avoid the charge of 
self-contradiction. 
First, suggesting that Lacanian rhetoric is designed to achieve the opposite effect 
of securing power is an attempt on Gunn’s part to accomplish the very thing he claims is 
impossible: to get at the absolute meaning of a text. There is no absolute truth or meaning 
according to Gunn’s own principles, and yet he speaks of the pursuit of truth and the 
intended meaning behind Lacan’s rhetoric. Contradiction and other violations of logic are 
not uncommon within deconstructionist discourse (and probably explains the 
postmodernists’ general intolerance of logic altogether). Even Derrida “breaks his own rule 
when he accuses John Searle of ‘avoiding reading me and trying to understand’” (Osborne, 
2006, p. 487). In similar fashion, Gunn also engages in self-admitted “hypocrisy” (Gunn, 
2005, p. 235), and stubbornly fails to recognize that Lacan’s language contributes to the 
very problems that Sokal and Bricmont diagnose. Contrary to the charge that “they have 
succumbed to the fetish of esoteric language” (Gunn, 2005, p. 141), it is Gunn who 
startlingly admits that he is the one who has succumbed to it (Gunn, 2005, p. xxix). In 
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addition to being self-defeating, one cannot help but wonder: did not Helena Blavatsky 
explicitly centralize her authority by the exact same means that Lacan is said to democratize 
his own? How are outsiders supposed to know when precisely Gunn’s counter-argument 
applies? One would be wise in suspecting Gunn to not spare any effort in attacking his 
enemies with ruthless clarity, logic, and precision, but then appeal to the principle of 
ineffability whenever critics fire back with accusations of obscurity and 
incomprehensibility. It would make for a fine rhetorical strategy. After all, deferring to 
misunderstanding is the ubiquitous ‘rescuing-device’ of occultic rhetoric. The Bogdanov 
brothers from earlier claimed to have been misunderstood; the exponents of feminist 
glaciology also claimed to have been misunderstood. “You can pretty much 
defend any piece of postmodernist tripe by saying that it was ‘misunderstood’” (Coyne, 
2016). The true lesson to be learned from Sokal and Bricmont’s critique is that, had Lacan 
written well, they would not have misunderstood him. 
Still, this critique should not lead to the all-too-hasty generalization that all forms 
of rhetorical obscurity are unethical. This is where Bok proves more useful than Gunn, 
because she provides the right measure of nuance to texture our understanding of secrecy 
and lying, the principles of which directly translate and contribute to the formation of an 
ethics of occultic rhetoric. Before engaging in a systematic analysis of the ethics and 
various forms of rhetorical obscurity, it is first important to understand that the major 
problem with Gunn’s philosophy of language is the Sophistic denial of truth assumed 
within his principle of ineffability—a verdict reached out of impatience over our inability 
to grasp absolute certainty, omniscience, or the ‘whole truth.’ Having allowed the 
limitations of knowledge to disable our assumption that truth is accessible, that the world 
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is intelligible, or that the domain of human experience is effable, we have essentially 
sabotaged any chance of contemplating ethical questions about the good, the right, and the 
moral. In short, the problem with a Sophistic understanding of truth is that it suffers from 
an inability to separate the epistemological concept of truth from the ethical concept of 
truthfulness. This unfortunate conflation is a foundational error, and “[until] the 
differences are seen, and the areas of overlap and confusion spotlighted, little progress can 
be made in coping with the moral quandaries of lying,” writes Bok (1999, p. 6). The shades 
of secrecy and lying in the art of occultic rhetoric as practiced within the contemporary 
academy is a matter of ethical importance, and it begins primarily with recognizing the fact 
that “truth and truthfulness are not identical, any more than falsity and falsehood” (Bok, 
1999, p. 6). From Cratylus and Pyrrho in the ancient world, to Nietzsche and Gunn in the 
modern world, the pattern of this confusion is perpetuated and in need of correction. In 
order to renovate the Sophistic foundations of occultic rhetoric, the relationship between 
ethics and epistemology must be reformed and brought back into balance. Otherwise, ethics 
will remain impoverished. 
Even after the two domains of the ethical and the epistemological are set 
apart, some argue that the latter should have priority. It is useless to be 
overly concerned with truthfulness, they claim, so long as one cannot 
know whether human beings are capable of knowing and conveying the 
truth in the first place. Such a claim, if taken seriously, would obviously 
make the study of truth-telling and deception seem pointless and flat. 
Once again, the exalted and all-absorbing preoccupation with ‘truth’ then 
comes to nourish the reluctance to confront falsehood. …For these 
radical skeptics, just as for those who believe that complete and absolute 
truth can be theirs, ethical matters of truth-telling and deception melt into 
insignificance by comparison with the illumination of truth and the dark 
void of its absence. As a result, both groups largely ignore the 
distinctions between truthfulness and falsehood in their intense quest for 
certainty regarding truth. (Bok, 1999, p. 9) 
 
As a result of eclipsing the moral domain of choice and action with the much vaster 
epistemological domain of truth and knowledge, philosophers fail to see the value in 
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studying the ethics of deception. Devoid of any ability to determine truth from falsehood, 
it is no surprise to find, therefore, that “every man [does] that which [is] right in his own 
eyes” (Judges 21:25). Like a country without a king, moral duties and values are 
consequently relativized, and academicians then “make up their own rules,” writes Bok. 
“They think up their own excuses and evaluate their own arguments” (Bok, 1999, p. 11), 
such as Gunn’s convenient defenses of Lacanian rhetoric as a hermeneutic that supposedly 
facilitates independent thinking, or how the Fool is a fitting abbreviation symbol for the 
virtue of humility. Moral relativism, it seems, is symptomatic of epistemological 
relativism. By dismissing the assumption of objectivity in epistemology, a Dostoevskian 
sort of logic may find application here: if truth does not exist, then everything is permitted. 
Ethical relativism spawns from the rejection of objective truth. In fact, without truth, we 
eliminate the very basis that makes trust possible. Trust is a necessary component to the 
functioning of a healthy society, for all relationships depend on set patterns and 
expectations that form the basis of human character and credibility. In rhetoric, one’s 
credibility was reflected in one’s ethos—the persuasive appeal of a speaker’s ethical 
character—the foundation of which depends on the value of trustworthiness. Without being 
able to distinguish truth from falsity, the ethical idea of trust then loses all meaning, 
perpetuating once again the irrelevance of ethics. Bok is particularly attuned to the 
absurdities that incur from a world devoid of truth. She argues: 
Imagine a society, no matter how ideal in other respects, where word and 
gesture could never be counted upon. Questions asked, answers given, 
information exchanged—all would be worthless. Were all statements 
randomly truthful or deception, action and choice would be undermined 
from the outset. There must be a minimal degree of trust in 
communication for language and action to be more than stabs in the dark. 
This is why some level of truthfulness has always been seen as essential 
to human society, no matter how deficient the observance of other moral 
principles. Even the devils themselves, as Samuel Johnson said, do not 
lie to one another, since the society of Hell could not subsist without truth 
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any more than others. A society, then, whose members were unable to 
distinguish truthful messages from deceptive ones, would collapse. But 
even before such a general collapse, individual choice and survival 
would be imperiled. (Bok, 1999, pp. 18-19) 
 
By rejecting the objectivity of truth, individual choice is incapacitated. The cost of 
epistemological skepticism, it seems, is ethical relativism. In fact, denying the possibility 
of knowledge (i.e., skepticism) foregrounds the parallel of denying the possibility of 
freedom (i.e., determinism). Denying the possibilities of knowledge and freedom 
circumvent the foundations for “reasonable choice,” writes Bok, thus committing skeptics 
and determinists to the aporia of relativism—being “cast about like a dry leaf in the wind” 
(Bok, 1999, p. 22). Religious scholars have marshaled similar critiques against relativism, 
such as Francis J. Beckwith and Greg Koukl who affirm that “When truth dies, all of its 
subspecies, such as ethics, perish with it. If truth can’t be known, then the concept of moral 
truth becomes incoherent. Ethics become relative…” (Beckwith & Koukl, 1998, p. 20). 
The suggestion that truth is unknowable or incommunicable undermines the possibility for 
an ethics of occultic rhetoric, if not ethics altogether. “Few go so far” with their doubts 
about truth, writes Bok, but Gunn is a determined skeptic. Unfortunately, what he does not 
seem to realize is that “Both skepticism and determinism have to be bracketed—set aside—
if moral choice is to retain [its] significance” (Bok, 1999, p. 22). Contrary to the suggestion 
that ethics is compatible with the skeptical doctrine of ineffability, Bok insists on the 
reverse: that ethics or moral choice depends on a necessarily reasonable degree of 
knowledge (what Bok calls “truthfulness”). Truthfulness is an ethical prospect of 
knowledge that avoids the epistemological obsession with establishing absolute certainty. 
“The fact that the ‘whole truth’ can never be reached in its entirety should not, therefore, 
be a stumbling block in the much more limited inquiry into questions of truth-telling and 
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falsehood,” writes Bok. “It is possible to go beyond the notion that epistemology is 
somehow prior to ethics. The two nourish one another, but neither can claim priority” (Bok, 
1999, p. 13).  
Bok’s distinction between epistemological “truth” and ethical “truthfulness” is one 
that is endorsed by other scholars, such as the religious philosopher Douglas Groothuis 
who separates the existence of objective truth from the mastery of it: “It is one thing to 
claim that objective, absolute and universal truth exists. It is quite another to claim that one 
has mastered these objective, absolute and universal truths or that one has nothing more to 
learn and is in no need of correction. I will argue strenuously for the former claim but (not 
being omniscient) make no pretense to the latter” (Groothuis, 2000, p. 12). Nobody has a 
mastery of the truth, for this implies an omniscient sense of ‘whole truth’ which Bok admits 
is beyond human apprehensibility. Despite this epistemological challenge, we are 
nevertheless capable of defending a modest sense of knowledge which Bok calls 
‘truthfulness.’ Such a distinction (between truth and truthfulness) would predictably find 
no audience among the postmodernists who, like Gunn, fret over the way scholars 
commonly weaponize the truth to humiliate and overpower others. According to the 
postmodernists, truth entails an “arrogant attitude or an unbending, irrational dogmatism” 
responsible for all the rhetorical obscurities and scholarly mistreatments that have 
ruthlessly engulfed modern academia. And so postmodernists have made it their mission 
to disconnect truth from language: “The only way to end the chaining of occult modes of 
invention is to let go of the need for a transcendental presence; trapped in our own 
symbolicity, there is no access to the outside” (Gunn, 2005, pp. 210-211). The postmodern 
turn to skepticism (and relativism), therefore, is a bid to stamp out the presumed source of 
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these conflicts. But this response, of course, is a flamboyant overcorrection to the sins of 
modernism. 
Rather than perpetuate the postmodernists’ assumption that truth is corrosive to the 
virtue of humility, Groothuis offers a sobering rebuttal that showcases their compatibility: 
“In fact, it is precisely belief in a truth beyond one’s own thoughts and culture that allows 
one to be rebuffed and reconstructed by reality,” argues Groothuis. “We can, therefore, be 
realigned by the truth and with the truth. This nonnegotiable distinction should engender 
humility, not arrogance; a quest for reasonable certainty through dialogue, not dogmatism 
through mindless affirmation and denunciation” (Groothuis, 2000, p. 12). Far from Gunn’s 
suggestion that humility can only thrive under a skeptical, relativistic epistemology, 
Groothuis argues instead that humility is best secured through the possession of a 
reasonable certainty. The quest for a reasonable sense of knowledge reflects Bok’s ethical 
concept of ‘truthfulness’—a concept which is perfectly consistent with the art of rhetoric, 
particularly judicial rhetoric, where judges and juries in court proceedings act as an 
audience of “reasonable persons” who ascertain not the absoluteness or certainty of truth, 
but rather its justifiability (its ability to be placed beyond a reasonable doubt). Clearly the 
standard of reasonability in jurisprudence is not irreconcilable with the idea of humility. In 
fact, it restores our trust in the power of communication and our ability to make ethical 
judgments. Reasonability, not ineffability, is more conducive to the aims of justice, 
especially given how the burden of proof humbles our suspicions against the accused, for 
the necessity of proof always lies with the person who lays the charges. Bok’s principle of 
truthfulness, therefore, should serve as a better foundation for the ethics of language and 
occultic rhetoric, rather than Gunn’s principle of ineffability which instead fosters a kind 
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of intellectual vertigo. Whereas Gunn enforces a crippling skepticism that eliminates any 
grounds for humility to flourish, Bok (and Groothuis) restores our trust in the bond between 
rhetoric and ethics by effectively redirecting our skepticism to our mastery of the truth, not 
the existence of truth itself. 
 
Section IV.5: Contingent and Necessary Causes 
 
Having renovated the foundations of occultic rhetoric by reinstating a classical, 
essentialist ontology of language in place of a nominalistic, postmodern one, the challenge 
now is to focus on the areas of occultic rhetoric that pertain specifically to its ethical (rather 
than metaphysical) nature. How do we identify the ethical dimensions of occultic rhetoric? 
Such a task would no doubt require our locating those areas of occultic rhetoric that lend 
themselves to moral inquiry and evaluation, and separating them from those other areas 
which do not. In other words, we must identify and distinguish between its neutral and non-
neutral elements. Starting first on the subject of its neutrality, occultic rhetoric shares in 
the neutral definition of secrecy. Occultus, meaning ‘hidden’ or ‘secret,’ tethers the idea of 
occultic rhetoric to the Bokian principle of neutrality, given how it serves ambivalent biases 
(for both the purposes of good and evil). Even Gunn is savvy to this insight when he points 
out that the occultic “study of secrets…did not exist until there was a need for secrecy” 
(Gunn, 2005, p. 9), and “a need to maintain one’s elite status” (Gunn, 2005, p. 171). The 
need for secrecy overlaps with the notion that jargonized language—language that hides 
or obscures—is a necessary staple of human discourse. We have a duty to conceal as much 
as we have a duty to reveal; thus, if Bok is correct in her conclusion that there exists a 
“need for secrecy” (Bok, 1989, p. 18), then the ethical nature of secrecy would no doubt 
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transfer over to the art and practice of occultic rhetoric itself. Occultic rhetoric is thus 
neutral, given the range of uses and secretive purposes to which it can be put. 
At the same time, however, occultic rhetoric is not limited to secrecy alone, for it 
also encompasses the non-neutral domain of lying and dishonesty. Strategies of deceptive 
statements are among the functions of occultic rhetoric; therefore, in cases such as these, 
occultic rhetoric is not neutral, but also prima facie unethical: “Whereas I take lying to be 
prima facie wrong, with a negative presumption against it from the outset, secrecy need 
not be” (Bok, 1989, p. xv).  This conceptual versatility complicates the nature of occultic 
rhetoric, for “while all deception requires secrecy, all secrecy is not meant to deceive” 
(Bok, 1989, p. 7). Secrecy is a neutral concept; truth is a neutral concept; communication 
is a neutral concept. Neutrality applies when concepts fulfill a need that can be used to 
serve a range of moral (and immoral) purposes. But lying, according to Bok, is not neutral; 
it is an act which already assumes an “initial evaluative stance” (Bok, 1989, p. 9). Whereas 
truth itself is neutral, truth-telling and lying are morally biased from the outset. Truth is a 
need; but need we always tell the truth? Secrecy is a need (or ‘good’) with the potential for 
abuse; but lying on the other hand seems to already constitute an actual abuse (in violating 
truth) therefore requiring justification. In the case of “prefatory piety” and other forms of 
irony like the “deliberate rhetorical blind” (Gunn, 2005, p. 22), occultic rhetoric is 
evidently involved in the business of misleading audiences through distorting truth as well. 
Modern Occult Rhetoric is not only about the drama of secrecy, but also the drama of lying. 
It appears that, depending on the circumstances, occultic rhetoric straddles the boundary 
between neutrality and non-neutrality, for the variant forms of manipulation that emerge 
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from occultic rhetoric seem to result from its envelopment of both the discourses of secrecy 
and lies. 
The common thread between these two discourses, however, is a principle which 
helps to clarify the moral dimensions of occultic rhetoric: the role of intention. Drawing 
on Bok’s philosophy of communication, the defining element in the ethics of secrecy is 
intentional concealment (Bok, 1989, p. 5), and the defining element in the ethics of lying 
is intentional deceptive statements (Bok, 1999, p. 13). Intention is the essential principle 
governing the ethicality of secrecy and lying, and since occultic rhetoric (like all rhetorical 
engagements) involves the element of intent, it becomes paramount to distinguish between 
certain kinds of rhetorical obfuscation that are (and are not) intentional in nature. Hence, 
in order for rhetoric to truly qualify as occultic in the deliberate sense, it is prudent that we 
establish a fundamental distinction between two forms of obscurity: (1) the legitimate form, 
and (2) the apparent form. Legitimate forms of rhetorical obscurity denote genuine occultic 
rhetoric—that which is ‘intentionally’ occultic—and thus pertain specifically to moral 
inquiry and investigation. Legitimate forms of occultic rhetoric therefore possess what may 
be termed in principle as occultic intent. Occultic intent is essential to the identitfication 
of the legitimate form because of the added layer of moral responsibility that comes with 
the consequences of our intentions. Silence, evasion, (wide) mental reservation, and some 
forms of equivocation, bespeak the presence of occultic intent, for the ethics of these 
actions hinge on the reality of one’s willfulness to conceal knowledge—“to block 
information about it or evidence of it from reaching that person, and to do so intentionally: 
to prevent him from learning it, and thus from possessing it, making use of it, or revealing 
it” (Bok, 1989, p. 6).  
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In addition to the intent to hide, Bok also showcases the intent to deceive, revealing 
the depth of intricacies involved in the three differing “filters” of lying: (1) self-deception, 
(2) error, and (3) variations of the actual intention to deceive. “These three factors can be 
looked at as filters of irregular thickness, distortion, and color that alter the ways in which 
a message is experienced by both deceived and deceivers. To complicate matters further, 
someone who intends to deceive can work with these filters and manipulate them; he can 
play on the biases of some persons, the imagination of others, and on errors and confusion 
throughout the system. The interaction of these filters through which communication 
passes and is perceived is immensely complex” (Bok, 1999, p. 15). Although the 
complexity of these filters can seem daunting and discouraging to the formation of an ethics 
of lying, Bok avoids this complication by reserving her analysis to those clear-cut examples 
of deception “where the intention to mislead is obvious” (Bok, 1999, p. 16). The intention 
to mislead or evade (i.e., occultic intent) constitutes the foundational element common to 
acts of secrecy and lying, and thus must also apply to our engagements in the ethics of 
rhetorical obscurity. However, not all forms of rhetorical obscurity invariably result from 
occultic intent; some examples, for instance, are the consequences of necessity or of 
circumstance—what could be described as apparent forms of occultic rhetoric.  
The distinction between apparent forms and legitimate forms is one of vital 
importance for the ethics of occultic rhetoric, and an ancient precedent of this distinction 
goes as far back as Philodemus of Gadara (110-35BC), an Epicurean philosopher who 
wrote on rhetoric, ethics, and poetry, among other things. According to him, there were 
two kinds of obscurity: “one intentional (i.e., obfuscation), the other not” (Kustas, 1973, p. 
66). Rhetoric that is legitimately occultic is reflected in Philodemus’ notion of intentional 
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obscurity, which is produced “…when a person, having nothing to say, deliberately 
obfuscates so as to appear to be saying something useful. An author will use poetical and 
tropical expressions, archaisms, and solecisms toward this end since they would not be 
understood by the majority” (Kustas, 1973, p. 66). Speaking truthfully, says Philodemus, 
would contain “none of [the] vices” typical of intentional obscurity. “Here Philodemus 
introduces us to a common motif: obscurity is a device for keeping out the crowd and 
showing oneself distinctive and exclusive” (Kustas, 1973, p. 66). Philodemus’ emphasis 
on the intentional aspects of esoteric language parallels a Bokian approach to the ethics of 
occultic rhetoric. But of course, as stated earlier, obscurity does not always result from the 
element of intent. Some examples of obscurity are merely apparent, resulting instead from 
unintentional obscurity. “Unintentional obscurity, on the other hand, arises basically 
from ignorance, either of the subject matter or of the rules for writing good Greek” (Kustas, 
1973, p. 66). According to Philodemus, two kinds of ignorance are capable of generating 
unintentional obscurity: (1) ignorance of the subject matter, and (2) ignorance of the rules 
for good writing. Both forms of ignorance impair the codependency of truth and language. 
Subject-matter ignorance implies the flaws in one’s logic or understanding, setting the 
conditions for false statements and fallacious arguments; Good-writing ignorance implies 
the flaws in one’s rhetoric or expressive style, ripening the propensities for maladapted 
messages and poor articulation. It would seem, therefore, that unintended obfuscation can 
result either from logical thoughts poorly expressed, or false/fallacious thoughts eloquently 
expressed (or some combination of the two). 
Such was the curious case of Derlyn Roberts in 2017, a faulty sign language 
interpreter from Florida who appointed herself to translate for a press conference at the 
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Tampa Police Department, but who ultimately ended up confusing the deaf community and 
embarrassing the authorities with her phony skills in sign language. “Most of the time it 
just looked like she was signing but not using actual signs,” said University of South 
Florida professor Rachelle Settambrino. “When she was spelling words out, she wasn't 
spelling anything at all. They were just gibberish more than anything” (Chambers, 2017). 
Roberts’ subject-matter ignorance of sign language resulted in the unintentional 
production of confusing, obscure messages. Unintentional obscurity may be described as 
incidental (as opposed to intentional); it constitutes the flaws or accidents of the 
communicative process, apart from any deliberate intent, purpose, or strategy. It should be 
noted, however, that human ignorance does not exhaust the list of factors that contribute to 
communication breakdown. As Bok reminds us, “There are, of course, many other 
reasons why information or evidence may not reach a person, quite apart from intentional 
secrecy. Unintended distortions or blockages may occur either at the source, en route, or at 
the receiving end of any communication” (Bok, 1989, p. 6) She continues: “The speaker, 
for example, may be mistaken, inarticulate, or using a language unknown to the listener. 
En route, the message may be deflected by outside noise, by atmospheric conditions, by 
interruption. At the receiving end, deafness, fatigue, language problems, or mental 
retardation may affect the reception of the message” (Bok, 1999, p. 8). Based on these 
examples, messages can indeed be lost due to a variety of unforeseeable or accidental 
factors.  
Thus, in addition to the intentional (legitimate) and unintentional (apparent) 
categories of rhetorical obscurity, there may be room for another cause of occultic rhetoric 
that can be classified as necessary obscurity. Necessary obscurity contrasts with the 
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contingent categories of intentional and unintentional, for necessity is categorically 
different from contingency in the same way that permanence is different from change. 
Contingency implies change—where something can happen in more than one way, being 
the result of luck, specific choices, accident, individual effort, etc.). “Necessity,” on the 
other hand, rules in the opposite by implying permanence—that something must happen or 
happen lawfully, and that it can happen in one and only one way. Necessary obscurity refers 
to the type of occultic language that Gunn describes as unavoidable, or more precisely, 
“inevitable” (Gunn, 2005, pp. 52, 72, 77, 104, 234, 235). The inevitability or necessity of 
obscurity does not exactly refer to a “need” in the moral sense of a social ‘good’ which 
humans value and pursue (for this implies contingency); rather, it refers to something 
larger: namely the determinacy of obscure language—that obscure language must exist, 
independent of human action, beyond both design and chance, purpose and accident (or 
intent and incident). The necessity of obscurity is ontological, and it reflects its determinacy 
in the same way triangularity necessitates three sides. It exists by necessity, by sheer virtue 
of its definition or identity. Just as triangularity is a necessary property of any three-sided 
shape, so is obscurity a necessary property of any language, for language is bound by a 
range of inescapable limitations that nonetheless contribute to the exclusion and/or 
obstruction of understanding. 
There are various reasons why difficult prose must exist. “As a rhetorician,” writes 
Gunn, “I am most interested in the defenses that were offered for the invention of difficult 
prose” (2005, p. 233). He lists three main defenses: (1) the short-hand argument, (2) the 
audience-specific argument, and (3) the occult-poetics argument. Short-Hand: First, 
“jargon serves as a kind of shorthand for complex ideas” (Gunn, 2005, p. 233). Dropping 
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names and employing neologisms might come across as “hermetic,” but as Gunn affirms, 
“these are often useful and efficient ways of bringing an entire argument or position quickly 
into the conversation” (Gunn, 2005, p. 233). In fact, the efficiency of rhetorical ornaments 
have been thought to confer survival value to the human species by compressing data, 
assisting our memories, and saving us time in recalling information (Lanham, 1991, p. 80). 
Audience-Specific: The second argument focuses on the specificity of the audience, the 
existence of which determines the language or “style” best suited for a given context. Style 
is dependent on audience analysis, “a utopic gesture that attempts to speak to a future 
public” (Gunn, 2005, p. 233). Adapting one’s rhetorical style to an anticipated audience 
also capitalizes on “defamiliarization”—the artistic technique of presenting to audiences 
common things in an unfamiliar or strange way in order to enhance perception of the 
familiar. Occult-Poetics: The third argument centers on the human need to continually 
generate new ways to express ourselves, what Gunn refers to as “a consequence of the 
ineffability of human experience” (2005, p. 234). Involving the novel use, redefinition, 
and/or whole cloth invention of new terminologies leads Gunn to consider this argument 
as “better than the first two,” and that “it roots difficult language in an ontology” (2005, p. 
234). The ontology Gunn proposes, as critiqued earlier, is squarely in tension with his 
ethics. But, nevertheless, Gunn concludes that occult poetics is our 
“inevitable…ontological plight” (Gunn, 2005, p. 234).  
There certainly is validity in these arguments. Necessity (like its intentional and 
unintentional counterparts) is among the main causes of occultic rhetoric. In fact, necessity 
rarely (if ever) acts in isolation from the other two causes. In most cases, obscurity results 
from chance and necessity working together; at other times, necessity works with some 
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measure of purpose. For Gunn, rhetorical obscurity is a product of necessity, and the 
difficulties of scholarly language can evince this idea. Consider the natural sciences where 
abound multitudes of esoteric terminologies that vary from discipline to discipline. The 
language of biologists, mathematicians, physicists, geologists, chemists, computer 
technicians, and cosmologists can appear deliberately exclusive not just to the average 
reader or listener, but also to experts in disparate scientific fields. Parodies of such 
technobabble  have emerged in the past as reactions to the unavoidable difficulty 
associated with scientific language, such as the fictional machine: the “Turboencabulator.” 
The Turboencabulator (sometimes going by different titles, like “Retro-encabulator”) was 
conceived as a rhetorical spoof to illustrate the common, enigmatic motifs of mechanistic 
terminology. Observe the complexity of its expression in the following excerpt: 
For a number of years now, work has been proceeding in order to bring 
perfection to the crudely conceived idea of a transmission that would not 
only supply inverse reactive current for use in unilateral phase detractors, 
but would also be capable of automatically synchronizing cardinal 
grammeters. Such an instrument is the turbo-encabulator. Now basically 
the only new principle involved is that instead of power being generated 
by the relative motion of conductors and fluxes, it's produced by the 
modial interaction of magneto-reluctance and capacitive diractance. The 
original machine had a base plate of pre-famulated amulite surmounted 
by a malleable logarithmic casing in such a way that the two spurving 
bearings were in a direct line with the panametric fan. The latter 
consisted simply of six hydrocoptic marzlevanes, so fitted to the 
ambifacient lunar waneshaft that side fumbling was effectively 
prevented. The main winding was of the normal lotus-o-delta type placed 
in panendermic semi-boloid slots of the stator, every seventh conductor 
being connected by a non-reversible tremie pipe to the differential girdle 
spring on the "up" end of the grammeters. The turbo-encabulator has now 
reached a high level of development, and it’s being successfully used in 
the operation of novertrunnions. Moreover, whenever a forescent skor 
motion is required, it may also be employed in conjunction with a drawn 
reciprocation dingle arm, to reduce sinusoidal repleneration. (Koretsky, 
2014) 
 
This amusing, technical manuscript began in the mid-twentieth century and has 
since become a legendary subject of professional humor among engineers. Add to this the 
obscurity associated with chemical and molecular nomenclature, and you also have 
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another, similarly related, scientific spectacle known as the “Dihydrogen Monoxide” 
(DHMO) hoax of the late twentieth century—a parody which deployed unfamiliar, 
‘chemophobic’ verbiage to portray the mundane characteristics of liquid water as a 
dangerous, toxic substance that should be regulated, avoided, or simply banned (Glassman, 
1997; Kruszelnicki, 2006). The ability of large, unfamiliar, or specialized terminology 
inevitably contributes to the production of mystery over clarity, showcasing once again the 
link between science and magic, or knowledge and language. “Understanding the occultic 
in this general way begins to unravel the tidy distinction between ‘real science’ and the 
‘occult’ that was introduced during the Enlightenment. This is not to say that there is no 
distinction between science and the occult tradition but rather that the rhetoric of each is 
often experienced by the ‘outsider’ as occultic” (Gunn, 2005, p. xxiv). The occultic 
impression of scientific verbiage, however bewildering, is typically the result of a normal 
if not necessary part of our rhetorical existence. Such terminological obscurity is 
attributable not always to the sole factors of strategy or incompetence, but rather to an 
element of necessity which the late French-American historian Jacques Barzun (1907-
2012) described as the “gangrene of specialism.” Barzun took notice of the increasing 
overspecialization (and inevitable fragmentation) of modern, academic knowledge. He 
contended that “good writing should not sound stuffy, pompous, highfalutin, totally unlike 
ourselves, but rather, well—‘simple & direct’” (Barzun, 2001, p. 17). Fellow scholar, 
Herbert I. London, concurred with Barzun’s judgment against the gangrene of specialism 
when he wrote that, 
The proliferation of scholarship with specialties now so arcane that the 
average person cannot possible [sic] know what is meant by academic 
terminology has reduced knowledge to a form of mysticism or revealed 
truth. A faculty member at the New School for Social Research describes 
himself as a 'post-modern semiotics instructor.' After having listened to 
 173 
him lecture, I'm convinced he is a witch doctor enamored with 
obfuscation of language and meaning. (Barzun, 1993, pp. xiii-xiv) 
 
Barzun strove instead for universities to cultivate “common knowledge and 
common reference” (Holley, 2012) for the sake of advancing common sense and 
understanding. This approach to communication overlaps with Bok’s quest for a set of 
transcultural “common values” (Bok, 2002). The gangrene of specialism, however, 
aggravates the interdisciplinary coherence and unification of knowledge, and testifies to 
the fact that not all forms of difficult prose arise solely from human intent or ignorance. 
Sometimes, difficult prose is more so the product of necessity and circumstance. Just as 
the English words of this page are enough to exclude a variety of non-English audiences, 
no one would fault the reality of language-barriers as a breach of one’s personal ethics. 
Language-barriers are inevitable. Therefore, occultic rhetoric is inevitable—that language, 
according to Gunn, is only barriers, not bridges (if the principle of ineffability be true). But 
if Gunn is correct in his conclusion that all occultic rhetoric is inevitable, deterministic, or 
necessary, then of course the prospect of an ethics is surely undermined, for the blame of 
obscurity would lie with no one other than the nature of language itself. Fortunately, 
Gunn’s claim is not entirely true. In fact, it is far removed from our common experience of 
reality. Some of occultic rhetoric is inevitable, yes, but not all. Some forms of occultic 
rhetoric are also accidental in nature, being the product of human ignorance or 
incompetence. And other times, most pertinently, occultic rhetoric is explained only in the 
light of human deliberation, purpose, or intent. But Gunn’s preoccupation with inevitability 
and determinism stems from his commitment to the paradoxical idea that our intentions are 
pre-determined, that is, “the motives structuring intent may be unknown to the individual. 
In other words, intent may be scripted by ideological forces or unconscious motives and 
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desires” (Gunn, 2005, p. 150). With this presumption, it is no wonder then why Gunn 
espouses the inevitability of academic jargon (i.e., that all occultic rhetoric is borne of 
necessity).  
But as a Bokian approach reminds us, ethics depends not on the element of 
determinacy, but contingency, particularly the principle of intent, which she characterizes 
as the “most distinctive” part of “human reasoning” (Bok, 1989, p. 23). Without a free, 
indeterminate capacity to intend one way or another, moral choices between good and evil 
are incapacitated, for all of moral behavior is animated by our intentions. Without intention, 
there can be no genuine sense of action; only motion remains. The distinction between 
action and motion is one which deserves special attention here because it underscores the 
significance of intent within the moral calculus. Motion implies inevitability; it suggests 
that the movement of things are (pre) determined by the regularities of nature, such as a 
rock falling down a hill, or a person accidentally tripping over a bicycle. Motion, therefore, 
is a concept that connotes the lack of intention. But in his Grammar of Motives (1945), 
Kenneth Burke declared that motion should be distinguished from action, because action 
connoted something more. To put it simply, “the basic unit of action would be defined as 
‘the human body in conscious or purposive motion’” (Burke, 1945, p. 14). While action 
overlaps with motion, it is distinct from motion, because “Action involves character, which 
involves choice; and the form of choice attains its perfection in the distinction between Yes 
and No (between thou shalt and thou shalt not). Though the concept of sheer ‘motion’ is 
non-ethical, ‘action’ implies the ethical (the human personality). Hence, the obvious close 
relation between the ethical and the negatives of the Decalogue” (Burke, 1970, p. 41). By 
rejecting the freedom of the willing or intending individual (through an attempt to subsume 
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all rhetorical and/or ethical agency under the domain of motion or necessity) Gunn 
advances a philosophy of communication that detonates the very foundations of moral 
inquiry. 
Gunn renders ethics impossible. By advancing the claim that there is no intentional 
agent and that occultic rhetoric is inevitable, Gunn leaves no room for intent or free moral 
choice; he leaves no room for action; he leaves no room to tell the difference between a 
wink and a blink. The capacity for action (i.e., for ethical decision-making) is but an illusion 
conjured by motion. To Gunn, there is no distinction between action and motion—they are 
one and the same. But this is the downfall of Gunn’s ethical framework: motion is a 
precondition for action, not a synonym of it. Despite how often these terms are treated 
interchangeably, intention is integral to action. In fact, the very concept of “action” is 
inseparable from intention: to act is to imply an end in view, for all actions tend toward 
some end. Otherwise, we are talking about ‘motion,’ not ‘action.’ Motion is ‘non-ethical,’ 
writes Burke, because motion is devoid of an end in view—it has no motive or intent. Only 
action can account for these concepts because actions connote “consciousness or purpose,” 
while motions do not. Any verb, according to Burke, implies a willed phenomenon, because 
verbs are ‘action words.’ Without the will—without intent, choice, motive, or conscious 
purpose—our world cannot make sense of ‘action words’ (verbs) because action depends 
on something more than motion. And it is precisely because of this additional 
qualification—a qualification that Gunn rejects—that Gunn undermines ethics. 
 
Section IV.6: Grappling with Hierarchies & Mystification 
 
The discourse of action and motion (or contingency and necessity) leads us 
naturally to the phenomenon of mystification—a type of secretive or deceptive language 
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linked to the exercise of power. Power is a natural part of the social order. Where two or 
three come together, power structures inevitably arise. To this extent, power is both 
necessary and contingent: it exists within every motion toward social order, and social 
order is the end to which our actions make power manifest. In order to glean and organize 
the ethical implications that can be drawn from the relationship between power and 
language, one must first engage the question: How does the logic of contingency and 
necessity—which is to say the categories of action and motion—relate to or inform our 
ethical understanding of occultic rhetoric and/or mystification?  
As Gunn hinted at earlier, much of the cause behind academic gobblygook emerges 
from a desire to climb up various promotion systems and attain ever higher degrees of 
prestige. In other words, the drive to ascend the social hierarchy encourages the production 
of mystification. This is evident within Judith Butler’s own philosophy, since 
“[m]ystification as well as hierarchy are the tools of her practice, a mystification that eludes 
criticism because it makes few definite claims” (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 3). One scholar 
particularly adept at identifying the relationship between mystification and hierarchy is 
Kenneth Burke (1897-1993) whose contributions to rhetorical theory helps to clarify how 
these two concepts interact. Burke’s term “mystification” both predates and informs 
Gunn’s own understanding of occultic rhetoric. In fact, mystification is the “primary 
rhetorical feature of occultic rhetoric” (Gunn, 2005, p. 180). Mystification is precisely the 
element of language that misleads or conceals the truth, particularly with respect to one’s 
own power or status within a given hierarchy (Burke, 1969, p. 178). Inspired by his 
Marxian insights on the order of the social classes, Burke likened hierarchical 
communication to “pyramidal magic”—when communication from one level of the 
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pyramid facilitates action in another level. Hierarchical communication thus moves in two 
directions: (1) inferior-to-superior, and (2) superior-to-inferior. The former direction, 
inferior-to-superior, is a bottom-up magic whereby the inferiors’ communication 
influences change by flattering or imitating their superiors (which Burke termed “prayer”). 
The latter direction, superior-to-inferior, is a top-down magic whereby the superiors’ 
communication influences change by inspiring inferiors to sacrifice for a social good 
(which Burke termed “mystification”). Prayer and mystification are types of rhetoric that 
overcomes the divisions of hierarchy; but mystification, unlike prayer, is more frequently 
deceptive: it is superior-to-inferior communication that often disguises itself as equal-to-
equal communication (Thames, 1999, pp. 25-26). 
Burke referred to this as the “mystification of class.” Orders of class exist and are 
easily exemplified within academia itself. For instance, academia involves the division and 
authority of the teacher class over the student class. And just as students are “hierarchically 
arranged among themselves,” so too are teachers “among themselves ‘invidiously’ ranked” 
(Burke, 1969, p. 178). Mystification of class, however, can set in whenever teachers use 
equal-to-equal communication to conceal their hierarchical difference. Consider teachers 
who claim to “instruct” their students: instruction assumes the existence of an academic 
hierarchy. But teachers who claim to “facilitate” the learning experience essentially 
downplay the power relationship that prevails between the two groups. “Facilitation” thus 
becomes an attempt at mystification, for it obscures the reality of hierarchy that exists 
between teachers and students. Burke was interested in the ways language concealed the 
reality of hierarchy—an interest which likely sprang from his communist sympathies 
(Abbott, 1974). Equipped with this general overview on the relationship between hierarchy 
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and mystification, it now makes sense to see why Burke applies the logic of action and 
motion to the understanding and practice of difficult language. 
In his Rhetoric of Motives, Burke distinguished between two forms of 
mystification: (1) a “special” kind, and (2) a “general” kind. The first kind of mystification 
can be described as action (contingent, intentional, motivated, biased, and “simple but 
ubiquitous,”) given how it is rooted in the way “language can be used to deceive” (Burke, 
1969, p. 179). This type of mystification, then, “is a process of verbal and symbolic 
deception; linguistic or symbolic mystification obscures or covers up (or covers over) the 
world that supposedly is being described” (Jasinski, 2001, p. 378). Such examples of this 
purposeful type of mystification range from acts of deliberate omission and secrecy to 
strategic ambiguity, distortion, embellishment, and lying. On the other hand, Burke also 
illuminated our understanding of a secondary “general” level of mystification which could 
be described as motion (i.e., inevitable, necessary, “cannot be cleared away,”) and is the 
“‘logical conclusion’ of the persuasive principle” (Burke, 1969, p. 179). Indeed, this 
“profounder kind of mystification” is “implicit in the very act of persuasion itself” (Burke, 
1969, p. 178). In order to appreciate the depth of complexity involved in the distinction 
between special and general forms of mystification, consider how people invariably 
employ what might be described as deceptive names or terms to cultivate (or manipulate) 
the ways in which we understand the world around us. 
The process of naming or of definition is one which illustrates the process of 
mystification. Observe the function of the euphemism: a euphemism is a common 
rhetorical trope that qualifies as a kind of verbal magic by the way it masks or 
(mis)represents the harshness or unpleasantness of certain words, such as trading the word 
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“genocide” for “ethnic cleansing.” Euphemism gives a deceptive name to that which it 
refers; it functions often as an agent of humor, but sometimes is employed with subtlety 
for the “special” purposes of persuasion. At the same time, however, Burke also contended 
that euphemisms served a “general” function as well: that all words carry certain 
connotations of a euphemistic or dysphemistic cast. Burke’s notion of the eulogistic 
covering derives from the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) who 
criticized the use of eulogistic and dyslogistic terms. Bentham believed that language was 
once neutral, free from positive or negative suggestions, and stood simply and directly for 
the things they represented. Over time, however, certain names and labels would come to 
pollute language with biased connotations, acquiring degrees of good and evil undertones 
which served to complicate and confuse public discourse. Consequently, Bentham called 
for language reforms that would eliminate the use of eulogistic and dyslogistic terms. 
“Burke shared Bentham’s interest in uncovering the way in which certain terms, phrases, 
or epithets functioned to convey attitudes and feelings about the objects to which they 
pointed, but he did not share Bentham’s desire for radical linguistic reform. Bentham 
thought that language originally was neutral; Burke rejected this view” (Jasinski, 2001, p. 
235). 
Contrary to Bentham, Burke contended that “The magical decree is implicit in all 
language, for the mere act of naming an object or situation decrees that it is to be singled 
out as such-and-such rather than as something other. Hence, I think that an attempt to 
eliminate magic, in this sense, would involve us in the elimination of vocabulary itself as 
a way of sizing up reality” (Burke, 1957, p. 5). In other words, connotation is inseparable 
from denotation. All of vocabulary, all terminology, imbibes some degree of mystification, 
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for the power to christen someone or something with a name or label is the same power 
responsible for introducing a new, particular bias, affect, or covering. The process of 
“naming,” according to Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), is “an occult process,” one 
which reflects the “baptism of an object” (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 19, par. 39) and interlinks 
the identifier with the identified—thus forming the moral basis of identity. The question 
of identity is an ethical question, the implications of which result from the magical fusion 
of language and reality. Take, for example, the case of Paul Geisert—a biology teacher 
who denies the existence of God, yet desired to re-express his ideology through a different 
word—a word that was not as ugly or offensive as the common labels atheist or godless. 
“The way Geisert saw it, the word godless is synonymous with ‘evil,’ and its use was a 
surefire way to alienate the general public” (Leibrock, 2010). And so, in the Fall of 2002, 
Geisert devised a new term—“one that was less divisive than godless but more inclusive 
than atheist”—thus giving birth to the more fashionable title, “Bright.” A Bright is any 
individual who identifies as an “atheist or agnostic,” including “self-described 
‘freethinkers,’ rationalists, secular humanists and skeptics,” all of whom eschew “a belief 
in the likes of deities, the paranormal, psychic powers or any other so-called ‘supernatural’ 
entity” (Leibrock, 2010). Geisert’s felt need to re-identify his atheism by a different name 
is a case study in the reality of eulogistic and dyslogistic terms. Whether the coinage of 
Bright has been a success among the secular world is controversial. Richard Dawkins 
embraced the label on the spot; fellow atheist luminary Christopher Hitchens, however, 
considered it a “cringe-making proposal” (Hitchens, 2009, p. 5). 
All of this goes to show that language has a complex relationship with the truth. On 
the one hand, language users are capable of a ‘special’ mystification that intentionally 
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hides, bends, or contradicts the truth; on the other hand, language users are invariably 
subject to a ‘general’ mystification that is intrinsic to every channel of communication, 
forever limiting us only to approximations of the truth, and forbidding our grasp of its 
wholeness or entirety. “The first (or special) type of mystification…can be confronted and, 
with effort, overcome; community members can begin to ‘see through’ various naming 
strategies or acknowledge the contingency of their social structures. But the general or 
‘profounder’ sense of mystification cannot be escaped. …All persuasion involves an 
element of deception or mystification. As much as we might want to confront and 
overcome mystification, we also seem to depend on it” (Jasinski, p. 381). The inevitability 
of mystification constitutes the cornerstone of Gunn’s principle of ineffability, and it is this 
specific property that has been stretched beyond reasonable measure, retarding Gunn’s 
trust in the adequacy of language to communicate truth and meaning. Of course Gunn’s 
fallacy is understandable: the idea that mystification is inevitable seems to stem from the 
fact that hierarchy itself is inevitable (Burke, 1969, p. 141). We are all goaded into 
hierarchy, for hierarchy is “the motive of the sociopolitical order…of the social ladder, or 
social pyramid, involving a concern with the ‘higher’ as an organizing element, in men’s 
modes of placement” (Burke, 1970, p. 41). This brings to mind such notions as “ascent” 
and “social superiority”—those same inimical strivings that compare between those in 
academia and those in the occult. 
Just as the occultist seems to replicate the external hierarchy of class 
within a secret order, so, too, the academic carves out spaces of 
belonging in terms of a disciplinary argot and other rhetorics of inclusion 
and exclusion (e.g, admission standards). Indeed, as some first-
generation scholars are likely to admit, academic success is motivated by 
a desire for class ascendancy, a motive that is frequently derided as a 
source of professional arrogance. In this respect, it is not surprising that 
the unfavorable public reactions to occultists like Blavatsky and Crowley 
are similar to the unfavorable representations of academics in the popular 
media in general. (Gunn, 2005, pp. 219-220) 
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Competition for academic authority is a fierce struggle among students, and even 
among teachers. And the consequence of this rivalry for dominance in the intellectual 
hierarchy ripens our propensities for secrecy and deception. Such was the humiliating 
spectacle showcased by Gunn’s ignorance of Lacanian desire (Gunn, 2005, p. 234). 
Through our displays of intellectual superiority, we contend and compete for our place in 
the social ladder; we reinforce a practice of pyramidal magic that privileges pride and 
conquest rather than humility and cooperation. And one of the main weapons deployed in 
these struggles for ascension and prominence is mystification—or as Gunn would have it, 
occultic rhetoric. It would seem that in the game of academia, one need not attempt to 
possess expert knowledge; rather, it suffices to simply obstruct the understanding of 
everyone else around you. As one popular adage puts it, if you can’t convince them, confuse 
them. Such is the tactic illustrated within Gunn’s own experience, where the difficulty of 
the course content resulted in his outsider status.  
The subsequent nausea of that experience was precipitated by Gunn’s damaged 
ethos—his damaged reputation or credibility. This much is easy to see, for we all intuitively 
understand that without trust or credibility (ethos), our words will count for little; we are 
brought low and disempowered. Without ethos, we are, in effect, demoted in the hierarchy. 
Hence, the preoccupation of academics far and wide is to seek the elevation of their social 
and intellectual status by continually building their ethos, their trustworthiness, their reason 
to be taken seriously. And so, the attainment of a greater ethos implies that hierarchical 
ascension is dependent on each and every scholar’s ability to procure a greater level of 
knowledge that may be called ‘expertise.’ In her text The Rhetoric of Expertise, E. Johanna 
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Hartelius from the University of Pittsburgh showcases the importance of expert knowledge 
and its relationship to the academic hierarchy. 
Expertise is not simply about one person’s skills being different from 
another’s. It is also grounded in a fierce struggle over ownership and 
legitimacy. To be an expert is to claim a piece of the world, to define 
yourself in relation to certain insights into human experience. Expertise 
constitutes a special relationship between a subject matter, a public, and 
one who masters and manipulates the former for the latter’s benefit or 
need. The crux of the expertise issue is that being recognized as an expert 
generates not only status and power but considerable influence. Those 
labeled reap the financial and symbolic benefits. Their opinions are 
‘expert’ opinions. Their voices are heard above others’. To be an expert, 
in short, is to rhetorically gain sanctioned rights to a specific topic or 
mode of knowledge. (Hartelius, 2011, p. 1) 
 
The problem, however, is not with succeeding others in the hierarchy through a 
resilient and legitimate expertise; it is with trampling over others to get to the top, especially 
by means of an appearance of expertise (where the language is so inscrutable that the 
legitimacy of expert knowledge is indeterminable). The difficulty associated with 
academic language (i.e., the rhetoric of the experts) is a great source of disdain for all 
people, both inside and outside of the academic profession. As Marjorie Garber reminded 
us earlier, the word “academic” is held in low repute today for being so detached from the 
goods of clarity and comprehension. Gunn echoes a similar warning about the declining 
respectability of the academy which he attributes to the manipulation of secret languages. 
Just as occultists secure their hierarchical advancement through the novelty and controlled 
meanings of their own private vocabularies, academics assemble themselves around 
revered texts, dispute the meaning of words, and manipulate their place within the 
hierarchy through theatrical displays of their own knowledge. Gunn explains that the 
persistent arrogance of the academic community has fostered a society that no longer takes 
the profession very seriously, and that the threat of irrelevance has left scholars scrambling. 
In response to these chilly conditions, he writes, we academics should 
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be expecting increasingly spectacular dramas of secrecy and publicity. 
…we should be able to locate competing vocabularies concerning secret 
truths, and a professoriate at odds with itself, mobilized into elite, 
discrete, and competing cabals that are, in turn, organized around the 
challenging work of this or that scholarly magus. …we should discover 
that the ‘ivory tower,’ the central metaphor of a clandestine academic 
enterprise, has been leveled. Amid the smoldering rubble of this 
centuries-old artifice, we should find the Great Professor unprotected, 
naked, divided against him- or herself, unable to control or signify his or 
her texts, and, perhaps, under attack. If the rhetoric emerging from the 
academy these days is any measure, then these things are coming to 
pass—if they are not already a done deal. (Gunn, 2005, p. 234) 
 
The crisis of academic language concerns the struggle for existence between 
competing vocabularies and definitions, all of which seek to exert their dominance over 
the currency of thought, and assume official primacy. This cutthroat environment 
undergirds the unfolding drama of secrecy taking place within the academy, a scene 
concerned with the preservation of favored vocabularies in the struggle for acceptance, 
privilege, and officialization. While Gunn recognizes how abusive occultic rhetoric can be, 
he still tends to excuse its existence in either one of two ways—the first is economic, and 
the second is epistemic. The first excuse focuses on the economic factors that produce 
occultic rhetoric: “as our jobs becomes less plentiful and tenure goes the way of the dodo, 
as resources become more scarce and we are made to compete for a sense of security, the 
pressure to produce the contentious, argumentative…‘theory Nazi’ is increasing” (Gunn, 
2005, p. 235). Gunn suggests that capitalistic forces are to blame for the aggressive habits 
of the academic milieu—that the scarcity of venues for employment and promotion has 
fostered an interminable rivalry between scholars vying for authority through increasingly 
complex modes of expression. When demand is high and opportunities are diminishing, 
“there is immense pressure on us academics to popularize our work and to justify our 
existence, and consequently an intense desire to thicken our prose and to create the 
conditions that require our interpretive expertise and thereby guarantee our survival. In 
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short, we are encouraged to be snotty” (Gunn, 2005, p. 235). With these economic 
circumstances, Gunn excuses the snottiness of the academy and abuses of occultic rhetoric 
as necessary for survival. 
The second excuse, however, emphasizes the epistemic view of truth (i.e., that truth 
is man-made, socially constructed, or relativistic). This view is indebted to a fluid 
understanding of language, where the process of ‘invented words’ (neologisms) is the fount 
from which we derive our claims to truth and knowledge. Devoid of any objectivity, truth 
is but the product of sentences, or the result of preachments, politics, and power. From this 
postmodernist framework which denies the possibility of truth, engagements in rhetorical 
obfuscation are therefore rendered inevitable (and thus justifiable). This results in the 
supremacy of rhetorical power and skill over the philosophical values of truth and 
knowledge: academicians are now caught within a fierce, relativistic “struggle for authority 
and recognition,” bound within the hierarchy of intellectual celebrities that Gunn terms 
“the current star system of the academy.” He expounds, “We academics in the humanities 
are currently mired in a genius-virtuoso, superstar model of intellectual authority that has 
emerged in the wake of ‘Truth’ and the abandonment of absolutes. Understanding the 
relevance of the authority of the modern magus only requires one to replace the role of 
supernatural truth with this or that notion of post-truth ineffability that is so central to the 
project of the posts (e.g., poststructuralism, postmodernism, and so on)” (Gunn, 2005, p. 
118). The triumph of epistemic relativism in the academy has begotten a hierarchy of 
intellectual superstars vying not for truth, but for power—the legacy of which now 
exacerbates the occultic conditions of academic communication. This skepticism, 
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combined with the need for security, constitutes Gunn’s excuses for the drama of secrecy 
within the scholarly community.  
The overarching combination of these two (economic and epistemic) excuses 
outlined by Gunn is leading to the increase of mystification in the academy. And common 
to the two excuses, unsurprisingly, is the element of hierarchy, or authority, prestige, and 
power. But notice also that Gunn’s observations reflect the exact same two diseases 
diagnosed earlier by mathematician James Lindsay and philosopher Peter Boghossian, both 
of whom devised “The Conceptual Penis as a Social Construct” hoax (Boyle & Lindsay, 
2017). In response to their critics, both scholars concluded that their spoof article’s 
acceptance for publication was best explained by two fundamental problems, namely the 
epistemic problem—“the echo-chamber of morally driven fashionable nonsense coming 
out of the postmodernist social ‘sciences’…”—and the economic problem—“the complex 
problem of pay-to-publish journals with lax standards that cash in on the ultra-competitive 
publish-or-perish academic environment” (Boghossian & Lindsay, 2017). Together, both 
problems contribute to the plight of obfuscation in academic discourse, as well as foster 
the conditions that perpetuate the publication of fraudulent or pseudo-sophisticated 
literature. “At least one of these sicknesses led to [the “Conceptual Penis” article] being 
published as a legitimate piece of academic scholarship, and we can expect proponents of 
each to lay primary blame upon the other” (Boghossian & Lindsay, 2017). The important 
point to draw from this parallel of thought is that while Boghossian and Lindsay see the 
economic/epistemic factors as ‘diseases’ or problems in need of remedial action, Gunn sees 
them as excuses—as inevitable realities that justify the exploitation of mystification in 
academia. 
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In sum, Gunn’s philosophy of communication attributes the spread of mystification 
to the combined pressures of the epistemic and economic problems. In other words, 
mystification is excusable because these two forces guarantee its inevitability. As a result, 
Gunn allows the necessary existence of occultic rhetoric to eclipse the contingent realm of 
ethical inquiry. After all, as far as Gunn is concerned: why bother with the burden of clarity 
or comprehension when the truth, in the end, is ineffable anyway? Why consider it our 
obligation to communicate intelligibly when there is no contingency (i.e., purposive 
agency) in the first place? But as Burke makes clear: if genuine intent or free choice is 
illusory, then the idea of action is impossible. And if the idea of action is impossible, then 
all that remains is motion. And if motion is all that is left, then the entire point of ethics is 
utterly and unequivocally sabotaged from the outset. Whether he realizes it or not, Gunn’s 
philosophy of communication is not only radically skeptical; it is also radically 
deterministic. How can starting from these philosophical presumptions ever hope to 
support an ethics of occultic rhetoric? It can’t. And Sissela Bok explains why: 
An interesting parallel between skepticism and determinism exists here. 
Just as skepticism denies the possibility of knowledge, so determinism 
denies the possibility of freedom. Yet both knowledge and freedom to 
act on it are required for reasonable choice. Such choice would be denied 
to someone genuinely convinced—to the very core of his being—of both 
skepticism and determinism. He would be cast about like a dry leaf in 
the wind. Few go so far. (Bok, 1999, pp. 21-22) 
 
Gunn is one of those “few” who subscribes to such extremes. But his actions betray 
his theory. Is Gunn a real skeptic when he professes to know the true meaning behind 
Lacan’s difficult writing? Is he a real determinist when he attempts to persuade us away 
from pride and toward humility? According to his own words, one should expect him to be 
‘cast about like a dry leaf in the wind,’ and yet his actions speak otherwise. Either Gunn 
should be denied the substance of action (i.e., “reasonable choice”), or he should reevaluate 
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his convictions in the skeptical and determinist principles of his own philosophy. Alas, this 
is the value of a Bokian philosophy of communication, for she tempers Gunn’s radicalism 
with balance and reason. Not only does she refute Gunn’s skepticism by addressing the 
shortcomings of the problematic quest for epistemological certainty, but she also 
recognizes the economical forces that promote the reproduction of mystifying or deceptive 
language. 
The very stress on individualism, on competition, on achieving material 
success which so marks our society also generates intense pressures to 
cut corners. To win an election, to increase one’s income, to outsell 
competitors—such motives impel many to participate in forms of 
duplicity they might otherwise resist. The more widespread they judge 
these practices to be, the stronger will be the pressures to join, even 
compete, in deviousness. The social incentives to deceit are at present 
very powerful; the controls, often weak. Many individuals feel caught up 
in practices they cannot change. It would be wishful thinking, therefore, 
to expect individuals to bring about major changes in the collective 
practices of deceit by themselves. Public and private institutions, with 
their enormous power to affect personal choice, must help alter the 
existing pressures and incentives. (Bok, 1999, p. 244) 
 
 Rather than excuse the economic problem with philosophical determinism, Bok 
promotes our ability to choose: “Individuals, without a doubt, have the power to influence 
the amount of duplicity in their lives and to shape their speech and action” (Bok, 1999, p. 
243). She discourages our resignation to economic pressures, and moves us toward a 
position of ethical responsibility. Instead of surrendering to the strains that currently 
dominate the academic hierarchy, she seeks to reform the hierarchy. And because the only 
way to change hierarchical practices is from the top-down, she first initiates her agenda 
with the loftiest of all public hierarchies: the government.  
“What role can the government play in such efforts?” she asks. “First, it can look 
to its own practices,” and attempt to “reverse the injuries to trust” committed against the 
public (Bok, 1999, p. 244). Second, the government could begin enforcing “the existing 
laws prohibiting fraud and perjury. Here again, government members have to be the first 
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to be held to such standards” (Bok, 1999, p. 244). And third, our laws should be examined 
to see if “they encourage deception needlessly,” such as welfare programs that abet public 
dishonesty, or criminal record laws that compel felons to conceal or deny their history from 
prospective employers (Bok, 1999, p. 245). After the government can set the example for 
protocols on truth-telling, Bok moves to private institutions. “Private institutions can play 
a parallel role in reducing the incentives to cut corners. Recent studies indicate that 
businessmen regard unethical practices as very widespread, and pressures to conform as 
strong.” Patterns of conformity will undoubtedly persist unless challenged because “young 
executives automatically go along with superiors to show loyalty” (Bok, 1999, p. 245). 
Lastly and most relevantly, “educational institutions” must also recognize their 
responsibility in effecting ethical change. 
First of all, they, too have to look to their own practices. How 
scrupulously honest are they in setting an example? How do they cope 
with cheating, with plagiarism, and with fraudulent research? What 
pressures encourage such behavior? To what extent, and in what 
disciplines, are deceptive techniques actually taught to students? What 
lines do law school courses, for instance, draw with respect to courtroom 
tactics, or business school courses with respect to bargaining and 
negotiation? Second, what can education bring to the training of 
students, in order that they may be more discerning, better able to cope 
with the various forms of duplicity that they will encounter in working 
life? Colleges and universities, as well as nursing schools, police 
academies, military academies, accounting schools, and many others 
need to consider how moral choice can best be studied and what 
standards can be expected, as well as upheld. (Bok, 1999, p. 247). 
 
These questions renew the academy’s responsibility to ethical communication 
practices, and Bok promotes reflection about the status of ethical pedagogy in various 
academic disciplines. Certain traditions of ethical inquiry have existed in some professions 
longer than others, such as medicine and law. Even the discipline of communication ethics 
did not gain national recognition as an important field of study until the 1980’s (Andersen, 
1991, pp. 3-19; Arnett, Fritz, & Bell, 2009, pp. 28-29). Nevertheless, she warns that “in all 
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these fields, much too little effort is being devoted to train persons who are competent to 
teach such courses. As a result, existing courses are often inadequate, leaving students 
confirmed in their suspicion that moral choice is murky and best left to intuition” (Bok, 
1999, pp. 247-248). In the development of these courses, Bok recommends that 
contemporary scholars look to the wisdom of those who came before us, from the ancient, 
medieval, and modern periods. Much progress has already been made in answering ethical 
questions about secretive and deceptive speech. Thus, “[w]e need not start from scratch. 
The structure of [deceptive language] and the possible justifications have long been 
studied. We need to make use of the traditional approaches” (Bok, 1999, p. 248). 
 
Section IV.7: Discerning the Justifications 
 
So far, the practice of mystification or occultic rhetoric has been illustrated in a 
mostly negative light. But not all mystifications are equal. And it is upon this fact—upon 
the sheer immensity of its varieties—that occultic rhetoric must be examined thoughtfully 
and parsed with care. This marks the beginning of an ethics. In order to resolve the problem 
of occultic rhetoric, we must begin by locating the proper boundaries that distinguish it 
from amoral inquiry. As Gunn stated earlier, occultic rhetoric is “a popular social 
phenomenon that is currently difficult to capture and, consequently, rarely discussed in 
scholarly literature” (Gunn, 2005, p. xxviii). The difficulty in capturing and studying 
occultic rhetoric stems from the ambiguous scope of its meaning, thus making sense of 
Gunn’s admission: “readers expecting a direct or definitive definition of the term are likely 
to be disappointed” (Gunn, 2005, p. xxiii). It is therefore necessary to first develop a precise 
definition that works within an ethical framework, although this will be no simple task. 
Even Bok recognizes the complexity of occultic rhetoric when she outlines how the three 
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rhetorical filters (self-deception, error, and variations of the actual intention to deceive) 
work as the primary forces that obstruct a clear understanding of the concept. “These three 
factors can be looked at as filters of irregular thickness, distortion, and color that alter the 
ways in which a message is experienced by both deceived and deceivers. To complicate 
matters further, someone who intends to deceive can work with these filters and manipulate 
them; he can play on the biases of some persons, the imagination of others, and on errors 
and confusion throughout the system. The interaction of these filters through which 
communication passes and is perceived is immensely complex” (Bok, 1999, p. 15). Thus, 
we must attend to parsing the forms of occultic rhetoric that are, in practice, morally 
culpable. 
The first step, therefore, toward founding a less ambiguous definition is by 
excluding the necessary realm of occultic rhetoric from moral discourse. The necessity or 
inevitability of difficult language—what Burke termed the “general” or “profounder” 
category of mystification—is confined to the domain of motion. If a broad form of 
obfuscation is to some degree unavoidable, then it is to that degree where we must 
demarcate that territory as beyond ethical inquiry. This move automatically nullifies the 
source of Gunn’s ethical relativism and determinism, since the necessary realm of occultic 
rhetoric is outright disqualified as the ground from which to base our ethics. We must return 
to an understanding of motion as non-ethical, and therefore limit our moral attention to the 
contingent realm of occultic rhetoric, the realm which concerns Burke’s category of 
“special” mystification, or what can be described as the domain of action. This is consonant 
with Bok’s philosophy of communication, where she avoids the complications involved 
with the inescapable filters of language. She narrows her analysis to those clear-cut 
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examples of purposive deception “where the intention to mislead is obvious” (Bok, 1999, 
p. 16). This forces us to confront the role of what I call occultic intent, considering how 
intention is the distinguishing attribute shared among all actions of secrecy and lying. But 
once we recognize occultic intent as the common denominator in these events, we may 
prematurely assume that occultic intent is in itself the incriminating factor of occultic 
rhetoric. But this would be, as I said, a mistaken conclusion, since it violates Bok’s 
presumption about the general need (and thus ‘neutrality’) of secrecy, including certain 
justified forms of lying (both of which require occultic intent). Occultic intent, therefore, 
is not enough to fault the practice of secretive or deceptive speech, since some occasions 
demand or justify such speech. 
Consider more carefully the rhetorical uses of ambiguity (amphibolia). Ambiguous 
language is either “an intended or inadvertent…ambivalence of grammatical structure, 
usually by mispunctuation” (Lanham, 1991, p. 8). Some examples, like semantic 
ambiguity, is where “a word or phrase carries more than one meaning in a particular 
context,” or in syntactic ambiguity where “the structure or grammar of a sentence renders 
the meaning of a word or phrase uncertain” (Herrick, 2015, p. 184). Other kinds of 
ambiguity abound, such as “lexical ambiguity,” “structural ambiguity,” “scope ambiguity” 
and “pragmatic ambiguity” (Audi, 2015, p. 27). Although ambiguity can often spawn 
obscurity of meaning, it can also result in clarity as well, such as in metaphor which “both 
conceals and reveals” (Kustas, 1973, p. 65). We all experience ambiguity differently, if 
only because our expressions and interpretations of the world around us are subjective and, 
consequently, affect us in variant ways. Neither are all ambiguities the same, for there also 
exist several classes of ambiguity which have at times been arranged into unique 
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categories: there have been claims for four types of ambiguity (Kaufer, 1983), or five types 
(Schultz, 1974), or six types (Wilkinson, 2006), or even seven types (Empson, 1966). It is 
indefinite to know precisely just how many classes of ambiguity there truly are, for the 
construction of its categories seems entirely begotten from context-driven invention. 
Quintilian (35-100 AD), for example, suggested that its “species are innumerable” 
(Institutes of Oratory, VII.ix.1). The ambiguity of ambiguity, therefore, requires some 
demonstration of its varieties as they also testify to the versatility, productivity, and 
creativity of occultic rhetoric.  
In his discussion of the Ethics of Speech Communication (1966), professor emeritus 
Thomas R. Nilsen of the University of Washington reminds us that “vagueness and 
ambiguity are [not] wrong in themselves. …There are also instances of their legitimate 
use.” He argues, 
If a speaker seeks to stimulate his listeners to feelings of 
national pride (certainly an acceptable purpose if done with 
prudence), he must realize that for different people different 
aspects of their national life are cause for pride, and the 
speaker can rightfully permit each listener to identify with 
that which is most meaningful to him. Where rigorous 
thought is needed, however, where decisions are being made 
on specific issues, such personal interpretations may be 
highly misleading, and the speaker has an ethical obligation 
to minimize them. If ambiguity is unavoidable, it should be 
made explicit. Where vagueness is unavoidable, the speaker 
should not claim more specificity than the terms warrant. 
(Nilsen, 1966, pp. 62-63) 
 
Nilsen’s ethics of ambiguity demonstrates that some forms of broad or vague 
communication are permissible if not necessary in certain situations. From this, it is easy 
to see how Nilsen’s ideas resonate with Kenneth Burke’s concept of identification—the 
idea that division is humanity’s natural state, and that the prospect of overcoming division 
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and establishing unity is the primary function of rhetoric. Ambiguous language, it seems, 
is a redeemable practice; it is not always a nefarious art deployed for purposes of secrecy, 
deception, and power-grabbing. There are authentic reasons for its use, and the 
communication scholar Eric Eisenberg of the University of South Florida has dedicated 
much of his career to defending its role in organizational life. In his famous article 
“Ambiguity as Strategy in Organizational Communication” (1984), he explained his 
concept of strategic ambiguity: 
Strategic ambiguity fosters the existence of multiple viewpoints in 
organizations. This use of ambiguity is commonly found in 
organizational missions, goals, and plans. When organizational goals are 
stated concretely, they are often strikingly ineffective. Strategic 
ambiguity is essential to organizing because it allows for multiple 
interpretations to exist among people who tend that they are attending to 
the same (8) message—i.e., perceive the message to be clear. It is a 
political necessity to engage in strategic ambiguity so that different 
constituent groups may apply different interpretations to the symbol. 
…For example, university faculty on any campus may take as their 
rallying point “academic freedom,” while at the same time maintaining 
markedly different interpretations of the concept. (Eisenberg, 2007, pp. 
8-9) 
 
The role of ambiguous language for individuals in leadership positions is vital to 
their management of social order and group cohesion. In fact, strategic ambiguity can be 
illustrated through four major functions: (1) to promote unified diversity, (2) to preserve 
privileged positions, (3) to foster deniability, and (4) to facilitate organizational change 
(Eisenberg, 2007, p. 3). These functions constitute legitimate uses of unclear language, and 
it fundamentally expands our understanding and appreciation of occultic rhetoric by 
challenging the notorious impression that it is all just a bunch of rhetorical black magic. 
There is a lot of white magic involved here as well—not that this should reduce occultic 
rhetoric to a mere ‘rhetoric of magic,’ but that it should be better understood as an 
exploration into the ‘magic of rhetoric.’ And even though the magic of such rhetoric can 
be deceptive in principle, this does not necessarily consign it to the province of evil or 
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immorality. If this were the case, no one would expect the religious tradition of Christianity 
(who Gunn blames as the main suppressor of the occult) to be accused of dabbling in such 
strategies of language; and yet, we discover lo and behold that Christ Himself is one of its 
most iconic practitioners.  
Consider the occultic function of the parable. Christ told approximately 40 
parables throughout his short-lived ministry, and they work as “a form of indirect 
communication intended to ‘deceive the hearer into truth,’” writes bible scholar Klyne 
Snodgrass (2008, p. 8). In other words, parables are a species of occultic rhetoric; they rely 
on a logic of discrimination between in-groups and out-groups. When the disciples asked 
Jesus: “Why do You speak to them in parables?” (Matthew 13:10), Jesus replied: “To you 
it has been granted to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, but to them it has not 
been granted. For whoever has, to him more shall be given, and he will have an abundance; 
but whoever does not have, even what he has shall be taken away from him. Therefore I 
speak to them in parables; because while seeing they do not see, and while hearing they do 
not hear, nor do they understand” (Luke 8:10). Christ’s parables served a two-fold purpose: 
(1) to reveal the truth to those who wanted to know it—those with “an honest and good 
heart, having heard the word, keep it, and bring forth fruit with patience” (Luke 8:15); and 
(2) to conceal the truth from those who were indifferent or hostile—such as the Pharisees 
who had publically rejected their Messiah. Christ’s parables were indirect and unclear to 
some, yet profound and instructive to others. However, “[w]hen He was alone with His 
own disciples, He explained everything” (Mark 4:34). Christ employed cautious ambiguity 
in his teachings in order to help his listeners ponder on his words and lessons. By allowing 
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a degree of open-endedness, Christ’s audience was invited to participate in the process of 
bringing their own experiences to his stories, and identifying the inherent truths within. 
It should be clear from the examples above that occultic rhetoric is not always 
wrong, if only because “…ambiguity has an extremely ambivalent status in rhetorical 
thinking,” writes communication scholar James Jasinski. “Ambiguity often is figured as a 
pharmakon (a Greek term meaning both poison and cure)” where it functions as “a 
potential linguistic poison that prevents understanding and human cooperation” as well as 
“a linguistic cure that enhances the possibility of understanding and cooperation” (Jasinski, 
2001, p. 8). The question of an ethics of ambiguity or occultic rhetoric comes down to 
deciphering when occultic rhetoric is being used as opposed to when it is being abused. 
What variables legitimize the practice of occultic rhetoric? What forms are condemnable, 
and what forms are condonable? To answer these questions, we must not assume that there 
is a universal (one-size-fits-all) method or rule that can apply in all situations apart from 
time and place—that would be a Kantian solution. Rather, I propose a Bokian solution, one 
which avoids sweeping generalizations by accounting for the particularities of social being. 
In her attempt to study a linguistic phenomenon that Gunn describes as difficult to capture, 
Bok turns towards a ‘case study’ methodology—but case studies of a very special sort. She 
locates specified case studies that attempt to justify acts of secretive and/or deceptive 
language. Her examples stem from a variety of sources, like literature, private life, and 
work. “While completeness is obviously out of the question,” she writes, “the cases 
selected may shed light on the major kinds of lies, ways in which they vary, and excuses 
used for telling them” (Bok, 1999, p. xxxiii). In other words, examples of lying through 
misleading, mystifying speech, or manipulating others through deceptive omissions 
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(secrecy) do not qualify (in and of themselves) as sufficient case studies for ethical 
investigation. “We need to look most searchingly, not at what we would all reject as 
unconscionable, but at those cases where many see good reasons to lie” (Bok, 1999, p. 
xxxiii). Here starts the beginning of an ethical discourse. 
 Bok’s attention to these particular kinds of case studies is a rhetorical approach to 
ethics. As Gunn himself accedes, “To understand something as ‘rhetorical’ is to understand 
it as negotiable, as a contingent and protean object that can only be discerned partially and 
indirectly through case studies” (2005, p. xxiii). By attending to case studies that 
specifically submit good reasons for dishonesty, we can glean the logic of these excuses 
for deception, and then broaden our knowledge enough to discern what forms of academic 
obfuscation are ethically justifiable. For instance, as was stated earlier, Bok lists four 
categories where secrecy has served basic moral practices: (1) when secrecy protects our 
identity, such as keeping our religious or political beliefs hidden; (2) when secrecy conceals 
our plans, such as devising covert strategies in a game of chess; (3) when secrecy enables 
certain actions, such as facilitating the element of surprise; and (4) when secrecy defends 
our property, such that valuable information is treated as an object of confidential 
importance (Bok, 1989, pp. 20-24). In addition to these basic defenses of secrecy and their 
contribution to human autonomy, Bok also lists four common justifications for the practice 
of untruthful speech: (1) lying to prevent harm, such as misleading Nazis of the 
whereabouts of Jewish fugitives; (2) lying to achieve an overriding benefit, such as sparing 
patients of the news that they are dying, (3) lying to comport with fairness, such as 
following in the rules of a poker game, and (4) lying to serve the cause of veracity, such as 
telling a child to feel safe because his closet was recently sprayed with anti-monster 
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repellant (Bok, 1999, pp. 78-86). In sum, these several arguments for the practice of 
secretive and deceptive language constitute as more than mere excuses, for excuses often 
attempt to remove fault or blame. But the above excuses do not attempt to dodge 
responsibility—rather, they qualify as positions that own up to their actions, and defend 
those actions by supplying reasons that justify their use. 
 Within each of these justifications, there is room for the practice of secrecy and lies 
to be corrupted and abused. But when exercised with prudence, they form a reasonable 
basis for allowing the exchange of ambiguous or untruthful communication. Now, in 
addition to this, there must be a driving context to guide these justifications. The context 
for the purposes of this project shall be limited to the rhetoric (and goal) of the academy. 
The primary goal of the academy is “education” or “demystification”; therefore, its 
function is explicitly didactic (or edifying). The aim of education is enlightenment (or to 
serve the transfer of knowledge). Who among us would seriously suggest that the genuine 
purpose of education is misinformation, or worse, disinformation? No, the purpose of 
education is quality information—it is about the advancement of truth and the regression 
of ignorance. In such a context, there is a moral obligation on all teachers and scholars to 
demystify the complex, to explain the difficult, to correct the error, or to clarify the obscure. 
Treating obfuscation as the end of education rather than as its cause is to turn the 
pedagogical process on its head. Obscurity is the condition that initiates learning and 
wonder; in fact, it is the very obstacle which education seeks to remedy. Obscurity of 
meaning constitutes the conditions that make education necessary, for the need for learning 
is initiated by overcoming that which is unknown or unclear. “Learning is a pragmatic 
communicative function in a moment in which clarity does not reign” (Arnett, Fritz, & 
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Bell, 2009, p. xiv). But once clarity is achieved, then understanding can be secured. 
Learning is not an end in itself, but rather a means to an end (that being knowledge and 
understanding). 
 But the academy suffers from a rhetorical sickness known as academese. 
Academese is my shorthand way of expressing my concern for how far the standards of 
educated language has fallen. Spanning centuries of academic tradition, illumination was 
privileged over darkness—the triumph of truth over falsehood, fact over fiction. This 
hierarchical structure was also a moral structure that even played itself out in the dyad 
between expert and amateur. The amateur (or learner) is subordinate to the expert (or 
teacher), much like children are subordinate to their parents. As parents bear the 
responsibility of raising their children, so do children bear the responsibility of obeying 
their parents. The end of good parenting, after all, is to raise children who will grow into 
good parents themselves; and so the same expectations can hold out for the relationship 
between expert-teachers and amateur-students. This expert-amateur relationship can even 
be reflected in the very logic of discrimination that undergirds the structure of occultic 
rhetoric—where knowledge is possessed by an in-group over and against an out-group. But 
in the academic context, the expert in-group is responsible for ensuring the transfer of 
knowledge to the amateur out-group. And so, the academic tradition has been for experts 
to assume the role of pedagogues (teachers), and the amateurs to assume the role of pupils 
(students). But in the contemporary climate of academic language, many experts have 
foresworn their duty toward clear and profitable instruction, and have instead adopted the 
role of the mystagogue.  
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“[T]his is really and specially the age of mystagogues,” writes G. K. Chesterton 
(1874-1936) in his essay Aristocrats as Mystagogues, sometimes titled Demagogues and 
Mystagogues. “The demagogue succeeds because he makes himself understood, even if he 
is not worth understanding. But the mystagogue succeeds because he gets himself 
misunderstood; although, as a rule, he is not even worth misunderstanding” (Chesterton, 
1987, pp. 31-32). Mystagogy, it seems, has come to replace the traditional function of 
pedagogy in common, academic discourse. With this being the case, learning is no longer 
possible in an environment where knowledge is hoarded or kept hidden. Mirroring Gunn’s 
criticism of the arrogant and aristocratic professor Boris Balkan, Chesterton points out that 
“[a]n aristocracy is a secret society”; it is an in-group that subscribes to an exclusive 
language so that people “can be more effectively kept at a distance” (Chesterton, 1987, p. 
34). This exclusive language is what Chesterton referred to as a Modern Jargon, an 
“impudent piece of pedantry” often characterized by “the habit of arbitrarily changing the 
ends of abstract words (which are bad enough already so as to make them sound more 
learned),” such as changing Christianity to Christianism, or Ethics to Ethology (Chesterton, 
1987, p. 338). “What the deuce is Ethology?” Chesterton asks.  “[T]here seems to be a 
curiously bloodless and polysyllabic style now adopted for the discussion of the most direct 
and intimate matters” (Chesterton, 1987, p. 339). While Chesterton agrees with Gunn about 
the impudent or pedantic status of modern, academic jargon, he does however stand 
squarely opposed to Gunn’s principle of ineffability. In his poem Mystagogue, Chesterton 
contends that truth, or any ideas of serious merit, will always strive toward communication 
rather than remain incommunicable. 
Whenever you hear much of things being unutterable and indefinable 
and impalpable and unnamable and subtly indescribable, then elevate 
your aristocratic nose towards heaven and snuff up the smell of decay. It 
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is perfectly true that there is something in all good things that is beyond 
all speech or figure of speech. But it is also true that there is in all good 
things a perpetual desire for expression and concrete embodiment; and 
though the attempt to embody it is always inadequate, the attempt is 
always made. If the idea does not seek to be the word, the chances are 
that it is an evil idea. If the word is not made flesh it is a bad word. 
(Chesterton, 1912, p. 174) 
 
 The thrust of Chesterton’s critique stems from his conviction in the notion that 
goodness always tends towards “Incarnation,” while the trend of evil will always hide 
itself, remaining shapeless, wordless, unutterable. The Devil is worshiped as “the 
unspeakable name” (Chesterton, 1912, p. 175). Chesterton’s philosophy is unequivocally 
pedagogical; it reflects a bias toward publicity rather than secrecy, to manifest and debate 
rather than leave vacant or unexplained. And it is in this sense that it also mirrors the 
theological impulse of the Great Commission—to preach the truth boldly, always and 
everywhere, instead of opting for silence or mystification.  Mystagogy, like Lutz’s 
doublespeak, is a corruption of pedagogical practice—it is language that pretends to share 
knowledge, but really doesn’t. Authentic pedagogues on the other hand undertake the 
valiant task of moving from the unintelligible to the intelligible, from darkness to light; but 
mystagogues seem to prefer lingering in the shade. “They can explain nothing because they 
have found nothing; and they found nothing because there is nothing to be found” 
(Chesterton, 1912, pp. 181). Because of this difference, both Chesterton and Bok endorse 
a pedagogical philosophy—a philosophy that privileges the light of publicity over the 
darkness of secrecy. In fact, as far as Chesterton is concerned, mystagogy is just a worse 
kind of demagoguery—“it is more vulgar than being a demagogue; because it is much 
easier” (Chesterton, 1987, p. 33). Thus, both Chesterton and Bok reject Gunn’s 
mystagogical philosophy of ineffability, and instead promote the value of public, 
intelligible communication. 
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 The association of pedagogy with clear communication must be renewed; we must 
return to the traditional purpose of education, which is the sharing or transfer of knowledge. 
In other words, I offer a parallel presumption to Bok’s Principle of Veracity: that we all 
should, in the absence of special considerations, strive for accuracy and precision in our 
teaching. Whereas mystagogues operate under the presumption of the “Dr. Fox 
Hypothesis”—that “researchers who want to impress colleagues should write less 
intelligible papers”—pedagogues undertake the opposite presumption of the 
“Communication-for-Knowledge Hypothesis”—that “researchers should invest energy in 
developing understandable ways to present their findings” (Armstrong, 1982, p. 30). In 
order to live within a reasonably informed society, we as scholars in rhetoric must 
recognize the role of style in the means by which we inform the public. Inspired by Bok’s 
work, I submit a similar presumption which can be called the Principle of Clarity: an a 
priori ethical obligation among academics to share their knowledge plainly and directly, 
for the benefit of both the public and the professoriate. Unfortunately, at present, “[c]lear 
communication is not appreciated. Faculty are impressed by less readable articles. Lack of 
clarity is especially helpful when content is poor” (Armstrong, 1982, p. 32). By submitting 
this presumption as a primary commandment of academic communication, we can set a 
new standard of intellectual engagement that erodes the negative connotations of the 
academic profession, and restore the value of scholarly expertise necessary for the 
functioning of a more informed society.  
In order to cultivate this society, we must rejuvenate the virtue of clarity alongside 
Bok’s principle of veracity; this move will demonstrate academia’s humility and good will 
to the public, in addition to offsetting the impressions of secrecy, snottiness, arrogance, 
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pridefulness, superiority, pedantry, priggishness, and impudence that Gunn, Garber, 
Barzun, Bok, Lutz, Chesterton, Sokal, and others have so thoroughly reported about earlier. 
The test of clarity, like that of veracity, must enter into the marketplace and engage people 
on their own grounds. This form of communicative engagement is a true hallmark of 
academic humility, as was displayed in the work of Paulo Freire (1921-1997). “Not all 
students in a class are brilliant, but mentors meet students on the ground where they walk 
rather than the soil on which we demand their presence,” writes communication ethicist 
Ronald Arnett in his analysis of Freire’s revolutionary pedagogy. “To fail to meet a student 
on his or her historical ground courts pessimism on our part as underprepared students 
disappoint us. Meeting the historical situation and rejecting the temptation to focus on our 
own ideals require us to engage life on its own terms, not in terms of our own demands” 
(Arnett, 2002, p. 505). The revolutionary element in Freire’s pedagogy is its humility, one 
that harmonizes with the principle of clarity since it compels the expert to meet the amateur 
on their own terms, literally (by translating the unintelligible into a terminology that the 
student or uninformed scholar can understand). Such is the method by which scholars in 
the liberal arts are able to walk the humanities into the marketplace, as reflected in Bok’s 
justification procedure (a morality-testing method that is geared toward publicity). 
Striving for clarity and veracity are acts that exude a concern for the welfare of 
others, particularly the public marketplace, and other non-expert outsiders The three levels 
of Bok’s justification procedure is a method for determining the justifiability of deception 
by moving increasingly toward the public realm. In order to test when occultic rhetoric is 
ever justifiable, I submit that we apply the same logic of her procedure here: (1) we 
scrutinize our conscience—where academicians should weigh the reasons for occultic 
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rhetoric within their own minds; (2) we solicit helpful advice—where academicians should 
weigh the reasons for occultic rhetoric with fellow allies and wise experts; and (3) we enter 
into public debate—when academicians should weigh the reasons for occultic rhetoric with 
all outsiders, especially those of whom this rhetoric will affect the most. As Bok exclaims, 
“publicity is connected more directly to veracity than to other moral principles” (Bok, 
1999, p. 92). The reason for this is because, from an ethical perspective, the public provides 
the greatest weight in approving the justification of certain moral practices. “Moral 
justification, therefore, cannot be exclusive or hidden; it has to be capable of being made 
public” (Bok, 1999, p. 92). Bok’s focus on publicity is a rhetorical understanding of ethics 
by the way it engages the polis—all members of the assembly, not just the self or a secret 
minority—to participate in the process of moral decision making. By assigning publicity 
as the metric by which we justify certain exceptions to the ethical rule, her philosophy in 
fact reflects the spirit of the Golden Rule, taking into consideration the perspective of 
reasonable persons—those persons who would be most affected by such exceptions. “The 
test of publicity asks which lies, if any, would survive the appeal for justification to 
reasonable persons” (Bok, 1999, p. 93).  
Inherent to Bok’s philosophy of communication is an emphasis on human 
relationships, particularly between insiders and outsiders—hence her stress on the public 
(not the individual) as the province of justification. The interconnection between these two 
groups (expert and amateur; private and public; teacher and student) is what allows Bok to 
“recognize communication as a relational process” (Makau, 1991, p. 119). But part of being 
in a relational process carries the dilemma of how to assign fault amidst instances of 
occultic communication: Who is to blame when unintelligibility arises? Is blame to be 
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attributed to the student’s ignorance, or to the mystifying professor? How can we determine 
whether occultic rhetoric is in fact the result of expert intention, or amateur 
interpretation? Because rhetoric can be simultaneously revealing and ambiguous, the 
question of how to study it has thrown up many differences in opinion. For example, the 
contemporary British historian of rhetoric Richard Toye at the University of Exeter reports 
how George Orwell (1903-1950) and other advocates of plain-speech in the ‘rhetoric 
exposed’ school had emphasized intention over interpretation. From this perspective, 
Orwell placed greater responsibility on the clarity of speakers and leaders, having 
concentrated on “denouncing perceived abuses of language by contemporary politicians” 
(Toye, 2013, p. 60). In contrast to this, Toye then showcased Roland Barthes (1915-1980) 
and the ‘New Critics’ of the mid-twentieth century who began to challenge this approach 
by privileging the audience over the author, or the interpretation over intention. In other 
words, these literary critics argued that the message of a text was gathered only by how an 
audience understood it, rather than by what the author meant by it. As far as the New Critics 
were concerned, the author was dead, his or her intentions were indeterminable, and any 
biographical context should be kept irrelevant to the process of reaching a text’s meaning 
(Wimsatt & Beardsley, 1954; Barthes, 1967). 
But the logic of the New Critics often showed signs of confusion, “descending at 
times into quasi-mysticism about the role of the reader” (Toye, 2013, p. 64). I submit that 
the privileging of either intention or interpretation over one or the other is a mistaken way 
to characterize the link between these two rhetorical (or hermeneutical) concepts. Similar 
to Bok’s insight about the bond between ethics and epistemology (Bok, 1999, p. 13), I 
argue that ‘it is possible to go beyond the notion that one is somehow prior to the other. 
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The two nourish one another, but neither can claim priority.’ Like Bok, I argue for a middle 
path: that intention and interpretation are rhetorically co-dependent concepts. As Eric 
Eisenberg has pointed out, researchers have remained “vague about the locus of ambiguity, 
i.e., whether it resides in the source’s intentions, the receiver’s interpretations, or in the 
message itself.” He seems to suggest that because fault is too difficult to locate in any one 
of these things, the relational process indicts them all as partially responsible. “[T]he 
concept of an ideally clear message is misleading in fundamental ways. Clarity (and 
conversely, ambiguity) is not an attribute of messages; it is a relational variable which 
arises through a combination of source, message, and receiver factors” (Eisenberg, 2007, 
pp. 6-7). Eisenberg advances a “contextual view of meaning,” one which considers 
identifying the locus (or blame) of ambiguity “an impossible task.” This does not, however, 
change the fact that fault or blame is real; only that it is difficult at times to ascertain.  
But I digress: the object here is not meant to be one of hermeneutics, but rather 
ethics—it is not about locating a method or mechanism for determining what qualifies as, 
or who is necessarily more to blame for, ambiguous communication; rather, it is about 
focusing on the reasons we advance in order to justify the intentional practice of rhetorical 
ambiguity. As such, Eisenberg focuses majorly on the role of the intender rather than that 
of the interpreter, having “limit[ed] the discussion to those instances where individuals use 
ambiguity purposefully to accomplish their goals,” rather than devote much attention to 
those instances of “perceived ambiguity” which he describes as a “psychological variable” 
distinct from strategic ambiguity (Eisenberg, 2007, p. 7). Still, this interactional view 
should not imply that the interpreter holds no degree of responsibility; in fact, if the 
philosopher Diane Davis is correct, the very idea of responsibility—or “response-
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ability”—is inseparable from the obligations of the attentive listener (Davis, 2010). Active 
listening is a condition of ethical communication, for the sharing of meaning is never 
without the simultaneous transaction of speaking and listening. Listening, therefore, is a 
‘response-ability’ or “pact” (Gunn, 2018, p. 35) foundational to the function of all 
communication. Thus, in the context of academia, the amateur listener or interpreter has 
an obligation to listen actively, and to read closely. As was the lesson in Sokal’s hoax, 
journal editors who are not actively understanding what they are reading have no business 
working in the academic publication industry. At the same time, we ought to neither 
assume that a text is always dubious whenever its meaning is not immediately apparent or 
intelligible to us. 
In cases where messages fail to be understood, we as listeners and interpreters have 
an obligation to neither endorse nor condemn the message; rather, we must remain neutral, 
or in a sense, agnostic. To drive this point closer to home, the academic audience must be 
wary of avoiding two hermeneutical snares: (1) the Overreading Principle, and (2) the 
Noseeum Principle. Starting with the former, I draw from Colin Davis’s text Critical 
Excess (2010) in order to define the Overreading principle as an activity that “refuse[s] 
the hermeneutic regulation of interpretation,” which is to say, it “entails a willingness to 
test or to exceed the constraints which restrict the possibilities of meaning released by a 
work” (Davis, 2010, p. ix). The overreading principle goes beyond the symbolic stops of 
the author, violating the limits of interpretation contra Aleister Crowley’s ‘hermeneutics of 
authority.’ Overreading is an abuse of interpretation which the semiotician and literary 
critic Umberto Eco (1932-2016) called “overinterpretation.” In his work Interpretation and 
Overinterpretation (1990), Eco asked, “by what criterion do we decide that a given textual 
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interpretation is an instance of overinterpretation? One can object that in order to define a 
bad interpretation one needs the criteria for defining a good interpretation. I think on the 
contrary that we can accept a sort of Popper-like principle according to which if there are 
no rules that help to ascertain which interpretations are the ‘best’ ones, there is at least a 
rule for ascertaining which ones are ‘bad’” (Eco, 1990, p. 169). Eco sought a standard of 
hermeneutic falsifiability that still allowed multiple interpretations to arise, but argued that 
some interpretations were better than others. 
Overreading is one example where interpretations can go awry, as evident by the 
various hoaxes formerly discussed in the literature review. For example, the journal editors 
at Cogent Social Sciences read Peter Boghossian and James Lindsay’s “The Conceptual 
Penis as a Social Construct”; and instead of seeing it for the rubbish it truly was, the editors 
overread the faux article as a stimulating project worthy of publication. They perceived 
something meaningful in a text which was intentionally meaningless (or, to be more fair, 
meaningful insofar as parodies go). Peering into an unclear text and deriving 
comprehension is a suspect way of doing hermeneutics, and the vice of the overreading 
principle has much to blame for that. As Richard Johanessen points out, “it seems ethically 
dubious to lack understanding of an argument but to pretend to agree with it in order to 
mask our lack of comprehension” (Johanessen, 2008, p. 122). This was the failure of Alan 
Sokal’s reviewers in Social Text; it was the failure of the dissertation advisors of the 
Bogndanov twins; and it continues to be the failure of journal editors world-wide whose 
chronic support for mystagogical prose fuels the standards of the Dr. Fox Hypothesis. 
The second snare to be mindful of is the Noseeum principle—the assumption that 
the absence of evidence is justified as the evidence of absence. Noseeum arguments are 
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probabilistic arguments that rely on the condition that, more likely than not, the item in 
question would be detectable if existent. For example, we can apply the Noseeum principle 
by asking ourselves if there is an elephant in the living room. If we check the living room 
and see no elephant, then the principle allows us to be justified in the knowledge that there 
is no elephant in the living room. But if we were to ask ourselves if a sandflea is in the 
living room, then the justification allowed by the principle would certainly be much harder 
to satisfy. It seems that the Noseeum rule admits exceptions depending on reasonable 
expectations of the “seeability” of the item in question. Thus, in the context of academic 
communication, freshman-level students and other amateur interpreters may be impatient 
with the rhetoric of scholarly texts, and condemn them as too difficult to understand. They 
may also rashly assume that because the meaning of a text is not readily apparent to them, 
they are justified in concluding that the text is therefore meaningless and worthless. But 
this would commit a faulty application of the Noseeum principle.  
Imagine a student who finds a philosophy manuscript in the library. It 
has many sections that seem utterly meaningless. (I certainly hope that 
this example does not apply to this book.) The student is about to dismiss 
the paper as nonsense, until it occurs to him that a distinguished 
philosopher may have written it. Philosophers are known to write 
specialized papers that are intelligible only to a small group of their 
peers. So the student’s Noseeum case fails. There is no warrant for the 
students to say, “I don’t see the merit of this paper, therefore it doesn’t 
have merit.” If the paper did have merit, the student is not likely to have 
seen it anyway! Notice that the Noseeum case fails even if we aren’t sure 
that the paper was in fact written by a distinguished philosopher. The 
mere possibility that it was is enough to defeat the student’s presumption 
that “there is no merit to this paper.” (D’Souza, 2013, pp. 69-70) 
 
Such is the risk with all probabilistic arguments, for no amount of probability can 
amount to absolute certainty. Still, not to be entirely sidetracked by these hermeneutical 
considerations, the Noseeum principle does suggest some important ethical implications 
for the active listener. In order for listeners to be ‘response-able’ actors in the academic 
community, they must apply the Noseeum principle virtuously, understanding the nuances 
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that allow certain exceptions, and made aware of the fact that, in the absence of clarity, the 
honest adoption of epoché (the suspension of judgment) is the ethically preferable choice 
over other options regarding works that we do not fully understand. By rejecting difficult 
theoretical rhetoric as meaningless (without first understanding its meaninglessness) is no 
more arrogant on the part of the interpreter than the editors’ endorsement of difficult 
theoretical articles as meaningful (without first understanding their meaningfulness). What 
is needed for the outsider/interpreter to exercise their rhetorical (or hermeneutical) 
obligations more ethically is if they apply the Noseeum principle more judiciously, having 
patience and humility with difficult texts before reaching the hasty conclusion that the text 
is nonsense all because the meaning is not (yet) evident to them. 
This project does not claim to exhaust all the ethical inquiries from every 
conceivable scenario of occultic communication in academia; but having so far offered 
some coordinates on the ethical duties of the outsider/interpreter, I now shift my attention 
primarily on the ethical duties of the insider/intender. When we intend to deploy occultic 
rhetoric, there is a greater responsibility placed upon us than if our obscurities were the 
result of sloppiness. As Bok has pointed out, “There is a large category of statements where 
deceit is not intended, but truthful communication is far from being achieved” (Bok, 1999, 
p.xxi). When occultic rhetoric is only apparent—without occultic intent—then whatever 
may be perceived as occultic in our speech or texts is a mere product of incidence, free 
from ethical guilt. Consider, for example, the innocent trust we place in superstitions or 
illogical thoughts. The philosopher Nicholas Rescher at the University of Pittsburgh 
believes that the unintentional or accidental use of unsound evidence or illogical reasoning 
is not a moral or ethical issue: “the obligation to be rational is not a moral obligation, and 
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lapses from rationality are not moral lapses” (Rescher, 1977, p. 80). A defective 
intelligence, he says, is guilty of ‘gaffes,’ but not ‘sins.’ Therefore, Rescher contends that 
only when occultic rhetoric is not just apparent, but legitimate—when we deliberately set 
out to deceive others by means of improper reasoning or fallacious, equivocating 
language—do we become “morally culpable,” (Rescher, 1977, p. 81). The propagation of 
logical fallacies, as a form of occultic rhetoric, if used disingenuously, becomes tantamount 
to lying and dishonesty.  
Our intentions (even if not fully actualized) are not the only variables at play in the 
ethics of occultic rhetoric. There is also the matter of duties. Duties are ethical obligations 
tethered to the particularity of contexts whenever and wherever they arise, and so the 
natural shifting of these contexts will always alter the ethical demands placed upon us 
according to time and place. Being a speaker in a political context, for example, will permit 
different standards of ambiguous communication than if the speaker were in a relaxed 
context. Other scholars, like Sister Miriam Joseph (1898-1982), have made similar points 
about how ethical duties fluctuate with the changing of our circumstances: “Although 
ambiguity is a fault to be carefully guarded against in purely intellectual communications, 
it is sometimes deliberatively sought in aesthetical or literary communication” (Joseph, 
2002, p. 42). It would seem that the ‘appropriateness’ (tu prepon) of rhetorical style (of 
either clarity or obscurity) is determined by the ethical duties inherent within each and 
every ‘opportune moment’ (kairos) of human communication. What this means is that not 
all contexts demand rhetorical clarity: “practical experience suggests that complete clarity, 
despite our professed desire to achieve it, is not always the best rhetorical strategy” 
(Jasinski, 2001, p. 9). Sometimes clarity can leave no wiggle room for negotiation; it can 
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even result in acts of truth-dumping, where “parents…bombard their children with 
criticisms, spouses who gloomily dwell on each other’s dreariest traits, curt health 
professionals who shock unprepared patients with grim new—all may be telling the truth 
even as they violate fundamental standards of respect and concern” (Bok, 1999, p. xxii-
xxiii). These examples reveal how our circumstances give rise to different ethical rules that 
determine the appropriateness of rhetorical style. 
But in the case of academic rhetoric, the expectation of plain and direct speech is 
preferable for the aims of pedagogy. Within a pedagogical context, the Communication-
for-Knowledge hypothesis must be the standard practice governing academic discourse. 
Even Richard Johanessen affirms the observation that “[m]ost people probably would agree 
that intentional ambiguity is unethical in situations where accurate instruction or efficient 
transmission of precise information is the acknowledged purpose. Even in most so-called 
persuasive communication situations, intentional ambiguity would be ethically suspect. 
However, in some situations communicators may feel that the intentional creation of 
ambiguity or vagueness is necessary, accepted, expected as normal, and even ethically 
justified” (Johanessen, 2008, p. 106). One example where academicians can be justified in 
overriding the principle of clarity is when teachers, like Jesus Christ from earlier, use 
parables, allegories, metaphors, and other forms of ambiguity (or defamiliarization) to 
teach lessons that stimulate contemplation through analogies. But notice how this form of 
ambiguity is beneficent and instructive. In a context where non-expert audiences are 
present to learn, the pedagogical use of ambiguity can be rewarding without relying on its 
capacity for confusion or concealment. Unlike Christ’s audience, many of whom were 
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hostile to his message, the academic audience is geared toward a desire to understand—for 
that is the very reason why the academy exists. 
Other forms of ambiguity are pardonable if not unavoidable, such as the word 
rhetoric which is itself a necessarily ambiguous term. But beyond these sorts of 
justifications, there simply is no reason to obstruct the learning of others when the ethical 
responsibility of the academy is to teach and communicate knowledge. It may be helpful 
therefore to distinguish between two forms of ambiguity: the ‘determinate’ form (which, 
as mentioned, is helpful and therefore justifiable), and the ‘indeterminate’ form (which is 
intended to shun the Other). The indeterminacy of ambiguous language—stemming from 
the indeterminacy thesis which is nothing more than Gunn’s principle of ineffability by a 
different term (Jasinski, 2001, p. 9)—refers to a type of ambiguity that misleads or 
confounds the audience rather than enlightens them. It is this type of rhetorical obscurity 
that Aristotle warns against in his Rhetoric: 
avoid ambiguities; unless indeed you definitively desire to be 
ambiguous, as those do who have nothing to say but are pretending to 
mean something. Such people are apt to put that sort of thing into verse. 
Empedocles, for instance, by his long circumlocutions imposes on his 
hearers; these are affected in the same way as most people are when they 
listen to diviners, whose ambiguous utterances are received with nods of 
acquiescence… Diviners use these vague generalities about the matter in 
hand because their predictions are thus, as a rule, less likely to be 
falsified. We are more likely to be right, in the game of ‘odd and even’, 
if we simply guess ‘even’ or ‘odd’ than if we guess at the actual number; 
and the oracle-monger is more likely to be right if he simply says that a 
thing will happen than if he says when it will happen and therefore have 
a definite date. All these ambiguities have the same sort of effect, and 
are to be avoided unless we have some such object as that mentioned. 
(Aristotle, 1952, p. 658). 
 
Within certain contexts, like in a game of poker, such attempts at ambiguous or 
deceptive communication can be found justifiable. But within academia, where the explicit 
goal is pedagogical and intrinsically biased toward the advancement of accuracy and truth, 
the practices of mystification cannot be justified. The scholarly enterprise bears an ethical 
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expectation toward the humanistic ideal of sharing knowledge, not occluding it. By 
overriding the principle of clarity in such a context is, therefore, unethical. As others have 
pointed out, “[f]rom a pragmatic standpoint, vagueness is only perceived a fault when a 
speaker deliberately violates ‘reasonable expectations’ about specification levels, when a 
speaker reneges on an obligation to inform and/or withholds information another has a right 
to know” (Kaufer, 1983, p. 211). The amateur’s right to gain knowledge is interlocked with 
the expert’s obligation to give knowledge. Failure to recognize the link between rights and 
responsibilities, we can only expect, will result in the very conditions that prompt Gunn’s 
warning about the Great Magi: “the rhetorical lesson to be learned from the Great Magi of 
modernity is an ethical one,” one that has “to do with the ways in which we ignore or forget 
those whom we exclude or discipline with our words in here, in the academy” (Gunn, 2005, 
p. 234). It is therefore important to cultivate a virtuous sense of discretion when it comes 
to our uses of occultic rhetoric.  
As Bok makes clear, it is only through the maturity of discretion that one can be 
sensitive to the duties or expectations that impinge upon us from the ever-changing cycle 
of contexts that qualify every moment of existence. She writes, “This ability, which I have 
called discretion, therefore calls for the judgment to pick and choose among incoming 
messages and possible outgoing ones: and thus in turn for sensitivity to certain forms of 
manipulative rhetoric and advocacy, whether in family or group settings or in such large-
scale practices as advertising or campaign bombast” (Bok, 1989, p. 43). While Bok and 
Gunn may differ on some fundamental principles of language, they both recognize the 
values of humility and respect for the Other. Without a maturity of discretion, the 
relationship between expert and amateur—insider and outsider—can become uncharitable 
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and sadistic. This moral failure is what led to the demise of the Great Modern Magus in 
the first place. But we in the academy can learn from the mistakes of the occult, by 
“recognizing our ignorance and celebrating the virtue of humility” (Gunn, 2005, p. 235). 
To exercise humility, we need to manage the boundary between expert and amateur with 
greater care. “Learning to handle secrecy with discretion blends with and reflects moral 
development. In each, one must come to see oneself and others as capable of moral choice 
and as owed respect” (Bok, 1989, p. 44). Only then can occultic rhetoric be exercised 




“We struggle all our days with misunderstandings, and no apology is required for 
any study which can prevent or remove them. Of course, inevitably at present, we have no 
measure with which to calculate the extent and degree of our hourly losses in 
communication,” wrote the iconic rhetorician I. A. Richards (1893-1979). In some ways, 
the logic of this project can be attributed to his philosophy of rhetoric which he defined as 
“the study of misunderstanding and its remedies” (Richards, 1939, p. 3). Occultic rhetoric 
indubitably fosters misunderstanding through the manipulation of unfamiliar, technical, 
coded, or ambiguous word choice and arrangement; it confounds outsiders and insulates 
knowledge among insiders. While not all instances of occultic rhetoric or occluded 
meaning are intended by the speaker/author, we have witnessed a panoply of examples 
where obfuscation is the explicit aim of many within the academic community. This move 
away from pedagogy toward mystagogy is worrisome for the future of academia. In fact, 
the effects of occultic rhetoric can be distressing to society at large. As the historian Steven 
Fischer explains, “A society also obfuscates, lies and deceives through language, with dire 
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consequences for the personal freedoms of its members who are thereby deprived of their 
right of achieving a democratic consent. Such misuse of language is a symptom of an ill 
society. In the past, governments which have practised this misuse for a protracted period 
have invariably perished” (Fischer, 1999, p. 191). Peril, it seems, awaits all who abuse the 
justifiable limits of occultic rhetoric. But this need not be the future of the academy. 
In order to subdue the abuses of occultic rhetoric, we must adhere to a principle of 
clarity as the standard style of academic communication. Style has a complex (perhaps 
inseparable) relationship with content, controlling the ways in which information is 
understood. In his Rhetoric, Aristotle affirmed that “Style to be good must be clear, as is 
proved by the fact that speech which fails to convey a plain meaning will fail to do just 
what speech has to do” (Aristotle, 1952, p. 654). Occultic style on the other hand strives 
too often toward indeterminate ambiguity rather than disambiguation (the reduction of 
uncertainty in meaning or interpretation). Hence, the remedy to occultic rhetoric may rest 
in what some have called the Plain Language movement. The call for plain and direct 
speech can be heard at times from various scholars frustrated by the inscrutability of, say, 
postmodernist prose, such as the historian of science Michael Shermer who proclaimed: 
“It’s time we put a stop to the lunacy and demand critical thinking and clear 
communication” (Sokal, 2017). Plain Language is more or less a movement among 
technical and professional communication scholars who see clarity as a virtue worth 
promoting in all manners of social, legal, and organizational discourse. In Plain Language 
and Ethical Action (2015), Russell Willerton of Boise State University explains that 
“[p]lain language gives citizens and consumers better access to their rights, and it combats 
the information apartheid that convoluted, overly complicated documents generate.” 
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Unfortunately, he admits, “I have been both surprised and a bit dismayed that plain 
language has not received much attention in the field’s publications” (Willerton, 2015, p. 
xiii). One reason for this lack of reception, I presume, stems from the insecurities of 
persistent, ambitious scholars, indicating academia’s enduring commitment to, and 
prolonged dependence on, occultic modes of speech. 
Such anxieties were hinted at earlier when Gunn lamented: “as our jobs becomes 
less plentiful and tenure goes the way of the dodo, as resources become more scarce and 
we are made to compete for a sense of security, the pressure to produce the contentious, 
argumentative… ‘theory Nazi’ is increasing” (Gunn, 2005, p. 235). It would seem that the 
ascendancy of ‘theor-ese,’ as it were, is proportionately attributable to a profit motive, a 
motive to attain a career, to preserve one’s status, and to ascend the intellectual hierarchy. 
This explains why the ethics of plain language has not received as much attention in the 
academic literature. When diplomas and faculty positions are put on the line, our 
pedagogical obligations to ethical standards of clarity are compromised and demoted in 
favor of a rhetorical style that (although less intelligible) we trust will better ensure the 
achievement of our personal aims. This is the great secret—the “ruse”—of the academy, 
argues Gunn; “the content running cover for form” (Gunn, 2005, p. 236). We turn to style 
when argument is lacking. Or, if you can’t convince them, confuse them. Such is the risk 
of clarity; or, to repeat the earlier phrase: “the profit motive is dangerous because ethics 
are expensive” (Boghossian & Lindsay, 2017). This is the reasoning that guides most 
academicians today, and which also led the British philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872-
1970) to give the following advice: “I suggest to young professors that their first work 
should be written in a jargon only to be understood by the erudite few. With that behind 
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them, they can ever after say what they have to say in a language ‘understanded of the 
people’” (Russell, 2009, p. 37). Who could deny that the profit motive is compelling? Even 
Russell condones it. Why honor our duty to clarity if it is so costly?  
I want to conclude this project by challenging the assumption that (plain language) 
ethics is expensive. Maybe it is to some; but not to those who have nothing to hide. In 
Writing for Dollars, Writing to Please: The Case for Plain Language in Business, 
Government, and Law (2012), professor emeritus Joseph Kimble of Western Michigan 
University dispels ten of the most common myths against plain language (e.g., plain 
language is anti-intellectual, or plain language earns less prestige, etc.), and summarized 
fifty studies showing that using plain language can actually save tons of money for 
businesses, organizations, and governments. If plain language can accomplish this much 
in other sectors of society, imagine how it could restore faith in public institutions like the 
modern academy. Contrary to Gunn’s account, the benefits of clarity are not costly, but 
rather cost-effective. Other scholars agree that plainness of speech would lead to 
improvements in the quality of academic journals: “Such a program would aid in the 
communication of knowledge. It's cheap. It's needed. Let's do it. Now!” (Armstrong, 1982, 
p. 32). So which is it? Are ethics cheap, or are they expensive? Between clarity and 
obscurity, it might simply depend on what we deem as profitable. For many unintelligible 
scholars, occultic rhetoric has won them fame, prestige, disciples, and influence. But for 
those of us concerned about academic integrity, one cannot traverse this carnival of 
confusion without, at times, wondering: What does the academy profit if it gains the whole 
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